MORAL VALUES AND THE MORAL LIFE

The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas

BY

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

In search of the scheme of moral values in Thomas Aquinas, I have found nothing more convincing than this study by M. Gilson. A theory of moral values almost evidently must, as a contemporary has urged, work out into a system, an integral and harmonious way of human life; and it seems that such a view is at least implied by nearly all writers on the subject. If this is so, students may hardly neglect the present statement of the ethics of Thomism, which aims to give, and I think does give, a good deal in the way of both completeness and effectiveness to the moral life.

The translation is from the fourth edition (Paris, J. Gabalda, 1925). Of course, the thought and the words of Saint Thomas are in all instances translated from the original Latin.

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INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR

Thomas was born in 1225 at the Castle of Roccasecca of the noble family of the counts of Aquino, and given at the age of five by his parents to the neighboring abbey of Montecassino, with the hope of seeing him become abbot so as greatly to further their own influence. After ten years with the Benedictines he was sent to the University of Naples, where he met the followers of Saint Dominic and made up his mind to join them. But his people objected, because his plan interfered with theirs. He won against their stand, however, and studied at the University of Paris from 1245 to 1248 under the direction of Albert the Great; then at Cologne under the same master from 1248 to 1252. In that year he returned to Paris, where he took his degree and taught until 1259; then till 1268 he taught in Italy, most of the time at the papal court, and came a second time to teach at Paris from 1268 to 1272, when he left for Italy to teach theology at Naples. Called by Pope Gregory X to the Council of Lyons, he fell sick on the way and died on March 7, 1274, at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanuova near Terracina.

After a life comparatively short but fully given to

intellectual labor, Saint Thomas left a notable product: a whole series of commentaries on the main works of Aristotle, compiled and edited steadily from 1265 till the time of his death, and such as to give us a key to the philosophical elements of all his teachings; a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the *Summa Contra Gentes,* a *Manual of Theology* and the *Summa Theologica,* which form an ordered statement of everything he taught; then a group of *Questiones Quodlibetales* and *Disputatae,* in which we find the profoundest treatment Saint Thomas has bequeathed us on the many problems which he studied; and a collection of *Opuscula,* one of which at least we find indispensable for explaining his views on government.

The great richness of this intellectual fruit can be understood only as the work of a choice disposition and of habits of a life of labor exceptionally well controlled. In fact, tradition represents him as a man of vast size, extremely fat, habitually quiet in manner, and we shall see, on his own word, that he thought the ideal human life to be one that is contemplative all the time, except for the intermissions needed to rest without interrupting it. We should get a most incorrect idea of his life if we did not remember that the secret spring which never ceased to be its soul, was a deeply religious inspiration. It is true that the whole bent of his thought was given to forming an integral synthesis of Christian thought and chiefly to bringing to light the unity

of a system of ideas through which we can express in the same language and interpret with the aid of the same concepts the truths of reason and those of faith. Yet Saint Thomas knew how to keep for his own mystic life the place which it has in his theory, and the way he speaks of it is one with the record of his biographers on the spirit in which he practiced it. We know that a little while before his death, and after he had had an ecstacy, Saint Thomas had to give up the composition of the *Summa Theologica,* and when he was asked to go on with it, he answered simply: "I can do no more; all that I have written seems to me only chaff." And indeed we could guess what was the preferred topic of his mystical meditations, when we see the central place the mystery of transubstantiation has in the poems he left us. Unmistakably he is the poet of the Eucharist; this is the deep devotional source from which his mind never ceased to draw.

Of his extensive works, we undertake to interpret only the ethics. But any attempt to define the spirit of the ethics independently of the spirit that breathes in all his studies would be useless. The first condition for grasping the ethics of Saint Thomas is to know that in this system there is no detached ethics; no one can define the spirit that rules over the elaboration of this ethics without defining the spirit of the whole of Thomism.

For the historian who puts the work of Saint Thomas into the history of Christian thought, the

two traits that appear most striking are the extraordinary newness of Thomism, and the extraordinary quickness of the success which, in spite of opposition that lasts till this day, his teaching won.

When we try to say precisely what is the newness of his thought, we see at once the exceptional place that the philosophy of Aristotle has in the system. In the strictly ethical field, it is clear that the *Summa* is the first work of its kind in which the Ethics of Aristotle took such a part. Reflection on this procedure cannot fail to impress us with the decisive importance it has for the history of human as well as Christian thought. That a work which stands as a full synthesis of the religious truths a man must believe to be sure of his salvation by faith in Christ, should think it needs to work into that synthesis the Grecian ideal of human life, as Aristotle had worked it out by reason alone, indicates that Thomistic thought, at the height of the thirteenth century, had integrated with Christianity all the capital acquired by civilization. The genius of Thomas took this step and settled a question from which the thought of man had suffered for a long time, and also opened up a future of promise.

This question was the conflict which had many times since the coming of Christianity brought the followers of the older culture and the confessors of the new life almost to blows; a conflict which not only set one group of men against another, but very often set two men against each other in the breast

of the same individual: the man who saw the road of salvation only as the radical supernaturalism of the Christian religion, and the man who could not resign himself to a denial of nature in the presence of the intelligibility and the beauty which the Greeks had found. This future of promise was what we now call the Renaissance and the whole of modern civilization. If it is true that, with the Ethics of Aristotle, it was the man of the Greek city who reclaimed his place in Christendom and installed himself there without giving up any of his rightful demands, we may say that the problem of the unity of human history, broken in the past, was solved, and that the unity of human history was assured for the future. More than that—and the answer to the question in a Christian philosophy was possible only at this price—Saint Thomas did not intend to show simply that the Greek man could, by going to an extreme limit, accommodate himself to Christianity, but that Christianity was necessary for him and that only it could fully guarantee his ideal and let him fully realize it.

Christianity, with all its supernaturalism of faith and grace, coming to fulfil the dreams of Hellenism, which did not know how to or hardly dared to hope —this is how the philosophy of history understands the ethics of Thomas Aquinas. This is also why his coordination of Aristotelianism with Christianity is not like the reconciliation of two heterogeneous realities, but like the fulfilment of the promise of

nature by the gift of grace and like the unhoped realization of Hellenism, which is quite satisfied only in Christianity. This is why the Renaissance dates, in its source, from the thirteenth century,—the Renaissance of esthetics and of form, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was to result from the former, being simply its last but not its most important consequence. When William Budé, in 1535, raised the problem *De Transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum,* it was a long time since Saint Thomas had settled the problem by finding in Christianity a complete Hellenism. To summarize this first distinctive trait of the ethics of Thomism, we would say that it is a *Christian humanism,* meaning not that it is the result of a combining of humanism and Christianity in any proportions, but that it witnesses to the fundamental identity of a Christianity in which the whole of humanism is included, an integral humanism that finds in Christianity its rounded satisfaction.

It is true that this newness and fruitfulness of Thomism may appear, and often has appeared, to endanger its agreement with the spirit of Christian tradition. And in fact, the accepting of all that Christianity can assimilate of the elements of Aristotelianism supposes the accepting of the philosophical basis on which such a doctrine rests. We must admit that there may be, within Christianity, a moment when the humanism of the Greeks is legitimate, and that human nature may therefore be seen and defined as

unrelated, with its rights and duties derived from its essence, and also with a value in itself—even before the supernatural has entered to sanction its rights and duties and value. But in that case does not Thomism merit the lasting reproach of Augustinianism? One can give to nature only what one takes away from grace; to introduce Aristotle into Christian thought is to give to philosophy a place that one necessarily takes from religion. Besides, Greek thought is above all interested in man, and teaches that this concrete being, whose essence is body as well as soul, is actually, before it quits this life, to enjoy a life that has no tomorrow. The Christian view, on the contrary, promises man an immortality because his soul is spiritual, and even promises during this life a communing between God and the soul because of the very independence the soul has with regard to the body.

This is the quintessence of the protest made by Augustinianism. As to how far it is justified, we shall grant that it is just in the measure that Augustinianism expresses one of the most imperious demands of Christian thought: to let man rejoin God and, even in the order of nature, wholly to reclaim God. In writing a history of Augustinian thought, it would not be impossible to show the dangers which gave rise to it and against which it was a needed reaction. The enduring aim of Augustinianism is to afford a basic philosophy of conversion and of the soul's union with God, against all false notions of inde-

pendence or sufficiency that the soul or nature might raise counter to the rights of God.

There is another tradition also, and this, contrary to popular belief, is not less ancient than Augustinianism; but Saint Thomas was able to use this second tradition. If anyone will run through the Greek and Latin Fathers from the second to the fourth century, he will see that all of them are interested primarily in man, and that it is the whole man of body and soul, not of soul alone, that they endeavor to save. Whoever despises the body or contemns nature on the pretext of better securing the rights of the soul or of God, by that fact is outside the Christian Church. Depth of thought, keenness of philosophical genius, even ardor of belief can do nothing for such persons; and if anyone doubts it, the history of the Christian Gnostics—for instance of Tertullian or of Origen—is proof of it. And just as Augustinianism shows new vigor every time that in the history of Christian thought the danger is an encroachment on the nature or rights of God, as in Pelagianism and in the naturalism of the Renaissance, so Thomism deploys all its powers and tells why it exists every time that the peril lies in a breakdown of human individuality, by confusing it with the race or nature or God; as happened in the crisis of Averroism in the thirteenth century and again in the modernistic crisis originated at the beginning of the nineteenth century by German Romanticism. That is why the Thomistic reform, though it seemed new, was not

novel in intention or in fact, but ran its roots deep into the heart of tradition, and this is precisely the reason of its brilliant success. If we were to designate this aspect of Thomism in a single phrase, we would call it a *Christian naturalism*—meaning by this, not a balancing or running together of naturalism and Christianity, but that mere nature needs the Christian confession for its own perfect development, and that in its turn Christianity needs a distinct nature that it is to perfect and to save.

When we grasp this leading place that Thomism has in the history of Christian thought and understand the tradition that inspires it, we have still, if we would get a just general idea of it, to see how it has also tried to meet the demands of the other tradition. For the endurance of Thomism and Augustinianism within Christian philosophy would be an inexplicable fact if these two systems of thought were contradictory, and they would be if each did not make an effort to meet the rightful demands that the other makes it its business to maintain. Augustinianism wishes to keep to one reason, one nature, one human individuality which is to be saved, body and soul, and if we had space we could show how it succeeds. But Saint Thomas not less expressly wishes to be sure of putting man and all things in their places, and of giving to nature that which is nature's and to God that which is God's. If Augustinianism should object that its standards are different and that it would that all

were God's, one speaks simply the truth in answering that Thomism also wishes this. It wishes this most manifestly in ethics, and we shall see that without God nature would be nothing, could do nothing, and would come to nothing. Indeed, the proper gift of nature consists in willing what God wills, and as it finds that its goal is beyond its reach, nature has to seek in God its full attainment.

The ethics of Thomas is quite intellectualistic, because God, to whom man is subject, is pure intelligence; it is an ethics of law and order, because the problem of the autonomy of man is solved by his freely entering into the universal divine scheme. It is an ethics without obligation or sanction, at least if we think of obligation and sanction as imposed on a human act from the outside to guarantee its moral character; for the only obligation that the ethics of Thomism knows for man is that he be wholly a man, for by that fact he is sure that he is what God wishes him to be. As for sanction, we should badly deceive ourselves in imagining it as a complementary disposition limiting the very life of morality from the outside, whereas it results from the morality of the act as soon as the act is performed, and it indicates a natural balance between the act and its consequences in a universe ruled by justice and reason.

In the following study we shall see how these views are worked out in the thought of Saint Thomas. We try to show the connections between

the parts of Thomistic morals and the spirit that breathes through it. His teaching on the Supreme Value, with which we begin, is the key to his entire ethics and makes clear how this hinges on metaphysics. We have attempted to outline his metaphysics elsewhere (*Le Thomisme: Introduction au system de Saint Thomas d'Aquin,* 2nd ed., Paris, J. Vrin, 1924).[1] But at that time we ran into the impossibility of stating, in a work that aimed to make plain the metaphysical framework of the system, the almost endless detail of the ethics; and Saint Thomas himself will tell us that it is only when morals comes to control the detail of our action that it has its full significance. It will therefore be understood that we have gladly undertaken to explain the ethics of Saint Thomas in the group of studies called *The Christian Ethicists,* and that we were ready to welcome the plan suggested by our colleague and friend, the Abbé Baudin, professor at the University of Strasbourg. Even the form of the modest and really easy task given to us is in line with one of our constant preoccupations. We have often deplored how very hard the teacher of the history of philosophy finds it to get students away from textbooks and secondary sources and to go directly to the originals themselves. Yet what he wishes as historian is to turn his readers over, just as often and as surely

[1] Translated by E. Bullough, under the title *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* 2nd revised ed., Cambridge, W. Heffer; St. Louis, B. Herder, 1929.—Tr.

as it can be done, to the great philosophers themselves.

The language of Thomas is difficult and might discourage beginners from tying themselves to the work of reading him. We have therefore hoped that some rather simple passages, as those from the *Summa,* might be a good way to bring readers to study him at first hand. This aim of ours is also the reason for the kind of translation we have attempted to keep to. We have not feared, for instance, to transpose, if this seemed indispensable for a clear statement; yet we have meant to retain in the translation the technical color and tone of the original, so that thought upon our study might serve to lead the inquirer to Saint Thomas himself and, when he had got so far, might be good enough guide to help him to be at home there.

NOTE: The student is respectfully referred to pages 330 and 331 *infra* for suggestions as to how best to use the present volume.

Part First

THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF MORALS

Chapter I

THE MASTER VALUE

I. MORALS AND METAPHYSICS

In the system of Thomas Aquinas the study of morals cannot be isolated from that of metaphysics. We see this as soon as we realize that an ethics apart from the scheme of sciences would imply that man and his moral activity are detached from the general run of things. This is not so. Man's moral and social action carry forward a movement which in origin, power and direction are independent of it. At the outset of his study of God, which is the subject of inquiry in the *Summa Theologica,* St. Thomas shows in a summary way the rounded oneness of the big field that is to be parcelled out for study, into parts, questions and articles.

The main purpose of this sacred science is to make us acquainted with God, as he is in Himself and as the source and goal of things, and in a special way the goal of man. We mean to give an analysis of this problem, and shall treat first of God, secondly of the movement of man towards God, and thirdly of Christ, who, as man, is our way to God (*cf.,* 1, q. 2).[1]

[1] The passages set in smaller type are directly from St. Thomas. —Tr.

The moral life is a kind of continuance of the creative act. We cannot study God in every light available to man until we study him as Creator, and if not, and if the act by which God creates things outside Himself is vitally one with the act by which He draws them back to Himself, the study of morals lies in the following metaphysical problem: Where do the power and direction of movement branded by God into things go when that movement reaches the human creature? The text will show how this question is posed for all creation and what special aspect it wears in the instance of the rational creature or man. The notion of morality enters precisely when beings gifted with reason receive power to guide themselves to their goals and to select this or that end, though they are among great numbers of beings that are directed from without and that are subject to them.

One first being called God exists and has the full perfection of being. We showed this in an earlier book (*Contra Gentes,* 1, c. 13). From the richness of His perfection He gives being to all things that are and so is witnessed to as the first being and as the source of whatever is. No necessity is written in His nature that He give being to others, but He does it of His own purpose and choice. And so God is master of His works, as we are masters of things subject to our will. But this dominion of God over things made by Him is complete. He is the one maker of their total being; He does not need any outside agent as prop or any original stuff.

When an agent gifted with will does anything, he means it for some purpose. In fact, good or end is the objective of will,

and it must be that whatever comes from the will is arranged for some end. Each thing reaches its farthest goal by its own action, and this action is inescapably shaped by the giver of the nature in line with which that thing acts. It is for this reason that God, perfect in Himself and of His power the giver of being to all things, is the guide of all, and guided by none, and as there is nothing that has not being from Him, so there is nothing that is exempted from His governance. He is perfect as being and as cause, and He is perfect also as ruler.

If we take a look now at the effect of the aim integrated by God with things, we shall see that it differs with the natures of the things in question.

Some beings are so made by God that they have minds, and in that sense are like Him and are His image. These are directed, and also by means of their actions they direct themselves to their goal. If, in guiding themselves, such beings accept the divine guidance, they come by the help of it all the way to their goal; but if they choose to go by any other road, they do not arrive.

Other beings have not got minds, and so cannot direct themselves to their journey's end, but are guided wholly by another. Some of them are existents that cannot disintegrate, and as they are not subject to any defect in their natural being, so in their actions they never leave the orb or path toward the goal prearranged for them, but yield without fail to the ultimate governance. The celestial bodies, whose motion is ever uniform, are of this kind. Others, however, can suffer decay, though this is compensated for by the gain of some other being, for when one goes to pieces, another is built up. So, too, in their actions they do not keep to the order of nature, but some good comes of their defection. It is thus plain that not even those things that seem to break

from the primal scheme and rule get around the power of the main guide, because, as these bodies were made by God, so they are fully subject to His might (*C. G.*, 3, c.1; *cf. De Veritate,* q.13, a.1 and 2).

We see at once that the moral life, precisely because it is but a specific instance of divine control, comes to the following problem: How can and how should a rational and free creature use the movement toward God which he has received from God? In other words, the pivotal notion of morals will be that of finality or, more exactly, of free finality: not of a forced finality like that of beings that have not reason; of these St. Thomas says that they are only instruments in the hands of God (1, q.22, a.2; q.105, a.8; and 1-2, q.1, a.2).

Of the acts that a man does, only some are "human" in an exact sense. These are proper to man precisely as man. The difference between man and the irrational animal is that man is master of his acts. So only those actions are properly called "human" of which he is master. Now he has this mastery through reason and will, and free will is known as the "faculty of will and of reason." Human, then, is the correct term for acts that arise from a deliberative will. There are other acts that a man does, but because they are not man's simply as man, they may be called "acts of man," but not strictly human acts. And, of course, any action that issues from a faculty is effected by it in line with the kind of object that faculty has, and the object of will is end or good; so every human action is necessarily for an end (1–2, q.1).[1]

[1] References specified by numbers only, are from the *Summa Theologica.*—Tr.

Hence, the dignity of man. Uniquely in our world, this creature is not an inert medium in the hands of the Creator. Yet it is also his responsibility, which is heavy and fearful when we remember that his own destiny is thus put into his keeping. The point is this, man is either to maintain order in his life and be saved or to destroy order and perish. In the drama of his fate he is at once actor and, by a commission of liberty like the divine trust of causality to beings, he is author. Morals is the science of how man is to conduct himself so that the story of his life may have a happy ending, and we shall see that this coincidence unavoidably comes from the principle with which we have begun: care to shape his life towards a prosperous end is one with care to bring his own humanity to the very peak of achievement.

If this is so, no task is more urgent on the student of the moral life than to give close study to the goals which human action strives for and to sort them with the discernment of a judge.

II. MORALS AND THE END OF ENDS

Any strictly human act is for an end. This end may be exterior to the act, as, for instance, a house built by a contractor or health brought about by a doctor. Or the act itself may be its own end, like an act of knowing, sufficient for itself and not willed for anything further (*C.G.*, 3, c.2). But all these acts, both those that are their own end and those

that have an exterior end, should have an ordered relation to one another and to a single end. This is not simply a matter of fitness. The existence of the acts is at stake. We shall not grasp the meaning of St. Thomas on the moral life, unless we bear in mind the close analogy between the argument by which we are going to show that all human actions are for one final end, and the metaphysical arguments for the existence of God. There would be neither movement nor causality in the world of secondary causes if there were not a First Cause to which the changes and effects that we see are tied by a limited number of links in a graduated series. So, too, there would actually be no human actions for specific ends if there were not an end of ends that gives place and meaning to the things people want, and again by a finite group of intermediaries ranked and ordered.

Nothing is more natural than this position for one who remembers that the two arguments answer to two aspects of one and the same problem. The problem is this: How does the divine causality work, first in the field of the efficient cause, secondly in that of the final cause? The text that follows is a good explanation of their metaphysical correspondence.

From the point of view of essences (*i. e., per se loquendo,* in contrast to *per accidens*) it is not possible to regress *ad infinitum* to end after end, no matter what the kind of change one begins with, for in any series of interrelated essences it must be that to take away the first is to knock down the whole series. This is the basis of Aristotle's proof, in the *Physics*

(8, c.5), that it is impossible to go on forever from cause or mover to cause or mover, because, if there were not a first mover, or if that were supposed out of it, the others could not do anything: they would not stir unless they were started by a first mover.

There are two kinds of order in the realm of ends—the order of purpose and the order of doing. In each of these there must be a first term. That which is primal in purpose is a kind of source that sets desire afoot, and without that source or starter no desire would ever arise. And what is original in doing gives us the story of action getting under way; if that original were lopped off, no one would begin to do anything. Now, this source of purpose or objective is the end of ends, and the first doer is whatever is first in view of the end. So in neither case can we have an infinite regression; without an end of ends nothing would be wanted, no action would have a terminus, and the bent of the agent would never come to rest; and if there were no first of the series toward an end, a person would not get started to do anything, but would go on making up his mind forever.

We may, however, have an infinity of things that are not related in an essential way, but conjoined by accident. Causes of an accidental kind are not determinate, and it is only in this way that there can be an accidental infinity of ends and of steps to an end (1–2, q.1, a.4; *cf. C.G.*, 3, c.2).

We have now to define the relations which are sure to arise between the end of ends and our moral activity. In the first place, this end will be unique for the individual man. Any action of ours is moral if it is willed, and we know an act is willed if it tends toward an end clearly seen by the intellect. Thus it

is the nature of the object or goal which a movement makes for, that allows us to class it as willed (1-2, q.1, a.3). And if this is so, what is true of each of our acts taken alone, should be equally true of all taken together; because as in each genus there is a first principle which defines it, so we have seen that in the genus of willed acts there is one end of ends which forms the true urge of all acts of will. The fact that we can group all willed acts into one class implies that they have just one end (*ibid.*, a.5), for which alone man wills whatever he wills and which is the same for humankind in general as for each man in particular.

A second point is that this farthest and unique end of all a man's actions, precisely because it has a share in the definition of man's nature or essence, holds for all men, but only for men. Here, however, an important distinction must be made. We may study man's ultimate end from either of two points of view: in itself, or in the way it is attained. From the former point of view, the end of ends for man is one with that of all creatures, for there is a kind of morality immanent in senseless nature, and it is in some sense a living thing, but not conscious and reflective like ours. Everything indeed tries to be like God (*C.G.*, 3, c.19), and this is why, even without knowing Him, all things desire Him. This point is brought out in a remarkable chapter of the *Contra Gentes*. After noting that, in Aristotelian cosmology, the stars are moved and guided by pure intelligences

and the movements of these stars are willed by these intelligences with the aim of bringing lower beings into life, Saint Thomas proceeds:

It is not hard to see how natural bodies that have no knowledge are moved, and in what sense they act for an end. They move toward an end as directed to it by an intelligent substance, just as the arrow goes for the mark because aimed by the archer. And as the arrow gets a start for the target or its definite goal from the impetus of the archer, so natural bodies take a line toward their natural ends because of the natural movers from which they have their natures and powers and motion. So it is clear that every work of nature is the work of an intelligence, since an effect is ascribed more to the one who starts a process and guides it to its end, than to the tools which he uses. For this reason the works of nature, like the actions of a wise man, take an orderly path toward their goals.

The following points begin to stand out. Beings that know nothing, can yet act for an end; they have a native bent and desire for good; they even desire to be like God and to attain their own perfection. It is all the same which of these two last we say. For by the fact that a being tends toward good, it tends toward its perfection: anything is good so far as it is realized. And tending toward the good, it nears and resembles God: indeed, everything is like God so far as it has goodness, and a particular thing is so far good or valuable as it is a likeness of the supreme value. So in achieving the goodness of God, it achieves its own, and not vice versa. All things then desire as the end of ends that they be like God.

And, of course, there are several senses in which the value of a thing may be taken. For instance, there is a good that

goes with it as an individual unit, and so an animal looks out for its own good when it seeks food to sustain itself. Besides, it has a specific good that is its own, and it is this that the animal desires in the appetite to beget and nurture, or in taking any turn to protect or screen the individuals of its kind. Again, there is a good of the genus, and it is in this sense that the sun (*caelum*), let us say, acts for its own good when it causes beings different from itself. And in a fourth sense, things are good by reason of analogy or likeness of effects to causes, and in this way we may note that God, though outside any class or genus, gives being to all things for the sake of His self-value.

We plainly see that as anything has more perfection and is higher on the scale of value, the broader its taste for good and the wider its quest to realize good. This is because quite imperfect beings work only for the good of their individual selves, the perfect for the good of their type, the very perfect for the good of their group, and God as sovereign and perfect in goodness for the good of everything. So some have reasonably said that the good as such is diffusive, because a thing is better if it pours out its bounty on things farther away. And as what is more perfect in any class is model and measure of all in that class, it must be that God, perfect and rich in goodness and universal giver of goodness, is model for every giver of goodness. And a thing is higher on the ladder of causes if it is a more liberal dispenser of good.

We see now that everything takes on a divine likeness as it tends to be a cause of others. It works *pari passu* towards its own good. It is not out of the way, then, to remark that the movements of the planets and the intelligent actions which start them, are in view of others inferior to them and put together or broken up by them. They do not aim at this

as end of ends, but they do effect their begetting and at the same stroke their own good and a divine likeness, as the end of ends (*C.G.*, 3, c.24).

It is another question, however, when we look into the end of ends from the point of view of how it is attained by each creature, for:

As Aristotle says in his *Metaphysics* (bk.5; also in his *Physics*, 2, c.4) the word "end" has two senses: that which and that by which: it means the thing on account of which one wishes anything, and that by which he seeks it: in other words, the thing itself the nature of which is good, and the use or attaining of that thing. For instance, we may say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is either a lower position, which is a thing, or it is the enjoyment and use of this thing. We say that the aim of a stingy man is money, which is certainly a thing, or it is to have money for use. Now, if we speak of the end of ends for man and mean the thing itself which is the end, it is true to say that all other things have the same end as man has, for God is the end of ends for man and for all other things. But if by the end of ends for man we mean the acquiring of this end, we should say that in this sense irrational creatures have no part in the strictly human goal, for man and other reasoning creatures reach their end by knowing and loving God, but the end for others is only a kind of likeness to God, whether these beings merely exist or live or have sense knowledge (1–2, q.1, a.8).

So man and other things have one common end of ends, but beings which are like that end by being or living or being conscious, attain this end without

ever understanding it and hence without enjoying it. This is the reason why, though all have one end of ends, man alone has happiness. We shall now go on to inquire in what happiness consists.

III. IN QUEST OF THE MASTER VALUE

Our introductory study has shown that Thomistic morals is integrated with metaphysics. We now proceed to point out that the metaphysics itself is built on a solid empiric basis. St. Thomas begins with the data of sense experience, explains these with the aid of the first principles of thought, and, abetted by the elementary notion of the analogy of being and by the principle of causality, works out a philosophy of God. So in morals, and especially on the question of discerning the Master Value. We know, to begin with, that this should be the end of ends for a creature that has reason, and also that it will lie in our gaining, by an act of knowledge, the one object that has the ability to fill up and to satisfy wholly our power of knowing. But one does not at a glance see precisely which object will be able to meet these demands. The ethician, like the metaphysician, searches the field. The latter, immediately sure that the sensible world requires an original source, must all the same try to fashion an idea of that source; so the other, at once certain that the moral life would not so much as exist if it had no objective, should nevertheless go over the ground of our moral

experience to discern the nature of this end of ends.

St. Thomas then begins the quest of the Master Value. He commences with what is most thoroughly outside the meaning of man and inquires whether money is not the great human good.

It cannot be that man's happiness is comprised of riches. In fact, riches, as Aristotle remarks (*Politics,* 1, c.3) are of just two kinds, natural and artificial. The natural are those a man uses to support his born weaknesses; they are such riches as food and drink, clothes, conveyances, and houses. The artificial, such as money, do not directly come to man's aid, but human ingenuity has devised them to facilitate trade and to serve as a measure of exchange.

Now it is evident that man's happiness is not one with natural riches. For we want these to sustain nature, and so they cannot be man's final end, but man is rather their end, and they are meant for him, as we read in the Psalms: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." Nor do we want artificial riches except in view of natural: we want them only that we may buy what we need to live, and so they answer even less to the definition of the end of ends. It simply cannot be, then, that the end of ends for man be made up of riches (1–2, q.2, a.1; *cf. C.G.,* 3, c.30).

A more interior value than money and bodily goods is honor, which is directed to the soul and satisfies it. Is it not the reward of virtue, and is it not even said that honor is due to God alone? (1 *Tim.* 1).

We must grant that human happiness is quite other than honor. After all, why is honor given to anyone? Because of

his excellence. Honor is a mark and a kind of witness to the excellence that is in the honored person, and we know that human excellence lies mainly in happiness, which is the rounded and perfect human value, and that it lies secondarily in those branch values which make happiness accessible to us under some aspect. So it may be that honor is a close associate of happiness, but it is not its chief ingredient (1–2, q.2, a.2; *cf. C.G.,* 3, c.28).

We may say as a corollary of this, that the end of ends for man is not human acclaim or reputation. For one thing, these are so little dependable that they do not class with a stable and abiding goal; and besides they are rather a by-product of happiness (1-2, q.3, a.3, ad 2). Supposing, of course, that it is earned, reputation follows perfection and is the companion of the good wherever this goes, and so it cannot make either of them. Still, a person might ask whether efficiency is not the great goal. No, efficiency or power, which in the Latin is another name for faculty (*potentia, vis*), is the source of action, and for this reason cannot be the end. And anyway, wealth, honor, reputation, and ability—all of these values have a common failing: they are morally neutral, they are good, but not good enough; they are a bother and at times harmful to those who possess them; worst of all, they are external to human nature.

Four general arguments may be cited to make it clear that happiness is not made up of any of the outer values that we

have just mentioned. The first is that happiness as the Master Value for man can have no part with evil, and everyone knows that any of the values cited may be met with among good people, but also among the wicked. Besides, it is the way of happiness that it has a self-sufficiency about it, as we read in the *Ethics* (1, c.6) that once happiness is had, no value needful for man is wanting. And we may suppose a man to have got all of the aforesaid values and yet he might be without many good things that are humanly needed, such as education and health. The third reason is that happiness is wholly a value and is never the source of evil to anyone, which may not be said of the values in question; for instance, Ecclesiastes (V, 12) says that riches is sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner," and so of the others. A last argument is that man is meant for happiness by reasons that are at work within him; he is by nature meant for it. But the four values we have passed in review hinge on the world outside man, and often on luck or fortune: so they are called goods of fortune. All this makes it plain that happiness cannot in any way lie in them (1–2, q.2, a.4).

With so much known, our demonstration takes a forward step. The present conclusion allows us to see that the four discussions which it sums up are a sort of induction that excludes from the essence of the Master Value any and every element external to the essence of man. And in fact the concept of "nature," which in Thomistic thought always has the decisive rôle, enters now to close the debate. If man is by nature made for happiness, and if this is so for anyone who is truly a man, it is within his nature that the source of happiness is to be sought.

The quest, then, is still before us, but on another field. What is it within man that can form the Master Value for him? He is made of body and soul, so it may be that the great good is some good of the body.

My view is that this cannot be. Human happiness cannot consist in values of the body, for two reasons:

It cannot be that the main goal of a thing that is used as a means for something else should be to protect its own existence. For instance, a captain does not take as his chief purpose the safety of the ship that he commands, because a ship is made for some other business or end, namely, to sail. Now as a ship is entrusted to the pilot that he steer her, so man is given in charge to his own reason and will; and so Ecclesiasticus says (c.15): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Well, man, since he is not the Master Value, plainly is meant for some other end, and so the eventual goal of human reason and will cannot be simply the survival of the human self.

Besides, even if one were to concede that the aim of human reason and will were the survival of the human self, one could not say that the goal of man was a value of the body. It is true that man is made up of body and soul, yet though the being of the body depends on the soul, the being of the soul does not depend on the body, as we showed in an earlier passage (1, q.65, a.1, and q.90, a.4). The very body is for the sake of the soul, as matter is for form or as tools are for him who uses them to do his work. Values of the body are subordinated to those of the soul as their end, and it becomes

evident that happiness or the Master Value cannot be any goods of the body (1–2, q.2, a.5; *cf. C.G.*, 3, c.32).

Because our search has run aground in the realm of the body, we turn to the domain of the soul. We first study pleasures of sense, as these are known to everyone and in the eyes of many are the Master Value. But we must at once rate them down and out of our quest. They are sense enjoyments, common to animal and man, and hence not specifically "human." Besides, they relate in every instance to the working of our organism and never raise us one inch above the goods of the body (*C.G.*, 3, c.33).

There is a broader and deeper reason. It is this: the enjoyment which we shall call by the technical name of delectation, is a result, an appendage, or at most a detail, of happiness, but not its essence. To cast the link between enjoyment and happiness into form and compare it to the well-known relation between essence and accident, we would say: to have happiness is to possess the value which makes up the highest end. This is the central thing or core, and whatever is not included in this definition is outside the essence of happiness and joined to it only by accident. We would not deny that an accident may always accompany an essence and as a proper accident, but it remains an accident even though it be inseparable from the essence. To laugh is proper to man, but his essence is that he is an animal that reasons. Hence the conclusion (1-2, q.2, a.6): even

the delectation which accompanies the having of the perfect value is not the essence of happiness, but only a by-product and a chance result of it (1-2, q.4, a.2).

At this moment, it appears that we are headed toward a conclusion the mere announcement of which looks paradoxical, and that we are in a blind alley: human happiness is not found outside man, nor in his body, nor in his soul; and for these reasons:

As we said a while ago, the word "end" has two meanings. First, it stands for the very thing which we seek to gain, and then for the use that is the gaining or the having of this thing. If we mean by the human goal the thing itself that men want as an end, the full human goal cannot be the soul or anything belonging to it. The reason is that the soul, studied in itself, is a kind of potential thing: it is potentially wise before it is actually wise, and potentially good before it is actually good. Now, the potential exists for the actual, which is its complement, hence the impossibility that anything, the nature of which is to be in potency, should play the rôle of end of ends. This rules out the soul as its own objective, and likewise any activity or habit or power of it. For the value which is the main goal is a value that fufils one's whole desire for good, but human desire or will is a desire for the universal value, whereas any value tied up with the soul is shared and fragmentary. So the end of ends for man is not any of these things.

If, however, we mean the attaining of the end of ends for man or the having or using of it, it is true that the human soul has something to do with the end of ends, for it is

through the soul that man reaches happiness. The very thing, then, which is sought as an end, is that in which happiness consists, and which makes man happy, and the attaining of this thing is called happiness; hence it must be granted that happiness is a feature of the soul. Still, that in which happiness lies is something outside the soul (1–2, q.2, a.7).

We have but one more step to take to obtain a distinct view of the aim of the moral life. If the end of ends is neither outside nor within us, where is it? Plainly, it must be above us. Still, how can it transcend us, yet be our goal, how can it be external to us, yet be our objective? These are questions that demand an answer; but if they can be cleared up, they offer a full solution to the problem of the meaning of man.

To begin with, we may remark that the contradictory look of the form which the problem takes does not warrant despair of its solution. The form of the question expresses experienced facts, and to try to put it otherwise, would involve disloyalty to the facts which we have come upon inch by inch in the course of our inquiry. It is too late to turn back now, and we should think it too soon to contest the validity of our quest. Where, then, is the mistake, and how can we with the conscience of good philosophers regret that we made it? Is it that there is no end of ends? In that case we should have to give up any satisfactory account of the existence of human action. Or is it rather that we are to let the values of body and soul, which seem fitted to our

nature and proper to us, take us by surprise? In that case we should renounce the discovery of the Master Value as man's nature defines it.

But after all why regret having taken facts always as given and having never foresworn the deciphering of them in the light of the original leads of reason? We cannot turn back; we must face the problem isolated in our analysis. If fact seems to stand against fact, this is doubtless because we have not carried our analysis far enough. Whatever is real is possible, and our business is to find the conditions of its possibility.

Let us look into the heart of the difficulty. Even when their own logic urges them, people are loath to give up the values which they think suited to them to acquiesce in a chief goal outside their own nature. Yet it may be that this transcendent, outer objective is the only one that is really suited to us, and the only one that fully answers to the needs of our nature. Here again we shall find it vital to return to the essence of man and to inquire whether the necessity of locating the great goal outside and above himself is so far from being a stumbling-block to him that it is a demand written into the essence of a being gifted with reason. What kind of thing, for instance, is the will of a reasoning creature?

It helps us to know that each kind of form has a corresponding tendency. Take fire for example; because of its form, it tends to rise and to beget a flame like itself. And the

form of things that have reason is a step ahead of those that have not reason. In fact, among beings that have not reason we find simply a form which fixes them in a unique type of being proper to them and constitutive of the being natural to each of them. An inborn tendency, called a natural appetite, answers to this natural form. It is different with beings that can know. Each of them is limited by its native form in a natural being proper to it, but in such a way that it can take into itself types of other things, as the senses take in types or images of all things that can be sensed and the mind of all that can be known. This is how the soul of man, helped by sense and intellect, can in a measure become all things, and so beings that know are in their way like God in whom all things pre-exist, as Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.*, 5, 1). Now just as the forms in beings that know are of a kind superior to natural forms, so we ought to find in them something higher than the natural tendency that we have called natural appetite. This higher inclination belongs to that power of the soul by which the living creature can desire the things it perceives, and not only those toward which it is inclined by its natural form (1, q.80, a.1).

It begins to appear that there is a large and clear disproportion between man, in his total experience, and in the object of his desire. God is fulness of being, and His infinite love can find in His infinite substance a source of full contentment. But man is too perfect to represent or be like God without knowing it, and not perfect enough to fill up by his own power the gap between what he is and what he represents. He is not just one thing, as the body is or as a natural being is; and he is not everything, like God.

He can only become all things, and it is because he becomes things in the degree that he knows them, that we have reason to locate in his power of knowing, by which he copies the divine infinity, his proper human likeness to God. Thus it is the very nature of man that imperiously calls for the transcendent and divine. Since he can be like the fulness of being, that is, in his knowledge and in his thus becoming an indefinite series of other beings, his will or desire, like the intellect of which it is the companion, will always remain torn and dissatisfied. At least, says St. Thomas, this is the case, unless man's will and desire at last find the infinite object that will give it peace and happiness.

Man's happiness cannot lie in any created good. For happiness is a consummate value which satisfies all desires: if beyond it there were something still to be desired, it would not be the end of ends. Now, just as intellect has for its object all truth, so will, which is the human form of desire, has for its object everything that is good. Hence the evident conclusion that nothing short of the sum-total of good things can content the will of man. This is not found in any created thing, but only in God, because no creature is all good, but each has only a share in goodness. This is why God alone can give complete peace to man's will, as it is written in Psalm 102: "Who satisfieth their desire with good things." Man's happiness, we conclude, is in God alone (1–2, q.2, a.8).

We know now what is the Master Value, but we have yet to define the act by which man comes into possession of it.

IV. HAPPINESS AND MORALS

The end of ends, or Master Value, is beyond our nature, because the object or cause of our happiness is an uncreated good, and this cannot be included in the finite or participated order which is ours. But the taking of it by man, the attainment, or possession, or experience—in a word, the enjoyment of this Master Value—is happiness in a truly human sense. And as there is question here of a contact which must be made within the human soul, we remain in the field of the finite, the bit by bit, the created. To inquire what is this happiness or enjoyment of the Master Value, is thus to set out on a quest of a spiritual state which, of course, could lead the soul to the peak of its perfection and to the rounded realization of its essence. But we know beforehand that this state will leave the soul outside God, face to face with an infinite which it will perhaps see, but will never become. A being by participation will never be happy except by participation (1-2, q.3, a.1, ad 1). However, we should outline how this participation can be effected.

We know, first, that it is sure to consist in an activity, or in the use of one of our powers. By definition, happiness can leave nothing to be desired. Hence it must realize to the full every possibility of our nature. But it would not do this if it were to make us able to perform the noblest act imaginable and yet not bring us all the way to the accomplishment

of this act (1-2, q.3, a.2). Besides, the activity by which we shall be happy, ought not to be directed to any outside material to work it over, for we would then act for its good, and not for our own (*ibid.*, ad 3). It will be an act within or, as the philosophers say, immanent to the soul. And because we know only three types of acts which have their terminus within the soul, our choice lies among these three only. We may eliminate acts of sense at the start, for we have seen that happiness means a union of the soul with an uncreated and spiritual good, which cannot come within the range of the senses (*ibid.*, a.3). Therefore, any hesitation could only be between an act of the intellect and an act of the will.

As we pointed out earlier, happiness comprises two things: one is the very essence of it and the other is as its natural companion, that is, the enjoyment which goes with it. As for that which is the very essence of happiness, I say that this cannot possibly be an act of the will. From what has preceded, it is clear that happiness is the attainment of the end of ends, and this does not consist in an act of the will, for the will is moved by desire toward the end when this is not had and by rejoicing and being at rest in it when it is had. But the desire of the end, taken in itself, is not the attainment of the end; so much is plain: it is only a movement toward the end. And as for enjoyment, we would say that this comes to the will from the fact that the end is present—and not, on the contrary, that anything becomes present from the fact that the will enjoys it. There must, then, be

something other than the act of the will to make the end present to the will. This is evident in the instance of sense objectives. If one could get hold of money by the act of wanting it, the miser would have gold as soon as he began to desire it. The fact is, he has not got it to begin with, and he obtains it only by getting his hands on it, or in some such way, and his joy over possessing it dates from that moment. The same procedure holds in the case of knowable objects: in the beginning we wish to reach some intelligible end, but we cannot do this unless it becomes present to us by an act of the intellect, and it is only then that the will finds joy and comes to rest in the end attained. Thus the very heart and meaning of happiness lies in an act of the intellect, but the joy resulting from happiness belongs to the will. That is why St. Augustine says in his *Confessions* (bk.10, c.23) that happiness is a joy born of truth (*gaudium de veritate*), since in fact this joy is the crowning touch of happiness (1–2, q.3, a.4; *cf. Quodlib.,* q.9, a.19).

Thus the limits within which our quest moves become narrower and narrower. It might seem that we even now reach the goal, since we know that the Maşter Value can lie only in an activity of the intellect. However, the intellect has two functions. By one of these it grasps objects of knowledge, and in this sense is said to play a speculative rôle; by the other it fixes the rules of action and is said to take a practical part. How are we to choose between the two workings of this one faculty? This is a problem of decisive import, because the question here is one of either maintaining for the future the rights of the

highest human ideal ever conceived, that is, the definitive integration of Christian morals with the Hellenic ideal of contemplation, or of yielding to the tendency which would have us set out for the goal, but locate the end of ends in the going. Yet, before solving this problem, we must note a vital distinction. Every query about happiness will be given two answers at the present juncture, according as the view is of a complete happiness beyond actual human experience, or of the relative happiness which takes the other as a model and helps to make us ready for it.

Happiness always means a kind of rounded perfection. But we are to understand this word in different senses, because the types of being which are capable of happiness can reach uneven levels of perfection. Thus happiness is essentially present with God: His being and activity are one, His joy is in Himself and not in another. But among the angels, happiness is the grand perfection of an activity that joins them to the uncreated good, which act of theirs is eternal and unique. As for men in the present life, the peak of perfection is marked by an activity linking them to God, but it is an activity that cannot be kept up, as it has to be broken off and begun all over again and, therefore, is manifold and not unique. This is precisely why in our normal life complete happiness is out of our reach. It is also why Aristotle, when he locates human happiness in this life (*Ethics,* I, c.10), says it is imperfect, and after much thought concludes, "we call them happy as men." But we for our part have from God the promise of a perfect happiness when, as

St. Matthew says (c.22), we shall be as the angels in heaven, and when there is question of this full felicity, all objection gives way, for it is by an act that is one, unbroken, eternal that the mind of man is united to God in a state of happiness. In the case of our earthly life, however, we fail of the oneness and continuity of such action, and so far we fall short of realization. All the same we have some bit of this happiness, and the more continuous and unified our activity, the more nearly it expresses the essence of happiness. It is for this reason that the active life, taken up with many things, is farther from the meaning of happiness than the contemplative, which is concerned with just one thing, that is, with attending to truth; and even if man does sometimes interrupt this act, it is always at hand and he can go on with it; and if he breaks it off, for instance, to sleep or to satisfy some human need, this is done only in view of resuming it, and the act seems to enjoy a kind of continuity (1–2, q.5, a.4).

We see now why happiness, as contemplation of the truth, cannot be merely the exercise of scientific thought.

We just remarked that happiness for man is of two kinds, perfect and imperfect. By perfect happiness we understand that which arrives at the true meaning of happiness, and by imperfect that which does not arrive there, but has some share in it, and is like it from some particular point of view. We may compare these two types to the perfect prudence which man has because he knows the reason for what he does, and the imperfect prudence which animals exhibit when they follow their instincts and go through particular acts like those that suppose prudence. This happiness cannot be the

study of the speculative sciences. To prove our case, we note that the field of speculative science does not reach farther than the power of its principles, for in the principles of a science is its whole potential content. But the leading principles of the speculative sciences are learned by the aid of the senses, as Aristotle shows in the opening of his *Metaphysics* and in the conclusion of his *Analytics*. This is why the entire field of the speculative sciences does not go beyond the point to which sense knowledge can bring us. And man's happiness, that is, his full realization, is not in sense knowledge. For nothing receives any perfection from what is lower than itself, unless there is in the lower some share of the higher. Now, because it is plain that the form of a stone, or of any thing of sense, is lower than man, the human intellect cannot get its perfection from the form of the stone as such, but it can in so far as there is in that form, by participation, a likeness of something above the human intellect, as, for example, an intelligible light or anything of that kind. But anything that exists by favor of another can be reduced to something that exists in its own right. Hence, the final human perfection must come through knowing something above the human mind. And as we have shown (1, q.88, a.2) that one cannot, by means of sense experience, come to a knowledge of separate substances which are above the human intellect, we are left with the fact that man's full happiness cannot consist in a study of speculative science. For all that, when there exists in sense forms a shared likeness of higher things, the study of speculative science gives us a little corner of true and perfect happiness (1–2, q.3, a.6).

So, when we look deeper into our spiritual activity, we are brought back more decisively to the point at

which the analysis of our desires had left us: within man's essence is a need of the transcendent and absolute, and this, like the very definition of man, cannot content us with what we are or give us what we are not. We accept, then, without any arbitrary hobbling, every demand written into the structure of our thought. Unless we maim it in its loftiest flights, human thought will never be satisfied with less than having reached the essence of God.

Things can be in potency in either of two ways. The first is a natural way, that is, it concerns that which can be reduced from potency to act by a natural agent. The second is to be in potency with regard to that which cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent, but by an agent of another kind. We show this from the realm of organisms. Take, for example, a child grown to be a man: this is within his natural power; or again sperm developed into an animal. But take wood made into a chair, or a blind man become clear-sighted; this is not within their natural power.

It is the same way with our intellect. To be sure, the intellect is in natural potency as to some knowable things, that is, those that can be actualized by "the active intellect," which is that inner principle by whose functioning we can actually know. But it is impossible for us to reach the human end of ends by thus bringing our intellect into operation, for the work of the active intellect lies in making actually intelligible the images which are but potentially so. Now, because these images are received by the senses, our intellect can be actualized by the active intellect only with regard to those knowable objects of which we can acquire knowledge by the aid of the world that can be sensed. But the end of ends can-

not consist in such knowledge, because once the end of ends is reached, natural desire should abate and die down. And yet let a man use his intellect, and make all the progress he can in the kind of knowledge that is got from the senses, still he always has a desire to know something more. In fact, the things that our senses cannot know, and of which we can get only a modicum of knowledge by beginning with the senses, are beyond number, so much so that we can perhaps come to know *that* such things are, but not *what* they are, because the essences of spiritual things are of another kind than those of physical things, and we may say that, in comparison with these, they are incommensurably transcendent. And even if we did fully grasp that which comes within the range of the senses, there are things whose nature we cannot know with certitude, for we do not know certain things at all, and we know others poorly.

The desire to know, to have a perfect knowledge, always remains with us; it is inborn, and an inborn or native desire cannot be aimless. We shall, therefore, reach our end of ends only if a higher agent than those connatural with us actualizes our intellect and satisfies our characteristic bent for knowledge. Now, this urge to know is such that when we know effects, we want to know the causes, and no matter what the thing in question be, or which of its properties we may know, our desire does not rest until we know the essence of it. And so our born desire to know is restless until we know the first cause, and not in any haphazard way, but in its essence. This first cause is God. The end of ends, then, for an intelligent creature is to see God as he essentially is (*Compendium Theologiae,* c.4).

United with God as the one object in which human happiness consists, the soul will have reached the

end of ends towards which its whole moral activity tends (1-2, q.3, a.8). Yet it might seem that by putting off to a future experience the union of man with God, we had rather deferred than solved the problem of happiness, because if God is in essence transcendent to us, He will ever remain so.

How this can be is what we have now to study. For one thing, it is clear that, since our mind cannot know anything except through an image of it, we cannot know the essence of one thing through the image of another, and the farther the image through which the mind knows is from the thing known, the less perfect the knowledge our intellect has of the essence of this thing. If, for instance, our mind were to know an ox through the image of an ass, it would know its essence imperfectly, that is, only in its genus; and it would know its essence even more imperfectly if it knew it through the image of a stone, because that is a genus farther removed. And if it should know it through the image of something whose genus had nothing in common with any ox, it would not know the essence of it at all.

At any rate, it is clear that no created thing can have a common genus with God. And if this is so, God cannot be known in His essence through any created species, whether this is known to sense or to intellect. That God Himself be known to us in His essence, therefore, He must take the form of the intellect which knows Him, and unite Himself to it, not making one nature with it, but as the intelligible image becomes one with the intellect which knows it. For as He is in His being, so He is in His truth, and truth is the form of the intellect. Besides, it is needful that, whatever acquires a form, should have some fitness or disposition for that form. But

our intellect by its nature is not in complete readiness to receive the form of truth, else it would have had it from the beginning. Therefore, when it does take it on, it must be raised toward it by a new and superadded disposition. We call this disposition the Light of Glory. Just as heat, which disposes to the form of fire, can come only from fire, so our intellect can attain its perfection only as helped by this Light and led by God, whose nature it is to have this same Light. Of this Light of Glory it is written (Psalm 35): "In thy light we shall see light (*in lumine tuo videbimus lumen*)."

Now, if we suppose this end reached, our natural desire should surely be satisfied, because the divine essence, united, as we have said, to the intellect of him who sees God, is at once the sufficient source of all knowledge and the fountain of all goodness, so that nothing remains to be desired. To know God in His essence and as He knows Himself, this is the most perfect manner of becoming like God. And if we do not comprehend Him as He comprehends Himself, this is not because we are ignorant of a part of Him, for He has no parts; but because we do not know Him as perfectly as He can be known, or because the power of our intellect, though it knows Him, is not possibly equal to the truth by which He is knowable. For His splendor or truth is without limit, whereas our intellect is limited; His intellect, like the truth which is its object, has no bounds. This is why God knows Himself exactly as He is knowable, or as a person knows a conclusion who sees it demonstrated, and not as one knows it imperfectly and as a hypothesis.

We have said that the end of ends for man is happiness. Human felicity or happiness consists in seeing God in His essence. But as regards its perfection, man's happiness is far

from God's, because it is by His nature that God has this happiness, whereas man, as we have explained, gets hold of it only by sharing the divine light (*Compend. Th.*, c.105–6; *cf. Quodlibet.*, 7, q.1, a.1).

These luminous pages are their own fit commentary; yet for those who have not in mind the organic structure of the system, we underscore three distinctive points of the teaching unfolded here.

The first is the much-censured *transcendence* which Thomistic thought attributes to God—a feature so deeply imbedded in the divine essence that not only no creature, in any state, can ever be or become God, but no creature, in any state, may pretend to a "natural" knowledge of His essence. The direct seeing of God will always be beyond the reach of the human intellect by the whole distance that God is above man, and hence, to see God can never be anything but a supernatural grace (1, q.12, a.2, and a.5; *C.G.*, 3, c.53). This grace does not bring the created mind into the interior of the divine essence, but is poured out on it to enlighten it and enable it to look upon that essence.

The second mark is the *continuity* of Thomistic thought, based on the applicability of the principle of causality to the visible world. At the height of his grandest speculations, St. Thomas never loses hold of the guiding thread of "analogy," which he has taken at the beginning. The expression "Light of Glory" is a comparison, but it is very reasonable.

In fact, just as there are objects of sense, for instance, these stones, a means to perceive them by, namely the sense image, and a medium that makes them visible, the light of the sun; so we have objectives of the intellect, such as the essence of the stones, a means by which we know them, that is the phantasm of visible things, and one that makes them intelligible to us, namely, the active intellect, which is a kind of light in relation to them. In a similar way we have at the last, in our state of realization, a perceived object, the divine essence, but in this case knowledge is direct and intuitive, and we have no medium through which we know that essence, but only a kind of light which makes it known to us (3, d.24, q.1, a.2; *C.G.*, 3, c.53).

A third chief feature is the *oneness* which this analogy implies between man's moral activity, with the relative happiness that goes with it, and the absolute happiness which is the substance of morality come to its full flower. Because the intellectual seeing of God is to bring human nature to the very peak of its expression and wholly to actualize this "humanity," which is otherwise realized but brokenly, we are sure that, by gathering them up and bringing them to a pointed perfection, happiness will warrant all the acts, all the desires, all the joys which, agreeing with the noblest and most "human" needs of our nature, are beforehand like the state of the soul whose boundless hopes will at last be fulfilled. This is why no moral system merits better than that of

Thomas the epithet "humanistic," and without the slightest paradox we may describe Thomism as an integral humanism.

From what has been said, it is plain that in the joy which comes of seeing God, all human desire will be realized, as it is said in Psalm 105: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." And in fact all human desires do find their completion in that vision, as we may show by taking them one by one.

Because he has an intelligence, one of man's desires is to know the truth. It is this desire that men satisfy by living a life of contemplation. Evidently, such a desire will come to fruition when, at sight of the first truth, all that the mind naturally wishes to know will become known to it (*cf. C.G.*, 3, c.59).

Man, as a rational animal, also has a desire to put affairs into their places. It is this desire he tries to satisfy by devoting himself to a life of action and social service. The main objective of this desire is to organize the whole of human life in a reasonable way, that is, to live a life of virtue; for the end or value proposed to himself by every active good man is his own virtue, as the end or aim of the strong man is a strenuous life. And this desire will be gratified when reason shall come to its full vigor and be enlightened by a divine light, so that it is no longer open to deception.

Social life also is accompanied by certain goods, such as high honors, which men need for life in society (if a man wants these over-much, he is ambitious and proud). But a man comes to the highest honors by seeing God, because, as we showed (c.51), he is in a way united to God. That is why the blessed or happy in union with Him are called

"kings," just as we say that He is the king of the ages. "They shall reign with Him" (Apocalypse, c.20). Another thing that people want in social life is name and reputation, and if their desire for it is uncontrolled, we say they seek empty glory. But at the sight of God, men become renowned, not in human opinion, which deceives and is deceived, but in the absolute knowledge of God and of all the saints. It is for this reason that in Scripture happiness is often called "glory," as we read (Psalm 149): "The saints shall rejoice in glory." And there is one last thing that men are after in social life, namely riches, and when our taste for these and our pursuit of them runs out of bounds, we either become tight or unjust. But in happiness with God there is plenty of all values, because the blessed there enjoy Him who sums up the perfection of all good things. So we read in the Book of Wisdom (c.7): "All good things came to me together with her," and in Psalm 111: "Glory and wealth shall be in his house."

A third desire common to man and all animals, is to be satiated with pleasure. Men seek to satisfy this desire mainly by voluptuous living and, when they overwork it, become intemperate and incontinent. Now, in happiness with God joy is perfect, and this as deeply overshadows sensual pleasure, which even the brute animals take delight in, as intellect outdoes sense. And as this good which we shall enjoy is higher than any sense good, and more intimate and persistently delicious, so this delectation is freer from any admixture of what could sadden or disquiet us. Psalm 35 speaks of this: "They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, and Thou shalt make them drunk of the torrent of Thy pleasure."

Yet one more inborn desire, common to all creatures: they struggle with all their might for self-preservation. When

overdone, this urge makes men timid, and afraid, and sparing of hard work. This desire will be fully satisfied when the happy or blessed, shielded from every harm, shall rejoice in a genuine and lasting way, as is told by Isaias (c.49) and in the Apocalypse (c.16): "They shall no more hunger nor thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat."

The patent inference is that it is in seeing God that intelligent beings find real happiness. In this vision all desire comes to rest, and in it is found that true sufficiency of all values which, in Aristotle's view (*Ethics,* bk.10), is required for happiness. So Boëthius also says (*de Consol. Phil.,* 3) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the assembling of all good things." In our present life, however, nothing comes closer to this full and final happiness than the way of those who contemplate truth as well as can be done now. The philosophers, not quite able to know this chief felicity, have said that man's grand happiness is the contemplation which he can reach in this life. For the same reason, Holy Scripture commends the contemplative above other ways of life, as Our Lord says (Luke, 10): Mary has chosen the better part, namely, the contemplation of truth, which shall not be taken from her. In fact, contemplation of truth begins in the present life, but is completed in the future life; whereas the active and social life does not last beyond the present (*C.G.,* 3, c.63).

Such is the end, and the whole moral life leads us safely to it. But as we can reach it only by action, we must inquire what a human act is.

Chapter II

STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN ACT

Ethics is of the practical order, it is the science of what is to be done to win happiness. It thus relates closely to the description and the prescription of specific actions. And because it is a science, it has to be grounded on the universal. We must begin, therefore, with the very broadest principles of action and come down to the concrete detail of moral doings. And since happiness, the attaining of which is our problem, is man's own peculiar value, we should inquire first into voluntary acts, which are man's own, and leave to a later chapter the acts common to man and beast and known as the emotions. What is a voluntary act?

I. THE WILLED ACT

A willed act is a reasonable act. And as man of course is a rational being, human acts are willed.

For a clear understanding of this we must remember that the source of some acts or movements is within the being which acts or is moved, and that the source of others is without that being. For example, when a stone is raised, as when you give it a throw, the source of its motion is outside

the stone; but when it falls (*i. e.,* when it naturally falls) the origin of its motion is within the stone itself. Now, of those things that are moved from within, some move themselves and some do not. And as everything that moves or is moved does so for an end (as we saw: 1–2, q.1, a.2), we shall consider as wholly moved by an inner principle those beings in which there is both a principle to move them and a principle to move them for an end.

If anything is to be done for an end, some knowledge of this end is required. So every being that acts or is moved by some inner principle implying a knowledge of the end, has truly within itself the source of its activity, and it not only acts, but acts in view of the end. As for those beings that have no knowledge of ends, even though they have an inner principle of action or movement, the principle which causes them to act or be moved for an end is not in them, but in some other, who impresses on them the principle of their movement towards the end. This is why we say of such beings that they do not move themselves, but are moved, and of those that know their end we say that they move themselves, precisely because they have within them the principle which moves them both to act and to act for an end. And thus, because their acting and their acting for an end are both from an inner source, their movements and acts are called *voluntary*. The word voluntary means that the movement or activity comes from a being's own inclination. For this reason, Aristotle and Gregory and John Damascene did not define the willed act simply as something whose source is within, but they added, "with knowledge." And because man best of all knows the purpose of what he does and initiates his own activity, his actions are out and out willed or voluntary (1–2, q.6, a.1).

Particularly or out and out, we say; and, in this visible world, we might say, uniquely. For if the willed act is a function of knowledge, it comes and goes with knowledge and varies with it. Where, then, there is strictly speaking no knowledge of end, as in the case of animals pursuing ends without seeing them as such, there is, strictly speaking, no will. On the other hand, it is enough that there be inner freedom of action, with consciousness of the end sought, for the willed act to exist, though it may be that no external action is carried out. In a word, we call voluntary anything that proceeds from the will.

We may say that one thing can come from another in either of two senses. First, it can spring directly from it if it arises out of the activity of the other, as, for instance, warmth comes from the action of heating. Secondly, it can come in a roundabout way, from the mere fact that the thing does not act, as the sailing of a vessel is said to be from the pilot, even when he has ceased to govern her. It must be understood, however, that what results from the absence of one's action is not imputed to him as cause, merely for the reason that he does not act, but only when he could and should do something. For example, if a pilot could not man his ship, or if the running of her was not in his hands, we would not charge him with anything that might happen in his absence. In like manner, the will, by willing and acting, can put a stop to not-willing and not-acting, and sometimes ought to do it: and of course the not-willing or not-acting is then imputed to the will as arising from it. And so there can be "a willed act without an act"; first, at such times as there is no external act,

but an interior one, as when one wills not to act, and again when there is not even an interior act, as when one does not will to act (1–2, q.6, a.3).

This absolute within-ness of will is explained by the fact that will is the most finished work of nature. Of course, we know that, in the Aristotelian sense, "nature" is the inner and direct source of the activity and doings of any being. And we now come to what is most interior in nature—its finality; and in understanding this as within nature itself, we have met the will. Henceforth we shall realize why this will, which does not let even its own finality come in from the outside, would much less let its movement and action be imposed on it from without. By the inner-ness, then, which is its own essence, the will is strictly inviolable. Violence can be brought from without only on acts that are exterior to it and so are different in character from it; and these acts remain subject to its control.

The will has two acts; one belongs immediately to it because it comes from it. This is the act of willing. The other is an act of the will in the sense that the will commands it, but it is done with the help of some other faculty. For example, to walk or to speak is an act commanded by the will, though carried out by some other power. As for acts commanded by the will, plainly the will can suffer violence, to the extent that the exterior members can be kept by force from obeying the order of the will. But violence cannot enter the field of the proper action of the will itself. The reason

is that an act of the will is simply the type of inclination that comes from an inner principle with knowledge, as the "natural" appetite is an inclination arising from an inner source, but without knowledge. Now, whatever is forced or violent has some external origin. It is thus against the very meaning of an act of the will that it be forced or violent, precisely as it is against the essential inclination or natural tendency of a stone to rise. A stone can be lifted up by force; but it is not possible that this forced movement be from its native tendency. So, too, a man can be taken by force; but that he should go of his own will is a contradiction to the kind of thing that force is (1–2, q.6, a.4).

Such is the character of the voluntary act. We have a means now to qualify every act, and with no great risk of error to put it among acts which do or do not arise from the will. It is clear, first of all, that that which is forced is still less compatible with the voluntary than it is with the "natural," for the two terms are opposed to each other as that which comes from within and that which is endured from without. We know at the outset, then, that no act resulting from outer force brought to bear upon our body, is chargeable to our will (*ibid.*, a.5). Yet it is just as clear, and the point is central and important, that nothing which might try to act directly on the will, can violate it. We inflict on the body, which is commanded by the will, acts condemned by the will, but no one can impose anything on the will by force; not even God could do it, for whatever He might impose on it, would become voluntary in passing

through the will. We do not doubt that it is correct to say with Scripture (Prov. 22) : The heart of the king is in the hand of God : whithersoever he will, He shall turn it. All the same, the heart is a human heart, and God does not cause it to will anything but voluntary acts (*ibid.,* a.4, ad 1).

Here, then, we see the profound oneness of the coöperation given by God to the material world with that which he gives to the moral world. This unity is explained by the fact that the will is a nature whose finality is conscious and within. Now, it occurs to no one to deny that the natural movement of a body is and remains natural, even though it has received its nature from God and is started by God as its first mover; nor would anyone wish to deny that the voluntary movement of a being remains voluntary in the very measure that its will is moved by God (*ibid.,* a.1, ad 3). In a word, the coöperation of God does apply to beings, but is not a substitute for them. It moves nature as nature, and will as will (*De Veritate,* q.22, a.8).

Here some one might cite the endless repercussions which such a principle would start on a detailed criticism of human acts, and even now he senses how hard it is for a man to pass off on others the responsibility for his own acts. We have said that nothing from without can force this principle; let us get rid now of the notion that anything can force it from within. The great interior sources of violence are the emotions, and the most general of these are concupis-

cence and fear. We now inquire whether the first can smother the voluntary character of our acts. Evidently it cannot. Concupiscence does really take us hot after the object of our desire, it inclines the will to choose what we want, and consequently it reënforces the free character of the act and does not tend to efface it (*ibid.*).

The problem raised by fear is more subtle; but, with a shade of difference, the same conclusion is sound. We cannot judge absolutely of the quality of an act unless we hold a complete list of the circumstances that go with it. An act born of fear may seem involuntary if taken in the abstract, but it is always seen to be voluntary when we look into the specific motives that mark it off. No one, for instance, would throw goods into the sea just for the fun of it, but no one would hesitate to do so to escape a wreck. This is a voluntary act, then, though he who does it is driven by the circumstances (*ibid.*, a.6 and *Quodlibet.*, 5, q.10).

There remains a problem which, because of its practical consequences, is even more important; namely, the bearing of ignorance on the free character of human acts.

By the very fact that it excludes knowledge, ignorance makes an act involuntary. For we have seen (a.2) that knowledge must precede an act if that act is to be free. Yet not every kind of ignorance negates this needed knowledge.

We must understand that ignorance can be related to the free act in different ways: it may accompany the act, or it may go before the act, or it may follow the act.

Ignorance accompanies the act when a person does not know what he is doing, but would do it just the same, even if he knew. In fact, in such case it is not ignorance that leads him to will what he does: it is simply an accident that the action is unknown. An example of such ignorance would be this: a man who is willing to kill an enemy, does unknowingly kill him under the impression that he is killing a deer. Now, this ignorance does not make the act involuntary, as Aristotle notes (*Ethics,* 3) because it does not imply anything averse to the will; it only makes it not-voluntary, because what is not known can not be actually willed.

Secondly, ignorance follows an act of the will when that ignorance itself is willed. This can happen in two ways, according to the two kinds of voluntary acts which we have cited above (a.3, ad 1). An example of the first is this: the act of the will has ignorance for its end, when one wishes not to know in order to have an excuse for wrong-doing, or so as not to give it up, as Job says (c.21): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." We call this ignorance *affected.* In a second way, one is said to be voluntarily ignorant if he does not know what he could and should know, for to do nothing and not to will are acts of the will, as was said before (a.2). We have an example of this sort of ignorance when a person does not actually think of what he might and should think of. This is the ignorance of a bad will and arises from emotion or from habit. The same is true if a man does not take care to acquire the knowledge which he should have; and in this sense we take as voluntary an ignorance of

the principles of right, which a man neglects and lets slip, even though he is required to know them. The ignorance is willed, because in each of these instances it cannot give rise to an act that is simply involuntary; yet it makes the act involuntary in a relative degree, namely, in the sense that it precedes the movement of the will to do a particular act, which, if a person knew he were doing, would not be done.

Besides, ignorance can go before the will in such a way that, though it is voluntary, it still causes the willing of what otherwise would not be willed; as when a man is ignorant of some detail about an act, which he is not required to know, and as a result does what he would not do if he knew. For instance, a man may take all precaution and yet not know that anyone is going along the road: he fires and kills a passerby. Such ignorance as this makes an act purely and simply involuntary (1–2, q.6, a.8).

Thus all these inquiries lead us to one conclusion, namely, that the willed act is present with, and only with, an inner principle of action, plus knowledge of the end pursued. Hence, the formula: "*Actus proprie dicuntur humani, prout sunt voluntarii,*" *i. e.* an act is rightly called human only if it is free. And this is simply to say that the human and the willed act are one and the same. From all of which we may conclude that the voluntariness of an act resides not in the materiality even of the movement which outlines it, since men, animals, plants, and things are all moved; but man is unique in willing for the reason that he is the sole creature that has in itself a principle for the orientation of its own life.

II. WILL IN THE CONCRETE

We know now what are the bounds of the willed act as such, and we go on to examine the will, taken in itself and in its concrete reality. The order we are to follow in this inquiry will necessarily be imposed on us by an analysis of the relations which the will has to its end, that is, to its proper object. It is plain, in the first place, that the will has no other object than the good, and we shall have to understand in a literal way that it is of the very essence of the will never to do anything except for a good. The proposition is evident from the very definition of desire, of which will is one kind, and the definition of the good. The good is that which we desire; we desire only the good: these are equivalent terms. Now, will is a reasoned desire, that is to say, it is the desire of a good known by reason (*C.G.*, 1, c.96; *De Veritate*, q.22, a.1; 1-2, q.8, a.1). But what is not at once seen, though it is brought to light by St. Thomas' analysis, is the complexity into which this fact throws the several elements of the moral act.

Sometimes the word "will" means the power of willing, and again it stands for the exercise of this power. If we want to speak of will in the sense of a power, it extends to both means and end. The truth is, each faculty takes in everything that in any way shares the nature of its object, as sight extends to everything which in any way has color, and the substance of good, which is the proper object of the will, is

found in the end, but just as surely in the means. However, if we speak of the will in the limited sense of voluntary action, then, to be exact, it is a question of end only. For any act that gets its name from a faculty, properly means only the act of that faculty, as, for example, to know means solely the act of intellect. Now, the simple act of a faculty is directed towards what is strictly the object of that faculty. And as everything that is good and willed for itself is an end, in a literal sense the will points to the end; and as the means, on the contrary, are not good or willed for themselves, but in relation to the end, the will never moves unless it moves towards the end, so that what it wills in them, is the end. In the same way, an act of intellect strictly deals with what is knowable in itself, that is to say, with principles; and knowledge deduced from these principles is not knowledge, except in the light of the principles. For in the field of the desirable the end is what first principles are in the order of the knowable (1–2, q.8, a.2).

Here, then, we have the way in which the complexity of the willed act just mentioned flows from this analysis.

Because the end is willed for itself and the means only for the end, it is plain that the will can aim at the end as such without aiming at the means, but that it cannot aim at the means without aiming at the end. The will, therefore, can go towards the end in either of two senses—first toward the end seen precisely as the end, and secondly, toward the end regarded as the cause of willing the means.

It is also patent that one and the same act of the will bears on the end, in the sense of the reason of desiring the means,

and on the means themselves. But a different act points the will towards the end taken in itself, and sometimes it precedes the other; as when a man first of all wants health, and afterwards, figuring out how to get it, is willing to call in a doctor to cure him. In the domain of intellect also we have the same procedure: first we know the principles in themselves, and afterwards we understand them in the conclusions drawn from them, in the sense that we assent to the conclusions because of the principles (1–2, q.8, a.3).

This basic duality in the act of the will outlines the order we must follow in studying the will. We shall examine successively: (a) the willing of the end; (b) the willing of the means; which will put us in a position to emphasize the interpenetration really and ceaselessly occurring between the two moments of willing which we have just defined.

A. WILLING THE END

In a study of the act by which the will seeks the end, we should first ask ourselves, what sets the will in action? And no doubt such a method seems to avoid the moot question: Is the will not able by its essence to start itself towards the good? Yet the fact is that it is to this very question that our research will answer: seeking whether such or such a faculty, such or such a being exterior to us, can or cannot move our will, we inevitably find the deep source of its activity, what the will receives from

this source and what the will gives to it. Let us take the problem first from the point of view of the intellect and its relation to the will.

One thing needs to be started by another only in so far as it is somehow in potency: what is in potency can be brought into act only by something that is in act; and it is this last which is justly called a starter. Now, a power of the soul may be said to be in potency with regard to several things in either of two senses: first, as to the fact of acting or not acting; secondly, as to the fact of doing this act rather than that. Take, as an example, vision: sometimes we actually see, sometimes we do not see; sometimes we see white and sometimes black. There is need, then, that something move the vision in these two senses, namely, to the *exercise* or use of its act and to the *determination* of its act. The first of these depends on the subject, who may be disposed to act or not to act; the other, however, depends on the object which gives a specific turn to the act.

We may first take the movement of the subject. This arises from some agent, and because every agent acts for an end, as we have shown (q.1, a.2), the source of the movement is in the end; and so the art to which the end belongs commands and moves the art to which the means belong: for instance, the art of navigation commands maritime talent, as Aristotle says in the second book of his *Physics*. Now the good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will; and from this point of view the will brings the other powers of the soul into activity. For we use other powers of the soul when we will: the ends and perfections of all other powers of the soul are comprised, as specific values, under the object of the will. And always an art or power to

which a universal end belongs calls into action the art or power to which a particular end, included under that universal end, belongs. Thus the general of an army, whose aim is the common good, that is, the order of the whole army, moves and commands each of his subordinates, and these aim at order on the battle front.

However, the object moves in its turn, for it specifies the act after the fashion of a formal principle by which an action is specified in subhuman things, as heating from fire. And the first formal principle is being and the truly universal, which is the object of the intellect, and it is by this kind of motion that the intellect moves the will by presenting its object to it (1–2, q.9, a.1; *cf. De Veritate,* q.22, a.12).

The purpose of this analysis is to make evident the essentially mixed character of every act of the will. It is a fact that the psychologist always has trouble when he has to describe the will from the point of view of the concrete acts in which it is exhibited. The will is everywhere in our inner life, but nowhere if we try to isolate it. Especially in what concerns our reasoned acts, we may say that there is not one of our faculties whose operation cannot eventually become matter for an act of the will: I will to eat, to take a walk, to feel, to know; I will to will. The will makes use of all the other faculties at its pleasure. It sets them in motion or keeps them from acting, so much so that, in the last analysis, it is because we have a will that we can always will or not will what we do will or do not will. Yet, correlatively, the will of itself can never determine the

nature of an act. The will is a tendency which of itself is blind, and it becomes voluntary or reasonable only at the moment when reason puts within its reach the several objects among which it may choose. An act is voluntary because the will wills it, but the will takes this object rather than that only because reason offers it as good; and it is the successive presentations of reason, making known to the will the divers possible objects among which its choice may be made, that successively move the will toward this object rather than toward that other. It is the will that causes me to will, but it is the intellect that causes my will to will what I will; and in this sense my intellect acts upon my will as my will acts on my intellect.

Itself indifferent, the will is always a fertile source of spontaneous determination towards whatever the intellect proposes to it as good. This spontaneity, however real it be, does not suppose that the will is the first origin of its activity; for just as there must be an external object to specify a voluntary act, so there must be an exterior principle to give a reason for the first impulse which our decisions actually make use of. At least, to run back infinitely in the conditions for the exercise of our acts, would be as absurd here as anywhere else. So we must suppose a first mover of our will, as we had to conclude to a first mover of all movement in general (a.4). And this first mover of willed activity ought to be exterior to our will, precisely as the mover of the world is

exterior to the world. Yet we must find an exterior mover of the will who respects the inner character that is of the essence of the will. Who, then, could move the will from the outside and yet not keep the will from being an inner principle which determines itself from the inside? God alone. For He who moves nature as nature can also move the will as will, and even, far from there being here one of those forced dialectical conclusions to which reason gives in, but the intellect does not, we may say that the cause of an inner movement being a cause of the internal character of this movement, this cause alone can act upon it, and that this cause cannot not act on it, since without the cause the movement would not be. Hence this decisive formula: *"Deus igitur est causa nobis non solum voluntatis, sed etiam volendi"* (*C.G.*, 3, c.89), *i.e.*, God is the cause of both our will and our willing. And yet the action of God, however deeply it penetrates, respects the spontaneity which it has given to the human will.

The providence of God is not a destroyer of the nature of things, but their preserver. This is why it moves each thing according to its status, so that from necessary causes the effects of the divine action follow necessarily, but from contingent causes the effects are contingent. Thus because the will is an active principle not set on just one effect, but can indifferently work out any of several, God so moves it as not to force it to one effect, and its action is not inevitable but free, except of course in relation to that to which it is naturally moved (1–2, q.10, a.4).

Now, will is naturally in act toward the good in general, and hence necessarily wills all that is good: love, science, joy, and so on, and it would unavoidably will any concrete object in particular if this object were an absolute good. But there is no such object in our human experience. Morals, then, is the process of the will seeking the absolute value by way of particular values, just as science is the exercise of intellect intent upon being which it seeks by way of particular beings. This procedure of the will should be described under its two chief aspects: it enjoys the good when it has it, and it tends towards good when it has it not. What is this, "to enjoy"? In the Latin, enjoyment is called *fruitio*, which word is plainly from *fructus* or fruit. Now fruit is what we get last from the tree and eat with pleasure, and by analogy we give the name fruition or enjoyment to the possession of the ultimate good which we hope for and which we love. It lies, then, in an act of the will, and it never exists perfectly unless there is the actual seizing of the end that is the last end, for it is only there that the movement of will is completed and comes fully to rest. And this means that there cannot be perfect joy in an experience and a morals which are solely of earth, for as yet we have not this consummatory end: we only tend towards it; so we have but imperfect joys (q.1, a.4) which go along with and crown every striving or conation on their way to being realized. And what is conation?

Conation, as the Latin word (*intentio*) suggests, means *to tend toward some thing.* Now that which tends toward some thing can either be the activity of a being that does move, or the movement of a being that is moved. But the movement of a being that is moved tends toward some thing because of the activity of that which moves it; and for this reason purpose and conation belong in the first place and mainly to that which moves things towards an end: as let us say the architect, or any leader moves others by his authority to the purpose which he himself has in view. And the will moves all the other faculties of the soul toward its end, as we proved. Thus it is plain that conation is an act of the will (1–2, q.12, a.1).

Now that we see their intimate unity, how can we keep apart these several aspects of the willed act: willing, enjoyment, conation? They are only three distinct relations which link one and the same act of the will to the end which it pursues. Taken absolutely and in itself, the act of willing is will: I will knowledge, I will health, and so on. Seen as come to its goal and content with victory, this act is enjoyment. As the will to reach an end by using the required means, this same act is conation (*ibid.,* ad 4). We have reached the precise point where analysis of the willed act may bear, according to cases, either on the willing of the end or on the willing of the means (*De Veritate,* q.22, a.14, 1-2, q.12, a.4). For conation consists essentially in the movement of the will which goes by way of the means to the end: to want medicine for the sake of health is yet to will health,

for whoever wills the end, wills the means. But there may and there necessarily will come a moment when I shall have to take the medicine; and, in order that the remedy give as little pain as possible, I shall make an empiric distinction of the wanting of an end and the willing of the means. The dissociation which is made in such instance between the two acts should serve as a guide in our analysis. Beginning, then, with the three relations of will to end, we shall study its three relations to the means. These relations are *choice, consent, use.*

B. CHOICE OF MEANS

An end is always willed, and the means to it should always be taken. Before choosing among them, one should think them over, and after they are chosen, the only thing to do is to use them. We shall examine first the nature of the pivotal act which ties will to means, that is their choice or selection. St. Thomas analyses this act with great care to bring out its essential complexity. Nevertheless, choice, as he sees it, is properly the will's.

The term selection means something that belongs both to reason (or intellect) and to will. Aristotle says in the *Ethics* (vi, 2) that choice is a conative knowing or an intelligent desire. However, when two things work together to make a whole, one of them serves as form for the other; and it is for this reason that Gregory of Nyssa says that choice is not desire taken in itself, nor deliberation taken in

itself, but a composite of the two. As we say that an animal consists of body and soul, and is not body alone or soul alone, so we may say of choice. And we should note that in acts of the soul the act which is of the essence of a power or a habit gets its form and species from a higher faculty or habit, because the lower functions under the higher. If, for instance, a man performs an act of courage for the love of God, this act materially is an act of courage, but formally, it is an act of charity. Still it is evident that reason precedes will in a sense and orders its act, that is, in so far as the will tends towards its object, as reason outlines it, because it is the faculty of knowing which presents the object to the faculty of desire; so the act by which will tends toward anything offered it as good, is, from the fact that it is reason which orders it towards its end, materially an act of the will, but formally an act of reason. In such case, the substance of the act enjoys the rôle of matter with regard to the order which a superior faculty imposes upon it, and that is why, substantially, choice is not an act of the intellect but of the will, for choice is a movement of the soul toward the good which the soul selects. This makes choice manifestly an act of the power of desire (1–2, q.13, a.1; *De Veritate,* q.22, a.15).

Arising from the will, selection or choice is as free as the will. Besides, as choice has to do only with the means, it is always free; for the only instance in which the will would cease to be free will never presents itself for selection or choice. This is the instance: in presence of the Supreme Value, the will, defined as desire of good, would of necessity will it. But the Supreme Value can only be an end, and never a means. It can thus be willed, but not chosen; and,

as a consequence, selection, as we define it, moves in the realm of relative values, and this domain is the one place of our freedom.

Man does not choose of necessity. This is because that which can not-exist need not exist. In the dual nature which is man's, we can give a reasonable account of the fact that it is possible for him to choose or not to choose. Man can will or not will, act or not act, and he can will either this or that. The basis of this power of willing is found in our very power of knowing: will can tend toward anything that reason can see as good. Now reason sees as good not only willing and acting, but also not-willing and not-acting. Besides, if we consider any particular good, the intellect can view it under the aspect of its good or its lack of good, which is what we mean by evil; and in this way it can understand any such good thing either as *"eligibile vel fugibile":* that is, as fit to be taken or to be left. But reason cannot envisage the perfect value, *i. e.,* welfare, from the point of view of evil or of any defect, and thus man of necessity wills welfare, and he could not will to be unhappy or to be miserable. But since choice has to do not with the end, but with the means, we have no choice of the perfect value or welfare, but only of particular values. Man, accordingly, is not forced, but free in his choices (1–2, q.13, a.6).

Choice or selection presupposes thought, for this metaphysical reason:

We saw that choice follows the judgment of reason on what should be done. Yet there is a good deal of uncertainty about what should be done because actions run into specific

and contingent cases, and these are so changeable as to be uncertain. Now, in doubtful and unsettled questions reason ventures no judgment without a previous inquiry, and so there must be this exploration before reason says what is to be done. It is this scrutiny that we call deliberation. Hence, Aristotle in his *Ethics* (bk.3) says that choice is a desire of something which has been considered beforehand (1–2, q.14, a.1).

Some will certainly object to this and say that deliberation is out of place in a study of the moral or free act, because to deliberate is plainly the business of reason. Yet this would be to miss the essentially mixed character of the activity which we describe.

When the acts of two faculties are inter-related, there is in each something of the other, and either could be named from the other. Now it is plain that the act of reason as director of the means, and the act of the will which tends to the means at the suggestion of reason, have an inter-relationship. Hence, in this will-act or choice there is evidently something of reason, that is, there is the order; and in deliberation, which is an act of reason, there is something of the will: first, by title of the matter, for we deliberate on what we should do, and also by title of motive, because in willing the end, we begin to think about the means. Aristotle says in the *Ethics* (bk.4, ch. 2) that choice is an intelligent desire, to show that intellect and will concur in it, and John Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.*, 2, c.22) says that deliberation is a desire that keeps informed, to make it clear that deliberation belongs in a measure to the will, on which inquiry is

founded and from which it arises, and also to the intellect, which conducts the inquiry (1–2, q.14, a.1, ad 1).

We may say that deliberation takes on a still more precise aspect when we study the voluntary act called consent, which goes with it and sanctions it. The center and substance of deliberation is an activity of the intellect. As such, it finds in itself the principle from which it arises and the conclusion to which it comes. Its point of departure may be a simple sense perception: a bit of bread, let us say, or some filings of iron. But it may also be a universal principle of either the theoretical or the practical order: *e. g.*, thou shalt not steal, or man cannot live without food. These are principles of deliberation, precisely because there is no room to deliberate about them. As for the outcome of deliberation, this is given us by the first means that we must accept if we care to reach the end (*ibid.*, a.6). But this purely intellectual conclusion of an action done on the will's account is normally completed by an acceptance or consent in which the will takes the leading rôle without a rival.

To consent supposes the application of one of the senses to some object. And the function of the senses is to know present things, whereas the imagination can form images of objects even in the absence of the imaged objects. And intellect, for its part, gets hold of universal notions and seizes them in both the presence and the absence of the individual objects. Now as the act of the conative faculty is a kind of

inclination toward the thing itself, presented in thought, this very application of our conative power to the thing, when the power fastens upon it, is given the name of sense, as if it had some sort of experience of the thing on which it fastens, in so far as it is satisfied with it. So it is said in the first chapter of the Book of Wisdom: "Think of the Lord in goodness." In this sense, to consent is an act of the conative faculty (1–2, q.15, a.1).

This act of consent is situated at a fixed point in the economy of the willed act, and because it has to do only with the choice of means, we may not allow it a direct bearing on the end. If we could, we should destroy the plan of this complex edifice.

Consent means the application of a conative movement to something that is at the disposal of the one applying it. In the practical order, we should put first the perception of the end, secondly, reflection on the means, and lastly, the desire of these means. Now, desire tends naturally to the end of ends; so that the turning of the conative activity on this end, once it is perceived, has not the nature of consent, but simply of will. Yet, when there is question of things which are means, and as such exist only in view of the end of ends, these means are matter for deliberation; and there can be consent with regard to them as often as the movement of desire is applied to the judgment which closes deliberation. A conative movement towards an end, however, does not apply to deliberation, but deliberation rather applies to it, because it presupposes a desire of the end; whereas desire of the means presupposes a deliberation already concluded (1–2, a.15, a.3).

Preceded by deliberate consent, choice in its turn is prolonged by the putting to work or the use of what the will needs to carry out the sentence just given. This action seems to be effected particularly by the powers of the soul, the members of the body, and the exterior instruments which the will employs to serve its purposes; but the action belongs to the worker and not to the tool which he uses. Thus it is the will that puts all the other powers to work, and to it properly belongs the business of employing them (1-2, q.16, a.1). So we may add a new link to the chain of operations which binds together our free activity, though it is important to note that here we are rather at the nearer end of another chain attached to the first. To perceive the good, to will it, to deliberate on the means of attaining it, and to consent to the result of this deliberation, to choose at last the means which this consent points out—here is a series complete by itself, one which we might regard as finished: the integral willing of the end includes the willing of the means. With use begins a second free activity, which certainly derives from the first, but instead of tending to will, as the other does, this tends precisely to take possession of the willed thing (*ibid.*, a.4). From this new point of view, the will commands acts through the organ of reason which puts the order into a formula.

To command is an act of reason, but it presupposes an act of the will. To realize this, we must remember that the acts

of will and of reason interact on each other, because intellect reasons on what is to be willed, and the will decides to reason. An act of will is preceded by an act of reason, and vice versa. And as the influence of the preceding act continues to make itself felt in the act following, it sometimes happens that a particular act of the will exists only according as there subsists virtually in it something of an anterior act of reason, as we said of use and choice; and, conversely, an act of reason exists only as there subsists virtually in it something of an act of the will. To command is essentially an act of reason; for he who commands orders him whom he commands to do something, by suggesting it or indicating it to him, and such ordering, no matter how it is done, is the work of reason. Now reason can suggest or point out in two ways: first, absolutely, and this intimation is expressed in the indicative, as when we say to anyone: This is what you are to do. But at other times reason suggests something to a person in a compelling way, expressed in the imperative: Do this. The first of the soul's powers that leads to the doing of things is the will, as we have said (q.9, a.1). And as a second mover moves by commanding, this is done in virtue of the will. It seems, then, that to command is an act of reason, but presupposes an act of the will, and in virtue of this the intellect proceeds at the command which the will gives to carry out the act (1–2, q.17, a.1).

This command goes just before the execution or doing of the act, and the action in turn utilizes the means selected for the end; there is almost nothing in soul or body that the will cannot employ in view of the end. It uses, first, the will itself, for it can will that we will. It makes use also of reason, as it can

command us to reflect, to pay attention, to give or withhold assent in all instances in which conclusions are not evident. It uses even the sense appetite, so far at any rate as our desires and impulses are under the control of reason, which in its turn comes within the purview of the act of will. It also employs, with the exception of the internal organs of vegetative life, at least the exterior members which obey the sense powers of the soul, and which, by way of them, obey reason (*ibid.*, q.17, a.6-9).

Such is the scheme according to which human acts are built up. They show an almost unlimited complexity in their elements, so that they can be combined to fit every conceivable formula and have every kind of repercussion on each other, since the will can consent to its own choice and consent to its consent, and use itself to give consent or to make a choice, and so on and so on indefinitely (q.16, a.4, ad 3). They also have a oneness of substance from the human soul whence they arise, and from the reciprocal order putting them together and ranking them above and below each other (q.1, a.4), and most of all from the end of ends, which guarantees a unity of principle to all these acts born of itself, and points them back towards itself as their origin.

Chapter III

MORAL VALUE AND DISVALUE

We know now what a human act is, but we do not yet know what gives it precisely the moral quality of a good act or a bad one. And perhaps it would embarrass us "to ground morals," that is to offer a just reason for this dual qualification, unless we kept in mind the perfect continuity which makes morals one with metaphysics. It is by integrating man with a system of beings and with the metaphysical laws of action that we have found the specific law of his activity. So, it is by taking moral value as an instance of value in general, and not by supposing *a priori* that it is an irreducible datum and a quasi-miracle, that we shall give it place and relevance in the elements of metaphysics.

What is value, quite aside from moral prepossession? It is an aspect of being. There is nothing that could justify the apparition of value at some point in human thought or in the scheme of things, if it were not present from the beginning. That which is, is; in as far as it is itself, it is one. So far as it is knowable (and all that has being can be an object of cognition), it is true. So far as desirable (and all that has being can be an object of desire),

it is good. The same is true of the human act. It need not put on a new quality and arise no one knows whence, to become good or bad. It need not even become one or the other: it is good in the measure in which it is, and bad exactly in so far as it does not exist. Let us lay down the principle, and then follow up concrete cases of it in their intricacy and detail.

We would say of good and evil in actions just what we say of good and evil in things, because anything acts itself out: such as it is, such it does. Now, each thing has as much of value as it has of being. As indeed we said in the Prima Pars (q.5, a.3), good and being are in a sense synonymous. Only God has the whole fulness of his being in a unified and simple way, whereas the fulness of being proper to each particular thing hinges on many relations. It may turn out that some of these have being from a certain point of view, and yet lack that fulness which belongs to them: for instance, the fulness of human being requires that it be made up of body and soul and gifted with all the powers and instruments of knowledge and action, and if a man lacks any of these, he has not the fulness of human being. Therefore, the more of being a man has, the more he has of value, but, contrariwise, in the measure in which he lacks something of the fulness of his being, in that measure he lacks good and is called evil. Take the example of a blind man: he shares goodness from the fact that he is alive, yet it is an evil for him to be without his sight. But if anything were without entity or goodness, you could not say that it was good or bad. And as the nature of good requires the very plentitude of being, if anything lacks what belongs to the fulness of its being, we would say

that it is not good in an absolute, but only in a relative sense, namely, in so far as it exists: yet it can be called a being purely and simply, and only relatively a non-being, as we said in an earlier book (1, q.5, a.1, ad 1). We would also say of every action that, so far as it possesses being, so far it contains good, but in the measure in which it lacks anything of the fulness of being due to a human action, just so far it lacks good and deserves the name of evil. Say, for instance, it falls short of the amount that reason fixes or is out of place, and so on (1–2, q.18, a.1).

This is the principle that we submit for the grading of moral acts. We have now to work out its consequences. The words quoted a moment ago from St. Thomas give us a hint of the essential factor needed for an action to have fully the character of a human action. It is not enough that it be done by man, for man does not always act as man. It must be aimed at an object fit for him in view of his nature. An animal fathers a monster; this is because his nature has gone wrong. A man brings his actions to bear on an object which is not properly his object; this also means that his way of acting has got off the track. Thus an action has its full quality of human action when it strives for an object which man should seek, and then too, *eo ipso,* it is good. On the other hand, an action has not its whole character of human action when the object which it aims at is not what the "form" of man requires, and then also, *eo ipso,* it is an evil action (1-2, q.18, a.2). There are, therefore, two kinds of ac-

tions: human or good actions and non-human or evil actions; and we may know them by the fact that the former point toward an object suitable for the nature of man, while the latter do not. And what is the nature of man and the "form" which makes him man? It is reason.

In the practical order, we know good from evil by a reference to reason, because, as Dionysius says in his work on *The Names of God* (part 4), the good of man is to conform to reason. And, conversely, that is evil which is out of line with reason. In fact, what is good for each thing is whatever goes with it according to its form; and what is evil for it, is that which is foreign to the order of its form. It is patent, then, that the difference between good and evil, in relation to the object, has a direct reference to reason and lies in the fact that the object is or is not harmonious with reason. For acts are termed human or moral in so far as they obey reason (1–2, q.18, a.5).

Let us state now, in less metaphysical terms, the relation set up between the human will and its objects. Whatever the will aims at, is its end; and as we have distinguished two points of application of the free act, the one interior (which is the act of willing), and the other exterior (the carrying out of the decision), so we shall distinguish two ends of the will, one interior, the other exterior; but we shall always keep this latter in a subordinate place.

Acts are called human in so far as they are free, as remarked above (q.1, a.1). Yet in a free act there is a double

act, namely, the inner act of the will and the exterior act. And each of these two acts has its object: properly, the end is the object of the inner act of the will, while the end of the exterior act is its object. Consequently, just as the exterior act gets its rating from its object, so the interior act of the will is ranked from its end, which is strictly its object. Now, everything that enters into the domain of the will plays the part of a form with regard to that which is in the domain of the exterior act, for the will in acting uses the members as tools. Nor have exterior acts any moral quality, except in so far as they are free. If, therefore, we look for the species of the human act in its form, we find it in its end; but if we seek it in its matter, we find it in the object of the exterior act. Aristotle says (*Ethics,* bk.5) that he who steals so as to commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief (1–2, q.18, a.6).

We thus come back to the interior act by which the will aims at the end and picks the means in view of the end, as to the very source of morality. We must, therefore, apply our analysis to this, in order to determine fully the conditions of the moral life. First of all, because the fitness of the object to the power of willing limits the goodness of the act, the object of will must be set before the will by reason.

As we have remarked, goodness of the will turns in a very exact sense on its object. And this object is offered to the will by reason. Indeed, the good known by the mind is the goal suited to the will, whereas the good of sense or of imagination is not adapted to the will, but to the desires of the senses, because will can tend to the universal good which

reason knows, whereas the hunger of the senses tends only to this or that good grasped by the faculty of feeling. For this reason, goodness of the will depends on reason in the same way that it depends on the object (1–2, q.19, a.3).

On the other hand, it is clear that the agreement of an object with human reason is not a one-way relation, and the nature of reason concurs to fix it as much as, and more than, the nature of the object, for an object is an object only from a faculty which understands it. But from whence does reason come? It is certainly a reason which is human in a precise sense, that is to say, supplied with everything needed in order to know; yet we cannot fully analyse its functions without seeing that it bears the mark of its divine origin. Primordially, the human intellect is as a blank slate, on which nothing is written. Hardly, however, have the first sense perceptions been felt, when the intellect forms universal ideas—the idea of being, for instance, and of principles, such as the principle of causality. Whence comes this readiness to conceive the universal and the necessary, whence comes it to the mere faculty of knowing a specific and contingent being? It can come only from God, from whom the natural light dwelling within the human intellect has the power to form, beginning with sense experience, notions and principles like the divine ideas. Each act of intellectual knowledge thus brings into play a light whose power arises from a transcendent origin.

And what is true in the order of knowledge is equally true in the order of action; for it is one and the same intellect that we call theoretic when it seeks truth in order to know it, and that we call practical when it seeks good in order to do it (1, q.79, a.11). Beginning, then, with our first sense experiences, we build principles of action as we work out principles of knowledge (*ibid.*, q.12), and these principles, by their very necessity and universality, are witnesses to the eternal and divine law from which they come (1–2, q.19, a.4). The agreement of the object with the will, which is the human and moral mark on acts, is now transferred to the agreement of the object with the bidding of conscience, itself an application of the first principles of action, which, for their part, are only human reflections of the divine law. How can this harmony of the object with reason and with the law of God be made sure of? By the subjection of the will to reason. If reason, in a hypothetical case, is right, and the will does not follow it, the will is plainly in the wrong, and it is equally so if, when reason is mistaken, the will refuses to follow it.

In an instance of indifferent acts, the will which breaks with a reason or conscience that is out of line, is in a sense bad, on account of its object, on which we know that goodness or badness of the will hinges. Certainly not on account of the object taken in its proper nature, but only so far as it is then perceived by reason as a good to be done or an evil

to be left undone. And as the object is what reason proposes to the will, as we have said (q.8, a.1), from the fact that any object is offered by reason as evil, the will, in taking a step toward that object, bears an evil mark. And this is true not only of what is indifferent, but also of that which is in itself good or bad. In fact, not only what is indifferent can wear the quality of good or evil, but even what is good can put on a character of evil, or what is evil, a character of good, because of the way in which reason understands it. For example, abstinence from fornication is good, and the will never starts toward this good of abstinence except as offered to it as a good by reason; if then such abstinence should be offered as evil by an unreliable mind, the will would aim at it as an evil and, therefore, be itself evil, for it would will something which is not an evil in itself, but which accidentally becomes an evil because of the way reason sees it. Thus, to believe in Christ is good in itself and necessary for salvation; yet the will purposes this only according as reason suggests it. This is why, if reason were to offer belief in Christ to the will as an evil, the will could accept it only as an evil; not that it is an evil in itself, but accidentally it would be an evil, because of the way reason views it. And consequently, Aristotle in the *Ethics* (7, c.9) says that he who does not follow right reason is truly incontinent, but that, incidentally, so is he who does not follow reason, even though it be on a wrong scent. It must be said, then, that if the will is out of step with reason, whether the latter be true or false, it is always evil (1–2, q.19, a.5; *cf. De Veritate,* q.17, a.4).

It is the same in the inverse instance, in which reason is deceived, but the will follows it. Certainly,

if there is question of those errors which are willed or which are due to an inexcusable ignorance (we have spoken of this in q.6, a.8), the will remains evil. But this is not so if the ignorance creeps into the act without a censurable neglect (1–2, q.19, a.6).

Let us recall our analysis of the voluntary act and of that movement of purpose which carries the will toward its end by way of the means used. We thus reach the conclusion that, in moral acts, goodness of the will turns especially on goodness of purpose. To follow reason, true or false, is really to be guided in the direction of the end which reason sets up and to employ the means only in view of the end. If, therefore, good and evil depend on the object, and if it is the purpose which points all toward this, it is necessarily the purpose which first orientates actions toward either good or evil. In every instance in which a purpose is bad, the action of the will also is wholly bad; for you cannot do good while you see it as bad, if that doctrine is correct which says it is the object known by the intellect that specifies the act. But if, on the contrary, the purpose is good, certainly it does not displace the inner act of the will which is to follow it, nor of the exterior act which is to carry it out; but it goes over in some way upon them when they are produced and it communicates to them something of its own merit (q.18, a.8, and ad 1). The purpose, therefore, is not the whole of the willed act, and this is why the quality

of will which is added, and of the exterior act which prolongs them, borders upon the quality of the purpose; yet it is as the form of the interior and the exterior act of the will, and for this reason, though we do not always merit so much as we aim to merit, we often merit more than we will and more than we do.

And at the same time we remark how the goodness of an act depends on its accord with the divine law.

If indeed the goodness of the will depends, as we have said, on the purposing of the end, and if the end of ends for the human will is the absolute value or God, as we said earlier (q.1, a.8), the human will, to be good, necessarily must advance toward that absolute value. And this value has first and immediate reference to the divine will, of which it is the proper object. Besides, as that which is primary in each genus is the measure and norm of everything that enters into that genus, and as, on the other hand, nothing is right or good except as it comes up to its own measure, it is required that the will of man be good, *i. e.,* in harmony with the will of God (1–2, q.19, a.9).

This moral system thus puts into place at the outset the concept of "ought to be," for if this ought to be is not inscribed to begin with in that which is, no artifice of dialectics can put it there. To discover what each thing ought to be or to do, it is enough to state the definition of that thing and to ask it to realise itself. The Thomistic moral system also

handles the concept of the "intentio" or purpose, noting that the problem of good and evil cannot receive a single and unilinear solution. Morals follows the psychological description of the human act, and because this is complex, an act will be thoroughly good only if it is good in each of its elements. A moral act has goodness in the sense that it is an act, and value through the reality of its own substance. Secondly, it should be a human act, that is to say, the willing of an object in accord with reason. Besides, it should take account of circumstances, for the object is to be conformed to reason not merely in a general way, but in the particular instance in hand. This interior act of the will should also be completed, if there is opportunity, by the exterior act which carries it through. Accordingly, this moral system, though based wholly on purpose, does not reduce the morality of the act to that of the purpose that animates it. For if the purpose is bad, the will and the exterior act will inevitably be also bad; but if the purpose or the end is good, it remains still to choose means which are not unworthy of it and which, if possible, are exactly suited to it. And when the means are chosen and the act is willed, it still remains to transfer this will by an act which does not lodge ridiculously on this side of the first purpose and which, if it can be, is precisely adapted to it. The purpose thus permeates all the elements of the voluntary act, but it does not replace them.

And it is because the human act, in order to be

good, must meet its definition squarely, that the full guarantee of its value is in God. Man does well in so far as he acts as man, and there is nothing better for him to do than to act as man in order to act as God wishes him to act. In brief, the human act is a rational act; but the natural light of reason is only the interpreter of eternal truth in the theoretical order, and of eternal law in the practical order. Thus every transgression of the orders of human reason is a transgression of the divine law and every bad act is a sin (q.21, a.1). By the mere fact that they are referred within our reason to the divine law, our good acts become worthy of praise and merit, and our evil acts blamable and condemnable in the eyes of God (*ibid*). For this reason, revelation introduces no break of the continuity in our inner life, either in the order of knowledge or in the order of action, because all the promptings of a right conscience are beforehand commandments of God.

Chapter IV

LOVE AND OTHER EMOTIONS

We have described the quality of acts of the will as acts belonging to man. However, a being does not necessarily do the acts which it alone is to do, and this is the case here. Man acts strictly as man when he acts freely; though remaining a man, he can act as an animal. He can do this the more from the fact that he truly is an animal, though a thinking one. Now the science of morals arises from concrete acts done by real men in a set of given circumstances; it is the whole man, therefore, spirituality and animality combined, that must be sketched in order to arrive at a moral science. The emotions of the soul form precisely those acts of man which are not exactly human, but common to man and brute What in general are the emotions? Which are chief among them? What problems do they set for the science of conduct, and what features do they give our moral life? Here are the main questions which the presence of animality in man's essence puts to rational research.

I. THE EMOTIONS IN GENERAL

What is an emotion? It is an activity which consists in the soul's undergoing something. Now to

undergo or suffer, in the broadest sense, means simply to receive; but in the most precise sense, it means essentially to bear; that is to say, to receive an action which must imply a certain suffering and loss. When it is a question of words, it is up to us to follow accepted usage. We shall accordingly employ the term emotion for the whole gamut of meanings which goes with it, that is, to mark any passing from better to worse, such as sadness, and any passing from worse to better, such as joy. But we shall always suppose: (a) that in the proper sense an emotion never belongs to the soul as such; (b) that, consequently, it belongs to it only in so far as the soul is joined to a body; (c) that being the repercussion in the soul of a changed state in the body, it subjects the soul to a law of change which is not its own, but the body's; (d) that this law is that of corporal movement, the specific character of which is that what is moved abandons one place or state and passes over into another place or state; (e) that an emotion of the soul, strictly understood, supposes that the soul is obliged to leave one state to enter into another, and that it is subject. In a word, when the soul as such acts, it yields nothing, even when it receives, for it can receive without giving up anything: as in the instance of the intellect and the acquisition of knowledge, when new facts are added to old ones. When the soul acts as united to the body, it cannot receive anything without subjection, because the states of the soul, instead of being added

together, replace each other, just as bodily movements do, nothing of which, except the echo, is kept in the soul. And this is true, no matter in what sense the action be done, and whether it be done by soul to body or by body to soul, provided, of course, that the action is common to both elements of the human composite.

For anyone who takes the word emotion in its correct sense, that which is incorporeal cannot feel an emotion. The one thing that could of itself experience an emotion proper to it is the body, so that, if an emotion, properly so-called, should affect the soul in any manner whatsoever, this could be only in so far as the soul is united to the body, and hence by accident. Now the soul is united to the body in two ways: first by title of form, so far as the soul gives being to the body which it vivifies; and second, by title of mover, so far as it carries on its activities through the body. And in each way the soul is subject to the emotions by way of accident, though in different fashions. In fact, in a being made of matter and form, action comes from form and emotion from matter. This is why emotion begins with matter and does not touch the form, so to say, except by accident. But no one feels any emotion unless something acts upon him, because all emotion is the effect of action. We may, therefore, say that the emotions of the body belong indirectly to the soul in two ways. First, in the sense that emotion begins with the body and rises to the soul, which is united to the body as its form, and it is any bodily feeling whatsoever. Thus when the body is wounded, the union of body and soul is enfeebled, and the soul itself, which is joined to the body according to the condition of the body, suffers by accident. Secondly, in

the sense that the emotion begins in the soul in so far as the soul is the mover of the body, and so enters the body. This is called an animal emotion, and we have plain instances of it in anger, fear, and the like; for they can be produced only if there is perception and desire on the part of the soul, from which a modification of the body results, just as there can come from the activity of an agent a change of a movable thing under all the relations in which this movable thing is subject to the activity of the agent. And when the body is modified or altered in this way, we say that the soul itself undergoes this in an accidental sense (*De Veritate,* q.26, a.2).

Evidently we have yet to learn why and how the soul can feel such emotions, or on its own account can provoke organic disturbances in the body of which, in its turn, it bears the recoil. If we wish to go back to the metaphysical principle on which the solution of the problem definitely hinges, we shall have to study the whole order of beings. To suffer, to feel—is to undergo, or, yet more broadly, to receive. God, who is pure act, receives nothing, and therefore experiences no emotion. But as soon as we leave God, we leave behind unmixed actuality; the most perfect angel has some potentiality, and there is, therefore, something which he has not, but could receive. Coming down from the level of the angels, we meet the human kind; and the lack of actuality which widened and widened as we descended from angel to angel, is yet more visible when we reach the human intellect. We know, of course, that the human mind has no innate ideas and that it must receive the whole

content of its knowledge from without. Let us go on down to the interior of man himself: his faculty of knowing depends on the object, but his faculty of desiring depends first on the idea which is made from objects and, beyond that, it depends on the objects themselves. Because the desire of man does not reach things then except by way of ideas which he gets from them, it is doubly dependent and still more passive than intellect. Yet, if rational desire is more passive than reason, sense desire is even more passive than rational; for the first is dependent only on the idea of what is a good for reason, while the second depends on what is a good for the soul as united to the body, all of whose needs have their immediate echo in the soul. Desires of this kind thus presuppose not only objects and perception of objects, but, far more, the perception of objects known as good by the soul, though they are not the proper good of reason, and it is in this most passive part of the soul that the emotion is most at home. Hence, *emotion is a modification which results accidentally in the soul from the fact of its union with the body and the seat of which is in sense desire.* How are we to tell one emotion from another and to classify them?

Let us turn to this sense desire in which the emotions seem to be begotten. We have three names, sensuality, sense desire or, more technically, sense conation, for this one thing, namely, *desire born of a sense perception of that which is of interest to the*

body. This desire translates itself at once into a movement which can be effected in two directions. When it takes an object agreeable to the body, or gets away from a painful object, the movement accomplished to seize it or to flee it is attributed to a faculty which is given the name *concupiscibile;* but when it resists an object to destroy or neutralise it, we attribute it to a faculty which bears the name of *irascibile*. These two technical terms are explained by the fact that concupiscence (or strong desire) is the type of movement which leads us toward pleasure or makes us flee pain, and that anger (*ira*) is a kind of violent reaction to opposition.[1] As we are here in the presence of two distinct faculties, the emotions relevant to each constitute a distinct genus, those of the first kind pointing to the pleasurable or the painful, while those of the second have for object all that is hostile or, as we say in face of the difficulty which it presents, all that is arduous.

The emotions of the first and the second type belong to different species. In fact, as the several faculties have different objects (as we said: 1, q.77, a.3) it must be that the emotions of the faculties are related to different objects and that, as a consequence, and *a fortiori,* the emotions of the various faculties differ in species. There must indeed be a greater difference in the object to diversify the faculties in a

[1] These terms of St. Thomas are often translated literally, but they are ambiguous in English. Maher, in his famous *Psychology,* leaves them in the Latin, but with their meaning explained we prefer to call them the emotions of the first and the second group. —Tr.

specific way than to diversify emotions and actions. Just as on the sub-human level diversity of genus results from a diversity in the potentiality of matter, but diversity of species from a diversity of form in the same matter, so in the acts of the human soul the acts which belong to different faculties will be not only of different species, but even of different genera, while the acts or emotions which concern different special objects within the one common object of one power will differ only as the species of that genus.

If, therefore, we wish to know which emotions belong to this or that kind of desire, we must study the object of each faculty. Now we have just said that the object of the faculty in the first case is the sense good or evil taken absolutely, that is to say, the pleasurable or the painful. But as it necessarily happens that the soul sometimes has some difficulty or puts up a fight either to make sure of some good or to escape an evil of this pleasure-pain kind, it is so far in some way raised above the animal's facile power. So, good and evil, as a little bit hard and uphill, are the object of the faculty of the second kind of emotion. Whichever emotions look to good or evil in an absolute way are in the field of the pleasure-pain faculty, and these are joy, sadness, love, hate, and the like; and whichever emotions have to do with good or evil as hard or arduous, as anything that is taken or missed with some difficulty, belong to the other faculty, and these are boldness, fear, hope, and the like (1–2, q.23, a.1; *De Veritate,* q.26, a.4).

With the main distinction of the two genera of emotions once made, we may introduce subdivisions according to their species by beginning with a dual basis of classification, one of which holds for the two

kinds of emotion, the other for the second group alone.

In the emotions of the soul we run across a double contrariety—one coming from the contrary objects, that is, from good and evil, and the other resulting from the contrariety of the two movements by which one nears or is kept at a distance from the same object. Now, in the first groups of emotions we find only the former kind, the kind that arises from the objects, whereas in the other we find both.

The reason for this is that the object of the pleasure-pain appetite, as noted, is good or evil without qualification. But the good as such cannot be a point of departure, but only a point of arrival. Nothing indeed shuns the good as such, but, on the contrary, all desire it; and in the same way nothing wants evil as such, but all flee it. And, therefore, we can never come to evil as a good, but only use it as a starting point. So any pleasure-pain emotion (for instance, love, desire, joy) that takes a look at the good, is as it were for it, but every emotion (such as hate, aversion or fleeing from evil, and sadness) that sees evil is against it. In this type of emotion, then, there can only be contrariety due to the fact that one is near to, or far from, the object.

The object of the other kind of emotion, however, is the sense good or evil, not now taken absolutely, but, as we have said, as difficult or hard to get. Now when a good is difficult or arduous, it causes us to tend towards it as good, and in this sense it arouses the emotion of hope; but if it is too far away from us by reason of being arduous and difficult, it begets a feeling of despair. And likewise an evil that is arduous causes us to avoid it as evil and turns into the emotion of fear; but just because it is difficult, it warrants our striving

for it and offers us the occasion of being freed from subjection to evil; and the emotion tending to it is boldness. Thus we find in the second kind of emotion, first the contrariety which results from the contrariety of good and evil, for example between hope and fear, and also that which comes from being close to, or far from, the same objective; as, between rashness and fear (1–2, q.23, a.2).

To show how complex this problem is, we need but to subordinate the classification to the facts and to show how impossible it is to deduce the facts from the classification. Let us add that there is at least one emotion that in no way allows a contrary. Anger really supposes a struggle against an evil already present; and if we wish to seek a contrary to it by distance from this evil, we run into sadness, which is of the other group; and if we seek its contrary in the opposition of good to evil, it is plain that, by substituting a present good for an irritating evil, we stir up the feeling of joy, which also belongs with the first group. We, therefore, cannot create the contrary of anger, and the only way to escape from it is to calm oneself (*ibid.*, a.3). If we make allowance for this notable exception, it will be possible to draw up a complete classification of the emotions, proceeding with the contruction of pairs and, except for anger, joining to each emotion its opposite.

Emotions are distinguished by their active causes, which causes are the objects of a soul's emotions, and the difference between the active causes can be studied from two points of

view: first, according to the species or nature of these active causes themselves, as fire differs from water; and secondly, according to the diversity of the faculty which acts.

Now the diversity of the active cause or mover, so far as there is question of its power of moving, can be understood in emotions of the soul by analogy with natural agents. Every mover in some way either draws that which he moves to itself, or repels it from itself. If we take first the instance of its drawing the moved thing to itself, it produces three effects. In the first place it gives it an inclination or fitness to tend towards the mover, as a light body situated on a high place does, when it confers lightness on the body which it begets, and through this lightness the inclination or fitness to stay in the high place. Secondly, if a generated body is outside its proper place, it causes it to be brought into that place. Thirdly, it causes it to rest in that place, once it is there, for the cause which makes one rest in a place is the same as that which makes it come into the place. And repulsion is to be understood in the same way.

Now, in movements in the conative part of the soul, value is as an attractive force and disvalue as a repellent force. Primarily, then, value begets in the faculty of desire an inclination, a fitness, or a co-natural affinity for value, which have the marks of the emotion of love, and corresponding to it, in the camp of evil, is the emotion of hate. Secondly, if value is not yet possessed, it gives desire a start towards acquiring the value which is loved, and this constitutes the emotion of desire. The evil opposed to this is estrangement or aversion. Thirdly, when the value is won, it gives desire a certain repose in the good which has been attained. This turns into delectation or joy; evil, on the other hand, gives sorrow or sadness.

If we go on now to the other group of emotions, there is supposed first a certain fitness or tendency to seek good or to fly evil, which is related to good or evil in an absolute sense. But in the field of a value that is not yet attained, it begets hope and despair; with regard to imminent evil it engenders the emotions of fear and boldness. With regard to the good already possessed, there is no emotion of the second kind, for in this case the character of arduousness, of which we have spoken, is not encountered; the emotion of anger results, on the contrary, from the actual presence of evil. It is plain, therefore, that there are three pairs of emotions of the first type, namely: love and hate, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. Parallel to these are three of the other kind, namely: hope and despair, fear and audacity, and anger, which alone has no contrary emotion. There are, then, eleven different emotions in all, six in one group and five in the other, and all emotions of the soul are subsumed under these (1–2, q.23, a.4).

Each of these eleven emotions arises in a specific way. Because the second imply the first, the first of the emotions is the first of the *"concupiscibile,"* that is, love; and the second is its contrary, that is, hate. Next are desire of the loved object and aversion from the hated one; then hope of the desired good, and despair of it. Hope in its turn fosters rashness, and despair of winning causes fear. Anger may succeed rashness to beat down whatever stands in the way of realizing one's earnest wishes, and at last joy and sadness are left as emotions resulting from all others, in the sense that they mark the soul as at

peace in the enjoyment of the object which it loves, or disquieted over not being able to get possession of it (q.25, a.3). Four of these emotions are commonly taken as the main ones: joy and sadness, because they are the last and stand at the end of every emotional disturbance; hope, because the term of the emotions belonging to the first group (I love, I desire, I hope); and fear, because the term of the emotions of the other group (I hate, I flee, I fear).

There is one question left relative to the emotions in general: Are they good or bad in themselves, and whence have they the quality of moral good or evil which people attribute to them? To answer this question we need invoke no new principle, and for elucidation it will suffice to recall what a moral act is. An act is moral or properly human in so far as it is willed. But the emotions in themselves are not willed, the proof of which is that the animals have feelings, but no morality. The emotions as such, therefore, are neither good nor bad. But for the same reason it is clear that any emotion can become good or bad once it is integrated, in a rational being like man, with willed acts which are themselves good or bad. Thus we settle the famous controversy between Aristotelians and Stoics on the question whether all emotions are morally evil.

On this question, the Stoics and Peripatetics were of different opinions, for the Stoics said that all emotions are bad,

while the others held that emotions under control are good. Now this disagreement, though in word it seems serious, in reality amounts to little or nothing, when one studies the meaning of the respective positions. For the Stoics did not keep sense and intellect distinct, nor therefore sense desire and rational desire. Hence, they could not tell the emotions of the soul from habits of will, nor give ranking to emotions of the soul in the sense appetite and mere movements of will in the rational appetite, but called every conative rational movement "will" and gave the name of "emotion" to any movement which went beyond the limits of reason. Cicero, in the third book *De Tusculanis Disputationibus,* calls all emotions "diseases of the soul" and from this definition argues that those who are diseased are not in health (*non sani*), and those who are not in health (*non sani*) are without feeling or senseless (*insipientes*), and that the insensate are insane (*insani*).

The Peripatetics on the other hand gave the name emotion to all movements of sense appetite and, therefore, judged good those emotions ruled by reason and evil those that get away from the government of reason. The result was that when Cicero (*op. cit.*) found fault with the Peripatetics for their approval of controlled emotions, his reason was that all evil, even though slight, is to be avoided; his whole specious argument being that, just as a body, when moderately sick, is not in health, so this control of the diseases or emotions of the soul is not health; for the emotions are not called diseases or disturbances of the soul unless they get beyond the control of reason(1–2, q.24, a.2).

Let us now go on, keeping in mind our description of the moral act. The conclusion on which we in-

sisted was that an act of such a complex structure as a human act could not be completely good—we should almost say, completely successful, from the moral point of view, unless each element in it was what it ought to be. Accordingly, we not only do not bring against the emotions the exclusion which a morality of "good will," as that of Kant, urges, but, on the contrary, we have the duty to requisition the emotions in order to give them the moral quality which they naturally lack. They are a kind of morally indifferent animal stuff within us and it is our duty to humanise ourselves fully by working reason into them. We have not only the right, therefore, but also the duty to have experience of the emotions, provided they are good; and they are always good when they come from an act of reason rather than run away with it.

Because the Stoics thought every emotion of the soul evil, they were consistent in claiming that an emotion cuts down the value of an act. For when a good is mixed with evil, it either becomes less or ceases to be; and what they said would be true, if we were reserving the name of emotions of the soul to the disorderly stirrings of the sense appetite and took them as perturbations or diseases. But if by emotion we mean simply any movement of the sense appetite, then the perfection of human value requires that the emotions themselves be controlled by reason. Indeed, since human good resides in reason as its root, this good will be more perfect the more it is extended to all that constitutes man. For example, it doubt-

less belongs to the perfection of moral value that the acts of the body be under the control of reason, and consequently, since the sense appetite can obey reason, as we have said (q.17, a.7), it belongs to the perfection of the moral or human act that the very emotions of the soul should be controlled by reason. Therefore, just as it is better that man should both will good and realise it by an external act, so it is of the perfection of moral value that man should direct his whole self, not merely his will, but also his sense appetite, towards it, as it is written (Psalm 83): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God," taking the word heart for rational desire and the word flesh for sense desire.

To the objection that whatever slows up the judgment of reason lessens the moral quality of an act, the answer is that the relation of the emotions of the soul to the judgment of reason is twofold. First, they can precede it; in which case, as they darken the judgment of reason on which the value of the moral act depends, they do cut into the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do an act of kindness from a judgment of reason than from the mere feeling of mercy. Secondly, they can result from the judgment of reason and they do, in two ways: first, by a kind of superabundance, when the superior part of the soul is intensely moved toward something, the inferior part of the soul follows the movement; and the consequent emotion in the sense desire is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates a greater moral value. And again, by way of choice, that is when man judges and reasonably chooses to be affected by some emotion which, with the help of sense desire, gives him power to act more promptly, and then the emotion adds to the value of the action (1–2, q.24, a.3, c. and ad 1).

Let us consider the human emotions one at a time, both those of the first and those of the second type, beginning with the queen and mother of them all, that is, with love.

II. EMOTIONS OF THE FIRST TYPE

The first two emotions which we meet of this variety are love and hate. It is at once evident that love is rightly classed with the faculty of desire, because it is the source of the movement directed toward the desired end. In fact, it is the affinity of the will with a certain value and the complacency which the will takes in it that begets love; therefore, love is this first onset felt by the soul at the touch of an object which it knows to be intimately allied to it, and towards which it goes in order to lay hold of it and to enjoy it (1–2, q.26, a.2). That is to say, love is an emotion and the basis of desire. But there are two degrees of love, and the difference in their moral value is such that it is important to keep them distinct.

As Aristotle says in the second book of his *Rhetoric* (c.4), to love is to will good for some one. If this is so, then the movement of love tends towards two things, namely: towards the good which one wills for anyone, whether for himself or another; and towards him for whom he wills the good. With regard to the good which one wills, there is love of desire; but with regard to that for which he wills the good, there is love of friendship. And this division supposes one term prior

to the other; for what is loved with a love of friendship is loved absolutely and for itself, whereas what is loved with a love of desire is not loved absolutely and in itself, but for another. For just as *ens per se* is simply that which has being, whereas relative being is that which exists in another; so good (convertible with being), taken simply, is that which has goodness, but that which is the good of another is a relative value, and consequently, the love by which anything is loved for its own good, is love simply; but the love by which anything is loved for the good of another, is a relative love (1–2, q.26, a.4).

If this is the nature of love, what causes it? The good and the beautiful, as known to reason. We have said that a kind of affinity or spontaneous complaisance of the lover in the loved is its origin. If this affinity is merely perceived by the senses, the love thence born is a sensual love; but if it is known by intellect, the resulting love is a spiritual love of the good; and if this knowing of the good becomes a source of satisfaction for thought, the love which results from it is a spiritual love of the beautiful, for the good is that which satisfies desire, while the beautiful is that which, even when seen, is satisfying to us. Yet, though recognition by the intellect is necessary in order that love be spiritual, love is not measured by the knowledge we have of the object.

Not all that is required for perfect knowledge is needed for perfect love. Knowledge is related to reason, whose work is to distinguish between things which really are one, and to

compare and in some way unite distinct things; and so a perfect knowledge supposes that we know one by one all that is in a thing, for instance, its parts, its powers, and its properties. But love is in the faculty of desire, which regards a thing as it is in itself. For this reason a perfect love asks only that a thing be loved just as it is known in itself. It may turn out, then, that a thing is more loved than known, because it can be perfectly loved, though not perfectly known. Plain evidence of which is observed in the realm of the sciences, for men love them for the summary knowledge which they get from them; they know for instance that rhetoric is a science that helps them to persuade, and this is what they love in rhetoric. We may say precisely the same of the love of God (1–2, q.27, a.2, ad 2).

We now understand what place love has among the emotions—a place that is necessarily the first. Any emotion of the soul implies a certain movement of the soul towards an object, or a repose in this object, whose likeness to and kinship with the soul causes the soul to rejoice in and to be satisfied with it. Love, therefore, is at the root of each emotion, and as we shall everywhere find its effects linked with those of the others, a description of its effects is at once required.

The first and most direct effect of love is union. If it is a question of love of desire, the lover experiences a desire to effect a real union with the beloved object which he needs for himself; in the case of a love of friendship, the union is no longer real and material, as in the preceding case, but it is never-

theless immediate, for it is love itself that is the bond and union, the friend being for the lover only another self (1–2, q.28, a.1). Hence, we may say that they who love each other are no longer in themselves, but each is in the other, by a kind of attachment or, more properly, a kind of inherence.

This effect of mutual inherence can be understood with regard to the faculties both of knowledge and of desire. In relation to the faculty of knowing, we say that the beloved is in the lover because the beloved remains in the lover's thought, in the sense of the Epistle to the Philippians (c.1): "For that I have you in my heart." The lover, too, on his part truly enters by thought into the beloved, in this sense, that he is not content with a superficial knowledge of the beloved, but tries to know in an intimate way each quality of the one he loves, as the Holy Spirit, which is the love of God, says (Cor., 2, 10), he "searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God." In reference to the faculty of desire, we say that the beloved is in the lover because he remains in his affection by a sort of complacency: whether the lover rejoices in him and his good points when he is present, or desires him and tends toward him by the love of desire in his absence, or toward the good which he wishes for the loved by a love of friendship. And he does this, not for any esoteric cause, as when one desires a thing for the sake of another, or wills a good for some one on account of some third thing, but he does it with an inner complacency in the beloved object. We may speak, then, of *an intimate love* and even of the *bowels of charity*.

On the other hand we may say that the lover is in the beloved, in one sense by a love of desire, and again by a love

of friendship. Indeed, the love of desire does not rest with attaining an external and superficial enjoyment of the beloved; but it seeks to possess fully that which it loves, by going, so to speak, to the interior of it. And in the love of friendship, the lover is within the beloved in the sense that he regards the ups and downs of his friend as his own, so that it seems that it were to himself that these good or bad things come in the person of his friend, and that it is he who is affected by them. Thus it is the way of friends to will the same things, and to be sad and to rejoice over the same things, as Aristotle says both in his *Ethics* (bk. 9) and in his *Rhetoric* (bk. 4). And so the lover, by taking his friend's goods as his own, seems to be in the beloved as if made one with him; and by the contrary fact that he wills and does for his friend as for himself, in some way seeing his friend as one with him, the beloved thus is the lover. And thirdly, in case of the love of friendship, this mutual inherence may be understood in a third sense: love is shared; for friends love mutually, and will and also do good to each other (1–2, a.28, a.2; *cf.* 3 *Sent.*, 7, q.1, a.1).

This mutual inherence of lover and beloved gives us a chance to explain the other effects of love. For instance, one grasps the fact that its ultimate aim is ecstasy, for the lover, when he truly loves, is literally out of himself; one sees that zeal is the normal effect of love, for zeal is enviousness to get hold of the good which we love, or to be rid of those who dispute it; that love is a beneficent and preservative emotion, because it always wills good and perfection; that love is also the prime mover of all our

actions, because he who acts does so for the good which he desires and loves. And so we again come into touch with the first source of all action and of all being, God. He creates because of love, and the movement by which He loves Himself in things like Him is, on a metaphysical view, their own movement. It is because he is the first Good and the first Love that all movement tends to some kind of good and so represents a movement of love, conscious or unconscious, towards God.

Standing over against love is hate, which is the second emotion in this group. This is the contrary of love and is opposed to it, point for point. As the object of love is good, that of hate is evil, that is to say, the immediate perception of an essential inconsistency between that which one loves and some specific object. It is love, therefore, that causes hate, for one must love a thing before hating its contrary; and as an effect cannot be stronger than its cause, love cannot possibly fail to excel hate. So, too, as love has good for its object, nothing that is good in itself can be the object of hate; no one, therefore, can hate himself, unless this be without knowing it and because he is deceived as to his true nature; and no one can hate truth as such, for it is good in its essence. Yet we can detest this or that truth as contrary to our desire in given circumstances (*ibid.*, q.29). Let us go on now to the second pair of love-hate emotions: to desire, which we so classify in the instance of sense desire, and to aversion.

The way in which the end, or the good, moves is not the same when the good is present and when it is at a distance. When present, its effect is to cause us to be content with it, and when absent, it induces us to tend towards it. For this reason, if we take an object agreeable to the senses and regard it so far as it is, so to say, adapted and shaped to desire, it causes love. But considered as absent, and as drawing desire toward it, the effect of it is desire. And taken in so far as it brings repose by its presence, it begets pleasure. *Concupiscentia,* therefore, is an emotion specifically different from love and from pleasure; but to desire this pleasant object rather than that causes movements of *concupiscentia,* which show only individual differences (1–2, q.30, a.2).

Some desires or tastes are natural: these are desires for what belongs to animal nature, as nourishment, drink, and rest. The emotion which carries us towards these objects is *concupiscentia* in the proper sense, and is as much the animal's as it is man's. Other desires, however, take us toward objects which we think of as good and agreeable, not because they are indispensable to our nature, but because our thought reports them as desirable. These emotions more properly deserve the name of cupidity; and they are proper to man, for it is distinctive of man that he represents to himself values beyond those that his nature demands. Now it follows of itself that the taste for natural value is necessarily finite and limited, for we cannot wish an infinity of food at one time; yet at least we can want, indefinitely, new kinds of food and drink, and

in this way natural desires are, so to say, insatiable. As for desire of goods not needed by nature, they are plainly infinite in all senses, for we control such desires by what reason tells, and our reason never wearies of conceiving beyond that which we already have (*ibid.*, a.4).

Aversion, the emotion opposed to desire, is not of any great importance, and as it has for its object an absent evil, people very often confuse it with fear (a.2, ad 3). Yet it is not fear in the strict sense, any more than desire is hope. At present we merely note its place, though we are not required to analyse it.

The last two emotions of the first variety—pleasure and sorrow—are of decisive importance. First of all we remark that pleasure is certainly an emotion; for we have said that every movement of the sense appetite is an emotion; and pleasure is the movement started in the sense appetite when the animal is in a state which suits its nature and of which it is aware. If the good whose acquisition motivates this pleasure is a natural good, and if it is a good which consequently has been the object of what we have just called desire or "concupiscence," we term this emotion a pleasure in the strict sense. But if the good is such only for reason and accordingly has been the object of what we have named cupidity, the emotion is called joy. And so the animals, because they lack reason, only have pleasures, but never joys; we, on the contrary, who have reason, can

experience joys, and are even capable of turning pleasure into joy. Man, then, is a rational being who can have pleasurable feelings to which his body is a partner, but who can also do agreeable actions which are only in the realm of will and thought. Which satisfactions are greater for him, those that come from activity of spirit, or those that arise from bodily emotions?

Pleasure is born of our union with a value which is suitable for us, when that value is known and felt. Now in the workings of the soul, especially of the sense and intellectual life, we must remember that because they have no transition to an external stuff, they are acts or perfections of the doer, as, for instance, to know, to feel, to will, and so on. For actions which do go over on any external matter are rather acts and perfections of the matter which they transform, since movement is an act which the mover starts in the movable thing. Thus, the actions of the sense and mental life of which we have spoken are in themselves a certain good of the doer, but as, besides, they are known by sense and by intellect, a pleasure is born of them, and not only of their objects. If, therefore, we compare pleasures which we take in the actions themselves, that is, in the knowledge of them by sense and intellect, there is no doubt that intellectual are much greater than sense pleasures. The truth is, we take more pleasure in knowing a thing by comprehending it than by seeing it, for first, the intellectual knowledge is more perfect, and it is also better known, because intellect is more capable of reflecting on its own knowledge than is sense. Besides, intellectual knowledge is more precious to us, for there is no one who would not be willing to lose his bodily sight rather than his

intellectual sight and to be without the latter, as are beasts and madmen, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *De Trinitate.*

If, therefore, we compare intellectual pleasures to the sense pleasures of the body, taking them *in themselves and absolutely speaking,* spiritual pleasures are greater. We prove this by a study of the three conditions required for pleasure, namely: the *conjoint* good, that to which it is *united,* and our *union* with it. In one word, value for the spirit is in itself greater than value for the body, and it is loved more by us, as is evidenced by the fact that men abstain from bodily gratifications so as not to lose honor, which is a spiritual good. Besides, the intellectual part of the soul is much nobler and knows more than does the sense part. Add to this that the union of the soul and its object is closer, more perfect, and more firm; closer, because sense stops at the outer accidents of things, whereas intellect goes to the essence, for its object is being or *quod quid est;* more perfect, because the union of the sensed with sense supposes change, which is imperfect act; thus, sense pleasures are never at any moment all they could be, but always imply something which is gone by and something waiting for consummation, as is plain in the instance of pleasures in food and sex, whereas pleasures of the spirit occur without change, and are there at once; more firm, because objects of sensual delight fall to pieces and soon cease to be, whereas spiritual values are not subject to decay.

Nevertheless, considered *with regard to ourselves,* the pleasures of the body are stronger, for three reasons. First, because things of sense are better known to us than are things of intellect; second, because sense pleasures, being emotions of sense desire, imply a bodily modification, which does not occur in spiritual delight, unless by a kind of repercussion of

the higher desire on the lower; third, because bodily pleasure is sought as a kind of remedy against the needs and afflictions of the body, which take their toll in certain sadnesses; and consequently bodily pleasure, coming unexpectedly out of sadnesses of this kind, is felt more and is more welcomed than spiritual joy, which, as we shall see (q.35, a.5), has no contrary (1–2, q.31, a.5).

If we apply the same principle in comparing sense pleasures to one another, we shall see that they also form a hierarchy, but in a different way—according to the dignity of the pleasure or its intensity. From a practical point of view, touch is the most useful sense, but sight is the most noble.

By reason of its usefulness, the pleasure of touch is greater than any other sense pleasure, but on the ground of the knowledge gained, the pleasure of vision is the leader. So if we wish to compare sight and touch, we shall find that, in an absolute sense, the pleasure of touch is higher, so long as we stay within the limits of sensual joys. It is plain that the natural in any being is also the strongest thing in it; pleasures of touch are precisely of this kind, as the natural desires, *e. g.,* for food, sex, and so on, tend towards them. But if we study these pleasures in the light of the fact that sight serves the mind, then the pleasures of sight are superior, in the same measure as pleasures of the intellect are above those of the senses (*ibid.,* a.6).

We have yet to ascertain the cause of this pleasure and its main effects. Because it supposes that we are

conscious of possessing a good suited for us, its cause is free accomplishment of an activity adapted to our nature (q.32, a.1), and, as a consequence, the doing of all that is natural to us (comprising in our "nature" the nature of others whom, because of the friendship we bear them, we no longer mark off from ourselves; a.6), is a source of pleasure for us. As for the effects of pleasure, these are not easy to define, because we can use only material figures to describe inner states which are not material. We may say, however, that pleasure has for its chief effect a kind of enlargement of the soul, which widens to gather in the good of which it becomes aware (q.33, a.1). So, pleasure guides an act, done by a power of the soul, to its full achievement. For the act done by the soul is at once a good in itself, but pleasure gives it the added good of appeasement of desire in a good at last attained. And this perfection ends by overflowing on the performance of the act itself, for one does better what he does with pleasure, bringing to the doing of it all his resources and attention (a.4). Let us add, too, that pleasure, as we have proved for the emotions in general, is, morally speaking, neither good nor bad in itself. As an end and perfection of the act, pleasure is worth what desire is worth: it is good, if the desire which it feeds rests in an object conformed to reason; it is bad if the object in which the desire, whether higher or lower, rests, is out of accord with the demands of reason (q.34, a.1).

We turn now to the last of these emotions, which is sorrow. This is the opposite of pleasure, and is outlined as the presence of an evil, plus the conscious perception of its presence (q.35, a.1). Just as courage of the soul is distinct from pleasure, sadness of soul is distinct from sorrow of the body (a.2), and both the one and the other originate, as all the emotions do, from love; but they derive from it by way of hate. For the first of the emotions is love, which is born in the soul from contact with the good; the second is hatred of evil, which, of course, arises from love, and it is through hate that sorrow over present evil also makes its way up to love (q.36, a.2). As for its effects, sorrow or sadness is a veritable disease. Begotten of a nearness to that which nature abjures, sadness impairs nature in every way, weakening our power of apprehension (q.37, a.1), weighing down the soul (a.2) by opposing the pleasure which enlarges it, enervating all its operations (a.3), and harming the body itself, whose vital functions it contradicts, to such a degree that sometimes it stifles the use of reason and even drives men into melancholy and mania (a.4). Because sadness and sorrow are diseases, they must be nursed, and the specific remedy for them is the contrary emotion, *i. e.,* pleasure or joy.

Pleasure is a kind of resting of desire in a suitable good, whereas sadness comes of something at variance with desire; and, therefore, among the conative movements, pleasure is

related to sadness as rest is related to bodily fatigue, which arises from attempting a work that is naturally too much for the body. Indeed, sadness implies that the power to desire is in some way worn out or ill at ease; just, then, as rest of the whole body is the remedy for any exhaustion, from whatever source it comes, so pleasure is the cure and alleviator of sadness, no matter what its nature or source (1–2, q.38, a.1).

Nothing in the line of soothing remedies is to be despised; not tears, which ease the soul and hinder it from centering itself on the evil; not sleep, baths or the other cures which correct the effects so unfailingly produced in the body by this emotion (a.5); not the sympathy of friends, who thus prove their love for us and pour joy into our hearts (a.3); and, above all, not the most powerful of palliatives.

As we have said, it is in the contemplation of truth that the supremest joy lies; and, as was just said, all delight sweetens sorrow. This is why contemplation of truth moderates sadness or sorrow, and this it does the better if one is a more perfect lover of wisdom. Here, then, is the reason why men who contemplate divine things and future blessedness rejoice in tribulation. Better yet, this is why people find joy even in the midst of bodily torment, as did the martyr Tiburtius, who with his bare feet trampled on burning coals and said, "It seems to me that in the name of Jesus Christ I tread upon blown roses" (*ibid.*, a.4).

Though it is in essence a sign of evil, sorrow, like the other emotions, can be turned into good. For it

is good and even praiseworthy to be saddened over evil that is done, and by adding evil to the evil which it accompanies, it makes this still more detestable; which effect gives sorrow a kind of utility. With it we complete our study of the first group of emotions, and go on now to an examination of the second.

III. EMOTIONS OF THE SECOND TYPE

For the six emotions of the first group we have only five of the second, and we may remember that this lack of balance comes from the fact that anger stands alone without a mate. The five are hope and despair, fear and boldness, and anger. No one doubts that hope is an emotion, but it is so easily confused with desire that some might hesitate to put it into the second class. Yet it is so far from blending with desire that it presupposes desire, and it is through the intermediary of desire that hope, like all the emotions of this group, is joined to the first of all emotions which is love.

The kinds of emotions are known by their objects, and we have four conditions to take into account in studying the object of hope. First, the object should be a good; strictly speaking, there is no hope except of the good; this is the way in which it differs from fear, which has to do with evil. Second, the good should be a future, for one does not hope for what one already has, and in this sense hope is distinct from joy, which is of a present good. Third, it is required that the good

be hard to get, obtainable with difficulty, since we never say that anyone hopes for a thing of meager worth or for what he can get in an instant. Just here is its note of difference from desire and longing, which are for a good that is truly future; hence desire belongs to the first group, and hope to the second. This good, though hard to get, should still be attainable, as no one hopes for what is wholly out of his reach, and it is on this point that it diverges from despair. It is plain, then, that hope differs from desire, as the emotions of the second class differ from those of the first. Hope presupposes desire, and, as we have remarked (p. 101) all the emotions of the second group imply those of the first (1–2, q.40, a.1).

The essentially emotive quality of hope is seen in the fact that it is in evidence even among the animals; we might almost say, among senseless bodies. But action is in some sense disunited (*décomposé*) in the animals, as they are led by instinct to a good whose suitableness for them is known by another. It will be useful for us to reflect on the deep metaphysical unity which this idea supposes in the structure of the universe.

The inner feelings of animals can be known from their external behavior, which makes it clear that the brute animals experience hope. For instance, if a dog sees a rabbit or a bird too far off, he does not start for it, as if he had no hope to catch it; but if the prey is close to him, he goes for it as if with a hope of seizing it. Now, as we have pointed out (q.1, a.2), the sense desire of animals, and even the natural desire of senseless things, follow the understanding of some mind,

as does the desire of an intelligent being, which desire is called "will." But there is this difference—that the will is aroused by the knowledge of an intellect joined to it, whereas the activity of natural desire is ruled by knowledge in a mind which is separate from it and which originates the action. It is the same with the sense desire of brutes, because they act by the light of a native instinct. So in the actions of the animals and the movements of natural things a process goes on much like works of art, and in this way [we know] there is hope, and despair also, in brute life (1–2, q.40, a.3).

Despair is the opposite of the first emotion of the second group, and on this title it falls into second place. But this is as far as the contrast of this pair of emotions is of the same sort as that of preceding pairs. Emotions of the first class are set over against each other in the sense that, as a rule, to a movement of the soul towards good there corresponds a movement away from evil, and so it is solely a difference of objects that makes these emotions distinct. But emotions of the second type may be contrary to each other, though the object never changes its nature, and simply because desire is for or against one and the same object. Such is precisely the way with despair, whose proper object, like that of hope, its opposite, is not an evil, but a good.

We have said (q.23, a.2) that two types of opposition are possible in changes. One kind is the result of approaching different termini, and only this kind can occur in emotions of the second group; for instance, this is the way love and hate

are opposites. A second kind arises from approaching towards or receding from one and the same terminus, and is evidenced among emotions of the second class. The object of hope, let us say, which is a good that is hard to get, does attract, it has that nature so far as we see the good as possible of attainment, and hence hope implies a tendency and approach towards that good; but if the good is thought impossible to get, it turns us away, because, as Aristotle says in his *Ethics* (3, c.3), when people come to what cannot be done, they just give up. It is in this light that despair sees its object: it supposes a yielding, and is contrary to hope, as retreat is to advance (1–2, q.40, a.4).

Viewed in its causes, hope, especially, is an emotion fed on experience, because, as we gain experience, we grow better able to act and more sure of ourselves. Also, we become experienced by thought as well as by action, and by the use of our minds we see that it is possible to do things which pure empiricism would not let us attempt. On the opposite side of the fence, of course, experience can cultivate despair; but, to make a long story short, it is not doing, but thinking, that can dishearten us, and thus experience gives us two motives for hope against one for despair. This emotion of hope rises strong in the hearts of young persons, "because they have everything ahead and little or nothing behind them, and as memory is of the past and hope of the future, they have not much to reflect on, but live in great hopes. . . . So, too, those who have not known rebuff or run into obstacles, readily think they can

do anything, and they are of vivid hope." We may add that drunken men are in the same class, for they are as hotheaded as youths and no more given to thought, and so hope is ready with them and they never have a doubt (a.6).

The effect of hope, then, is to spur our activity and though, like every emotion, it is caused by love, in its own turn it is a cause of love.

Hope may look to either of two objects. It can have the hoped-for good as object, but because this good is hard (though possible) to get, it may happen that what is difficult, is possible for us, not through our own, but through others' efforts; in such cases hope turns toward the means through which the good becomes possible to us. In so far, then, as hope regards the goods we hope for, it is caused by love; for there is hope only of a value that is desired and loved. But when hope has to do with the means that makes a value possible to us, it is caused by love, and not the other way round. For as soon as we hope that values can come to us through some one, we take steps toward him as our good, and we begin to love him; though from the fact that we love anyone we need not hope to get anything from him, unless indirectly, so far as we believe that we also shall be loved by him. To be loved by anyone, then, causes us to hope in him, and our love for him is caused by the hope or trust which we put in him (1–2, a.40, a.7).

The next two emotions of the second kind are fear and boldness. Fear has all the qualities of an emotion in a high degree: it is felt, it is in the sense

appetite, and it is related to an evil. No element, therefore, is wanting to it. Since the object specifies an emotion, the proper object of fear is exactly the opposite to that of hope: a foreseen evil which is hard to face, and which we feel we cannot stand if it does come, though we have yet some hope of escaping it.

A man fears a coming evil that is so far beyond his power that he cannot prevent it. But like human value, a human disvalue may be studied either in man's own activity or in external things. A disvalue has two fearful aspects for man's own doings: work is a burden to nature and brings on *laziness,* as when a man flies from his job through fear of heavy labor. Again, some nameless evil hurts our reputation: in the case of fearing infamy for an act we are about to commit we are *ashamed* to do it, and if we have already done the wrong, we feel *confusion.* On the other hand, the evil which is in external things can be beyond a man's power to withstand in any of three ways. First, because of its bigness, as when a person sees some huge evil and cannot judge the consequences of it; the result is *astonishment.* Second, because of its unusualness; that is, an evil that we are unused to is put before us, and so it is immense in our eyes; the result here is that we are *dumbfounded,* our imagination is so far beyond its experience. Third, because of its unexpected character we cannot possibly provide against it, and then the fear is called *anxiety* (1–2, q.41, a.4; *cf.* q.42, a.2, the last lines).

If we try further to identify the causes of fear, we find two main ones. The first evidently is love, for we fear an evil solely because it takes from us a value that

we love. The second is a lack or default of the power and resources needed to thrust back the evil that is upon us and that is about to separate us from the value that we love. As for the effects of fear, there are four: a drawing in, or a kind of taking in sail; then it drives us to ask advice, it makes us tremble, and changes our way of acting. Let us examine the first of these effects.

In the emotions of the soul, the movement of the conative faculty takes the rôle of formal principle, just as the change of the body takes that of material principle. These two elements are suited to each other, and the bodily change is like a conative movement, and corresponds to it. Now as to the movement of desire, fear works in this a sort of retrenchment or contraction, because, as we said, fear comes from imagining that some evil is threatening us and can hardly be driven off; and that anything be hard to thrust aside is the result of a lack of power. And the weaker any power, the fewer objects it reaches, and so from imagination, which starts fear, there follows a drawing in of desire. We can notice this in the dying, whose nature has little force and draws away within itself; and also in towns where the citizens get afraid and fly from the outskirts and go downtown as far as can be. Analogous to the withdrawing, which is the way of animal desire, there follows in cases of fear a withdrawing of the heat and blood of the body to the interior (1–2, q.44, a.1).

From this first effect of fear there comes as a natural result the second, which is a trembling or trepidation.

We have just said that fear starts a contraction or withdrawal from the outer to the inner parts of the body, and thus the extremities become cold. So a trembling sets in, caused by a loss of the grip which holds the several members steady, the chief difficulty being a lack of heat, which, as is noted in II *de Anima,* is the instrument the soul uses to move the body (*ibid.,* a.3).

At such a time men are especially minded to ask advice and to be taught by others the surest way to escape the dangers threatening them; in fact, fear forces them to consult themselves also or look into themselves in their striving for a favorable outcome of the situation. Yet fear is an evil counsellor, because it makes the feared things loom bigger and more redoubtable than they really are; fear urges reflection, but falsifies it (*ibid.,* a.2). The fourth main effect of fear, namely, the influence it has on our action, is more complex.

The causes of a man's activities are the soul, which is a relative first mover, and the members of the body, which are its instruments. An activity, of course, can be hindered by a failure of either the tools or the hand that uses them. As for the members of the body as instruments, fear by its nature always slows up their operation, because of the chilling which it effects in the extremities. As for the soul, a moderate fear, which does not greatly disturb reason, is a help to effective action, because it causes alertness and makes a man reflect and attend to what he is doing. But when fear becomes excessive and upsets reason, it gets in the way of even the soul's activity (*ibid.,* a.4).

The opposite of fear is *boldness* or *audacity,* which is the fourth emotion of the second group. Like its contrary, its proper object is evil, but whereas fear flies from evil, because it doubts any near victory over it, boldness turns on it and attacks it with the aim of triumphing over it (q.45, a.1). Here, again, a reverse movement, with regard to the same object, outlines the opposition of the two emotions. If we ask now by what thread boldness mounts up to love, evidently it is by hope that it is at first suitably attached. The truth is, audacity supposes a hope of reaching around and downing the peril that menaces, for to give up hope is to fear the difficulty which would have to be conquered to win the good one hopes for. This is why, in spite of its heroic look and the high deeds it can in certain instances inspire, boldness does not rise above an instinctive kind of hope and remains not a virtue, but an emotion; it differs from courage by the whole distance that separates sense from reason.

As boldness is one of the movements of sense conation, it is in tow to perception on the part of our faculty of feeling. But the faculty of feeling makes no comparisons and no inquiry into the particulars of an event; rather, it sizes them up instantly. And as it sometimes happens that so quick a perception does not permit a discernment of all the difficulties in a situation, one may take a bold step and march upon the danger, and then, when one has had experience of the danger itself, one feels it greater than he had thought, and gives up the undertaking. On the other hand, reason first runs over

everything that may help to lighten the load, and, therefore, brave men, advancing on danger in the strength of a reasoned judgment, seem at first to lack driving power, for they are not passionate, but go ahead armed with the needed deliberation. When they are in the thick of danger, however, they do not crash into any unexpected thing; indeed, sometimes they find the dangers less than they had supposed, and hold out better in their efforts. We may add that it is to accomplish the good of virtue that brave men face danger, and no matter how great the perils, this will of the good remains in them. But the over-bold act only from the impression that first gave them hope, and shut their eyes to fear (1–2, q.45, a.4).

We have yet one emotion, which is the last of the second type and of all the emotions; this is anger. We recall that it is alone, but this is because, making up for its difference from the four preceding emotions, anger unites in itself the two movements of diverse kinds which up to the present we have found divided into pairs among the emotions. It stands by itself, then, only because in some way it is double and counts for two.

An angry man seeks to avenge himself on some one, and for this reason the movement of anger tends in two directions: first, to the very vengeance which he wishes, which he hopes for as a value, and in which consequently he takes delight; but it tends also towards him on whom the man wishes to take vengeance as towards a being who is his own contrary, and is poison to him, and who enters, so far as he is concerned, the ranks of evil. This means that a dual difference

is to be kept in mind between anger and love, or anger and hate. The first is that anger always looks to two objects, whereas love and hate sometimes heed only one; this is the case, for instance, when we say that a man loves (or hates, for that matter) wine or some such thing. The second difference is that the two objects which love keeps before it are both good, for if the lover wills the good of anyone, it is because this one is like himself. And the two objects which hate eyes have an evil look about them, the hater willing evil to someone because this latter is not in agreement with him. For its part, anger views one of its objects in the light of value, that is, in the light of the vengeance which anger desires, and the other in the light of disvalue, and this object is the undesirable man on whom it would take vengeance. And so anger is an emotion that, we may say, is compounded of contrary emotions (1–2, q.46, a.2).

What we may call this general character of anger (*potest ira dici passio generalis, in quantum ex concursu multarum passionum causatur*) is just what makes it less serious than such a feeling as hate. It is less set and, though more impetuous and violent, is quickly cloyed when it gets a chance to inflict on its enemy the chastisement it desires. But hate is insatiable as it were; it wishes not the evil of punishment on its enemy, but evil purely and simply, and consequently, this emotion knows no measure. We might in a sense even say that anger aims at good, as one of its two acts is good. Thus it is with good reason that Augustine likens anger to a straw and hate

to a beam, as we shall be convinced by comparing the two.

Just what an emotion is, and just what it does, is known from its object. Now the object of anger is the same as that of hate, for just as he who hates wishes evil to him whom he hates, so he who is angry wishes evil to him at whom he is angry. But their procedure is not the same. He who hates wishes his enemy evil as evil, but the angry man does not wish evil as such on him against whom he is angry, but only so far as he discovers in evil a sort of good quality, looking at it from the point of view of vengeance. That is why we have said that hate means the application of evil to evil, while anger consists in the application of good to evil. It is plain, too, that to desire an evil which we think is justified, has less of the nature of evil than to will anyone evil purely and simply; indeed, to will anyone evil as justified, could even be an act of the virtue of justice, if done in obedience to the bidding of reason. Anger is bad only because, in taking vengeance, it does not heed what reason urges. It is clear, then, that hate is worse and more serious than anger (1–2, q.46, a.6).

If we examine anger in its roots, we always find an unjust act directed personally against him at whom one is angry (q.47, a.1). This act is inspired by a lack of respect that one has for the offended person, and this basic sentiment can appear in any of three forms: *contempt, rivalry,* and *insult.* In the last analysis, these are the motives to which anger can always be traced. For if we could suppose that

the injury done us is caused only through ignorance, we should suffer from it, but we would not be provoked. And when we notice that, while anyone has hurt us, he is himself lashed by a storm of emotion, we feel less angry than if he who injured us did it of set purpose (q.47, a.2). It is thus the deliberate scorn that hurts us, and it does it the more cruelly because we see in such a sentiment a radical negation of our value as men. Also, we may say that the higher a man's value, the more it naturally increases the occasions of his being chafed, his very superiority making more unjust the contempt of which he is the object (a.3).

As for its effects, we must remember that a just anger is pleasant to feel and the best remedy for the sadness which the injuries urging us to revenge have done us. The satisfaction it affords the irritated man is complete when he achieves an effective vengeance, but even without that the bare hope of revenge is agreeable, as is the pleasure of often thinking of what we strongly desire (q.48, a.1). All the same, anger occasions the gravest physical troubles and the most violent outward manifestations because of the heat which it works up in the blood and the boiling over that results, and for the same reason it affects the use of reason. For though reason does not employ any bodily organ in order to think, it needs sense perceptions as the content out of which it draws its ideas and it needs all the members of the body as instruments to carry out its orders. But the

undue heat which anger imports into the heart, which is the center of life, leads to a general perturbation of every function and every organ; and, though in an indirect manner, it slows up the free working of reason.

Chapter V

THE INNER PRINCIPLES OF MAN'S ACTION

We began by outlining the moral end toward which human acts tend when they are what they ought to be (ch. 1, "The Master Value"). We tried to make it clear that actions are human so far as willed, and we then described the inner make-up of an act of the will (ch. 2, "Structure of the Human Act"). With a knowledge of what the terminus of an action is, and also what its structure is, we were able to show that the suitableness of the elements within an act to their objective permits us to qualify the act as good, and their unsuitableness to stamp it as evil, and that the degree of its moral character follows the degree of this adaptation (ch. 3, "On Moral Value and Disvalue").

Thus we marked off the most general conditions of an activity which is truly human, and hence moral. We still had to pass from these conditions to the concrete detail of acts. Now, among the acts which a man does, some are not strictly his, but only in so far as he is an animal. They are "natural," and not properly human, and hence are outside morals and can become good or bad through the

use a man makes of them. We proceeded to describe and rank them, and we pointed out how each of them arises (ch. 4, "Love and Other Emotions"). From now on, the field of our study will no longer be general conditions of morals, but the direct principles which preside over our moral acts.

These principles are of two types: those that are within the human being, or *interior principles,* and those that rule the acts of human beings from without, or *exterior principles.* Among the interior we put the virtues in the first class, and link with their study that of the vices contrary to them. The exterior principles which we shall study are the several moral laws; man does not make them, but they are imposed on him from without, and he should guide his actions by them.

I. VIRTUE

A thorough sifting of the inner principles of human acts would suppose that we consider not only the principles that are specifically required for developing the moral life, but also those implied or presumed by them. From this point of view, all a man's active powers work together to effect a moral act. The soul, of course, is not, like God, a pure act, hence we cannot find in it any operation or power of operating that essentially belongs to it. In other words, the human soul, because it has not its existence from itself, necessarily receives all that

it is. Hence, even when it occurs in a being and is defined by it as a form of an organized body, it is not capable of drawing from itself the faculties it needs to carry on its many functions, but it must receive them, and this is why, since it does not draw them out of its own essence, the powers of the soul are really distinct from the soul itself. These faculties or active powers given to the soul, or form of the body, so that it can do other things besides being the form of the body, plainly make up the immediate inner principles of all our acts (1, q.77, a.1), including our moral acts. Because of their very general character, however, the study of them is not specifically to the point in morals, but goes back to the science of the soul, which describes senses, intelligence, and will one by one.

Yet if we view the soul as equipped with its faculties, we shall be constrained to posit other inner principles of action, and these, though not exclusively the property of moral acts in the strict sense of the term, nevertheless develop on the field of morals as on their chosen ground, and they are hardly separable from a qualification of good and bad. These are the virtues. In fact, the problem which we have just posed as to the essence of the soul, is put in analogous terms of its faculties; they certainly have not of themselves the determinations needed for going at once into action; some *inner principles,* half-way between faculties and acts, must of necessity enter in. For if the human soul with its powers were

wholly in act, as God is, it would lack nothing for action. If it were only a particular natural form, as those of bodies which are at once all that they can be, it would need nothing further for the exercise of its activity. And if the human soul were a form of the same kind as the elementary forms, which are naturally inseparable from their qualities, it would always act like the elements, which are necessarily hot or cold, moist or dry. But the human soul is of quite a different nature, because of the universal indetermination marking the power to think with which it is provided. Take, for example, the intellect itself. It is assuredly by nature that the intellect can know everything and thus can become all things; yet it would never pass from its simple capacity of knowing to the concrete multiplicity of the particular facts which it knows, if it did not in the beginning get hold of the first principles from which it receives a primary determination and which it goes on to employ as instruments. With the help of these principles, which it applies to the real, it proceeds to build up the sciences; and these in their turn are subordinated to each other and are more and more detailed until the intellect, enriched and rounded out with these specifications which it has taken on, becomes the progressive master of the unending minutiae of truths.

How are we to conceive of these particularizing principles that are acquired? Plainly, they are not faculties, for they are are added to the faculties

which they suppose as given; hence they are only a kind of disposition to use the faculties rather in one way than in another. Yet, when one of these dispositions is fixed so as to form a lasting acquisition of the soul, it becomes truly a property of the soul, that is, something that belongs to it as a stable and characteristic quality. Technically, we name each of these properties, acquired and kept by the soul, by the Latin word which translates the idea of a permanent possession: *habitus* (1–2, a.49, a.1). These acquired principles evidently are needed in order that the soul can apply its faculties to the doing of moral or any other acts; these, then, are the moral habits which we are going to study. We first show that virtues are habits.

A *virtue* is a perfection added to a faculty of the soul. The perfection of anything lies chiefly in the relation of this thing to its goal, and as the aim or goal of a potency is act, we say that a potency is perfect when it is adjusted to its act. Now some potencies are of themselves adjusted to their acts, as the natural active potencies; that is why such natural powers merit in their own right the name of virtue. The rational powers, however, which are proper to man, are not set on just one activity, but are indeterminate with regard to many. But by way of habit they are determined to their acts as we said a moment ago. Therefore, the distinctively *human virtues are habits* (1–2, q.55, a.1; *cf. De Virt.,* q.1, a.1).

Besides, the virtues are dispositions set, not in a way of *being,* but in a way of *acting.* It is their *human* quality that demands this.

As we have pointed out, the very name of virtue stands for a certain perfection in a potency; and as there are two kinds of potencies, with regard to being and to acting, the perfection of each of them is called virtue. Yet potency as to being is of the order of the matter, which is potential being; whereas potency as to acting is of the order of the form, which is the principle of action, because each thing acts only so far as it is actual. Now, in the make-up of man the body is as the matter and the soul is the form. So far as the body goes, man has nothing that the other animals have not, and it is the same with those powers which are common to soul and body. Therefore, only the powers which are proper to the soul, that is, the rational powers, are uniquely man's. So the *human* virtue of which we speak cannot belong to the body, but singly to the soul; and human virtue is accordingly related not to being, but to action. It is thus of the essence of a human virtue that it be a readiness set for action (1–2, q.55, a.2).

Not only should this disposition make straight the paths for a certain kind of action, so that the virtue we speak of may be genuinely human, but it should likewise be a *good* disposition, in order that, in a word, it may be a virtue. And since the virtues are fixed dispositions, giving the faculties of the soul their full expression, it is always for the good of the soul that we have them, and they themselves may be good. Hence, we can in a measure explain and justify the celebrated definition got up from several texts taken from Augustine (chiefly, *De Libero Arbitrio,* 2, c.19) : Virtue is that good quality of the

mind by which we live rightly, which no one uses ill, and through which God works in us, without us (*in nobis sine nobis*). Leaving aside the last part of this definition, which applies to virtues infused by God into the soul—that is, the supernatural virtues—we may say:

This definition takes in the whole meaning of virtue, even though we omit the last part, and it belongs to every human virtue. As we have noted, a virtue rounds out a potency relative to its perfect act; but the perfect act is the end and aim of the potency or of the being which acts, and, therefore, virtue should make good both this potency and the agent. That is why, in the definition of virtue, there is something relating to the perfection of the act and something relating to the perfecting of the power or being which acts.

If we study the perfection of the act, two conditions are required, namely: that the act be right, and that the habit cannot become the principle of any contrary act. Indeed, the principle of good or bad acts cannot in itself be the perfect principle of a good act. The virtuous habit should be the principle of a good act, but in such a way that it cannot possibly become a bad act. . . . The first of these conditions is laid down by the words: *by which we live rightly,* the second by these: *which no one uses ill.*

If we look at virtue from the other side, that is, in so far as it makes him who possesses it good, there are three things to attend to: the subject itself, and this is set off when we say: *of mind,* because there cannot be any human virtue except in that which belongs to man as man. Secondly, the perfection of the intellect; and this is indicated by the word *good,* because we call good that which is controlled in view

of its end. Thirdly, the manner in which the virtue is inherent in one, and this is indicated by the word *quality,* for virtue is not an emotion, but a habit. Now all these elements unite in virtue, whether it be a moral, an intellectual, or a theological virtue, and whether it be acquired or infused. As for what Augustine adds, that God works *in nobis sine nobis,* this has to do only with infused virtue (*De Virtut.,* q.1, a.2; *cf.* 1–2, q.55, a.4).

Granted that the human soul is the place where virtue resides, the question arises, whether virtue dwells in the very substance of the soul or in its faculties. It seems clear, at first sight, that the proper subject of virtue should be the faculty which it determines, for it is the perfection of a faculty, and that which is the perfection of a faculty ought to be in that faculty. Moreover, we have said that virtue is a disposition for action; and this disposition is in the faculties which act and not in the very substance of the soul. We know also that virtue makes a being ready for what is better for it; and the better for any being is its own end, and it is only by use of its faculties that a being can reach its end (1–2, a.56, a.2). However, a difficulty remains: The faculties are not substances, and the virtues are only qualities; hence there must be some substance to bear a virtue, and since the faculties are not substances, it cannot be they that support the virtues. How are we to solve this difficulty?

We answer: the relation of subject to accident must be one of three. First, it affords it a support, for accident does

not stand by itself, but is borne by a subject. Second, their relation is that of potency to act, for subject yields to accident as potency to the active principle, and so we give to accident the name of form. Third, it is the relation of cause to effect: for the principles of the subject are of themselves the principles of the accidents. If we speak of the first cause, an accident cannot be the subject of another accident; since in fact no accident stands by itself, it cannot serve to support anything else, unless, perhaps, we say that it supports another accident in so far as it is itself supported by a subject. But from the other two points of view, one accident can serve as a subject with regard to another, as transparency does with regard to light and a surface with regard to color; and one accident can also be the cause of another, as moisture is of taste. It is in these last two senses that we say, an accident is the subject of another accident, because the subject is found to receive one accident through the intermediary of another. This is quite as true as when we say that a faculty of the soul is the subject of a habit. The fact is that habit stands in the same relation to the faculty of the soul as act does to potency, since a faculty is not determined by itself, but by habit to this rather than to that. It is also through the first principles of the faculties of the soul that acquired habits are produced. It must be said, then, that the faculties are subjects of the virtues, because the virtues inhere in the soul by way of the faculties (*De Virtut.,* q.1, a.3).

We have to inquire now in which faculties of the soul we find the chief habits which rule over the performance of moral acts, and we shall see that these habits are essentially at home in the will, or

in all the other faculties of the soul, so far as these depend on the will.

In each thing, virtue is judged by its relation to the good, because it is the virtue of a thing, as Aristotle says (2 *Ethics*) that makes good both what has the virtue and whatever it does. Thus, virtue in a horse is what makes him a good horse, a good traveller carrying his rider well, which is the work of a horse. If a habit is a virtuous one, this is because it is directed towards good; which may occur in either of two ways, either materially or formally. It happens formally, if it goes on towards good, but not seen as good. Now good, taken as good, is the object of only the conative part of the soul; for the good is what all desire. It is thus the habits in the conative part or those dependent on the conative faculty that are formally aimed toward the good, and this is why they have in a high degree the nature of virtue. As for those of the habits that are neither in the conative part nor dependent on it, they can, of course, be materially headed towards what is good, but not formally and under its nature of good; hence we may call them virtues in some sense, yet not in so proper a sense as the other habits.

The intellect, both speculative and practical, can be perfected in two ways by a habit. First, absolutely and in itself, in so far as the intellect precedes and in a manner moves the will; secondly, in so far as it follows the will and carries out its act, we might say, at the behest of the will; for, as we have noted, intellect and will imply each other. Habits which are in either the speculative or the practical intellect in the first way, may be regarded as virtues in a sense, yet not in the strict sense, and it is only in this strict sense that intelligence,

science, and wisdom are in the speculative intellect, and that art is in the practical intellect. We say indeed that a man is intelligent or wise from the fact that his intellect is fully ready to know the truth, which is the value or good of intellect. And though this truth can be willed, in so far as man wishes to know truth, all the same it is not from this aspect that the habits we mentioned bring us any perfection; for though a man have knowledge, this does not cause him to will to study the truth, but only enables him to do so; and for this reason the study of the truth itself is not knowledge in so far as willed, but in so far as directed towards its object. And it is the same with art in the field of the practical intellect, for art does not give a man this perfection of willing to achieve a work that satisfies the rules of art, but only the knowledge and ability to do it.

As for the habits which are in either the practical or the speculative intellect when intellect follows will, they approach closer to virtue because, equipped with them, man no longer has simply the power and knowledge for right action: he also has the will to do. We see this in faith and prudence, though in different senses. Faith gives the speculative intellect a perfection by making it obey the will; as, for instance, the act of faith by which man assents to what is above human reason precisely because he wills to do so. This is what Augustine says (*Tract. in Joannem,* 26) that man can believe only if he wills to believe. Faith, then, is in the speculative intellect, so far as this is subject to the command of the will, just as temperance is in our desires, so far as these are obedient to the order of reason. This is why, when there is belief, the will commands the intellect, not only as to exercising the act, but also as to specifying the object: because of an order of the will the intellect gives assent to

a particular belief; just as when a temperate appetite tends towards this or that means, it is because the means has been decided upon by reason. Prudence for its part is in the intellect or the practical reason (see below, p. 155), for the will determines not the object, but only the end; and as for its object, it is prudence itself that seeks it, since, if we presuppose the end, which is the good chosen by the will, it is prudence that goes in quest of the means by which this good can be won and kept.

Thus we see that the several habits of intellect have different relations to the will. For certain of them have no utter dependence on the will, unless as to their use, and even this is but by accident, because the use of such habits as science, philosophy, and the arts, depends differently on the will than on these habits themselves. Thus man is by such habits not made able to will to use them well, but only to use them.

We have a second kind of habit of intellect which does depend on the will, in the sense that it receives its principle from it, for in the realm of doing it is the end which is the starter. Prudence is such a habit. A last type of habit receives from the will even the specification of its object; faith is an instance. And though all these habits may be called virtues in some sense, this name nevertheless belongs most perfectly and properly to the two last. But it does not follow that they are the most noble or the most perfect of all habits. (*De Virtut.*, q.1, a.7; *cf.* 3 *Sent.*, d.23, q.1, a.4; 1–2, q.56, a.3).

To resume: If we take the word *virtue* in its proper sense, as a virtue is always a principle of action, and the immediate principle of action is always the will, a virtue properly speaking can reside

only in the will. And if virtue be in some other faculty than the will, as in the intelligence, this is only so far as that faculty is moved by the will. When the act of the intellect is fully specified by the will, as in the case of faith, the habit of the intellect wholly realises the meaning of virtue. When the act of the intellect receives from the will at least the specification of its end, which is the good willed by a right will, the habit of the intellect is a genuine virtue; as in the case of prudence. And when, as a last type, the habit in question simply makes the intellect capable of acting well without in any way specifying it to perform good actions effectively, it is a virtue but indirectly, because concerned only in a round-about way with action and the will.

We see now the relation which the master faculties of man, intellect and will, have to virtue. Without intellect, there is determinism and no choice possible in the realm of action; hence the agent in such case acts always in the same way and does not need any complementary habit or virtue. But if intellect is the necessary condition where there is to be virtue, it is not its habits that are the virtues; and if there are any virtues, they are not intellectual, but voluntary. We remark this clearly in instances in which the virtue lies in a faculty of the soul which is neither the intellect nor, in proper language, the will. Take for example courage as an emotion of the second kind and temperance of the first. These are very noble virtues, but they can be in the emotional life

only of a man, and not of an animal, for these two types of emotions of the soul are immediate sources of action, and can produce virtues in the genuine sense of the term; they have no need to receive the specifications of it except in the measure that, shot through with intelligence, they themselves share the indeterminism of that faculty (1–2, q.56, a.4). *A virtue then is a settled habit of doing good, and the proper subject of it is the power of choice in an intelligent being.* How are the virtues acquired? Are they natural to us and innate, or are they acquired step by step?

We have a natural fitness for knowledge and virtue; but in their perfect form they are not natural to us. This is the better opinion, because just as when there is question of natural forms, the virtue of natural agents is not at all hostile to them, so when there is question of the acquisition of knowledge, it is by study and exercise that the virtue maintains its efficacy. Still, it must be kept in mind that in a given subject fitness to receive the perfection of form can be twofold. First, according to its passive power only, and it is thus that there is in the matter of air a fitness for the form of fire. Secondly, according to both its passive and active power, and it is in this way that a fitness for health is found in a sick body; because the body is able to receive health. It is in this last-mentioned sense that man has a natural aptitude for virtue, partly by reason of the nature of his species, since aptitude for virtue is common to all men, and partly by reason of the nature of the individual, since some are more fit for virtue than others.

To grasp this truth, it is necessary to know that three faculties of man can serve as the subjects of virtue: the intellect, the will, and that of the conative emotions, which are divided into three classes. Now we must, in some measure, give an account of each of these subjects both as to its fitness to receive virtue and as to the active principle of virtue that is in it.

We know, of course, that in the cognitive part of the soul there is, first, the possible intellect, which is in potency with regard to all intelligible things, the knowledge of which forms cognitive virtue; and secondly, the active intellect, whose light makes things actually intelligible. Among these things some are immediately known by man, are known from the outset without study or research. These are the first principles, not only of a speculative kind, as: *the whole is greater than any part,* or the like, but also of the practical sort, as: *evil must be avoided.* These facts are naturally known and are the principles of any and all knowledge that we can acquire by study, whether to speculate or to do. Similarly, in the case of the will, it is plain that there are natural principles of conduct; for the will tends towards the end of ends by a natural inclination; and in the practical order the end takes the place of natural principle, and so the inclination of the will is as an active principle with regard to every disposition acquired in the exercise of the affective part of the soul. It is clear that the will itself, as power of choice among means leading to an end, is suspectible of a habitual inclination toward such or such means. As for the emotions, they are naturally capable of obeying reason, and it is this fact that makes them naturally susceptible of the virtue achieved in them in the measure that they are habituated to follow the

good of reason. And as all these dispositions to virtue result from the nature of humankind, they are common to all men.

There exists another type of disposition to virtue, resulting from the nature of the individual, and because of it this or that man is temperamentally inclined to a particular virtue. This inclination is good, indeed it is a beginning of virtue; and still it is not perfect, because a perfect virtue would imply the rule of reason well established. And therefore, in defining virtue, we say that it chooses means *according to right reason.* And if anyone should follow inclinations of this kind without the discernment of reason, he would often sin and so, without the help of reason, this beginning of virtue does not form a perfect virtue. But it is necessary to say something of it as well as of the preceding virtues, for if we come down from universal principles to conclusions, it is by an inquiry of reason; and it is due to the work of reason that man is brought from a desire of the end of ends to the means fitted for that end. And it is reason also that, though it commands any of the emotions, subjects itself to them.

It is clear, therefore, that the concurrence of reason is required for virtue to be entire, whether it be a virtue of the intellect or of the will, of emotions of one kind or of another. And here is what its consummation consists in: that the disposition to the virtue which is in a higher faculty be applied to the virtue of the lower part. For example, man is made fit for virtue of the will by the disposition to virtue which is in his will and also by that which is in his intellect; and he is made fit for the virtue that is in the emotions by the beginning of the virtue that is in them, and also by that which is in the higher faculties: but not vice versa. It plainly follows that reason, the highest of the faculties, concurs for the at-

tainment of each of the virtues, . . . and so the perfection of virtue comes to man not from nature, but from reason (*De Virtut.,* q.1, a.8; *cf.* 1–2, q.68, a.1).

We have now in a measure rounded out our definition of virtue, including in it all the required conditions. A virtue is a *settled disposition,* in other words, a habit; its home is in a faculty of the will, or in any faculty that holds from a voluntary one; it belongs only to an *intelligent being,* who is capable of determining himself to his acts; it has its origin in *a natural germ,* but it comes to full bloom only by the *help of reason,* which forms and in a sense imprints in the lower faculties a right disposition, without which the acquired disposition would not be a virtue.

II. CLASSIFICATION OF THE VIRTUES

There are three kinds of virtues: intellectual, moral, and theological. Those in the second class form the proper object of our study, and it is on the classification of them that we shall chiefly dwell. Still, the moral virtues are incomprehensible so long as we are ignorant of the intellectual, at least one of which is their necessary condition; and we should get a false idea of the moral virtues if we did not know of the existence of the theological virtues needed to bring them to their perfection.

In the intellect itself it is proper to distinguish be-

tween a speculative and a practical function. If we take first its speculative function, it will seem to us as being, by definition, unconcerned with anything practical and active; as such it cannot be the seat of genuine virtue, since the virtues, strictly speaking, are dispositions for action. The intellect, as speculative, can have only the virtues which are from a good kind of being and not those which cause us to act from these good dispositions. But at the same time it furnishes the properly free virtues with matter on which to apply themselves. To have knowledge is a virtue of the speculative intellect; to contemplate truth by using this knowledge is, on the contrary, a moral virtue. It is thus necessary, first to have those virtues which are only from a manner of being, then to be able to exercise the contemplative virtues, which are the highest and rule the activities of the others.

The habits, or ways of being acquired and maintained lastingly by the intellect, are three. There is *intelligence,* which consists in the possession of the first and immediately evident principles of knowledge, such as the principle of contradiction and its derivatives. Second, *science,* which consists in the possession by the intellect of the conclusions of such or such a particular branch of study, the knowledge of which is not immediately evident. Third, *wisdom,* which consists in the possession by the intellect of the most universal principles and of first causes, and under these are ranged the principles of each specific science. We see at once that these three intellectual

virtues are not only distinct, but also hierarchical, and that the two others are subordinate to wisdom. Science, in fact, depends on intelligence, since the sciences are built up in part out of the first principles of knowledge; but wisdom contains both intelligence and science, because it consists in the possession of the final findings of the sciences and at the same time of the first principles on which these conclusions depend (1–2, q.57, a.2, ad 2). Wisdom is thus the highest intellectual virtue, and whoever has it, has the others.

But if we consider the practical function of the intellect, and keep in mind the part which it plays in the elaboration of voluntary acts, we distinguish three principal moments: deliberation (p. 74), judgment (p. 75), and command (p. 76). Here again there is not one of these operations that we cannot become capable of doing, and of doing better; each of them, therefore, can become the object of virtue. And certainly, to deliberate and to judge are, rightly speaking, acts of the speculative intellect; yet they are subordinate to ends that are immediately practical. To be able to deliberate well is to possess a virtue which we may call *good counsel,* in the sense in which we say of certain persons that they are good counsellors. To be able to judge well, whether following natural reason or common law, is to have that virtue which we mean when we say of a man that he has *good judgment.* There remains a third virtue, *prudence,* which is by far the most important

of all, and alone of the intellectual virtues cannot be dissociated from the moral.

The difference between the natural and the rational virtues is that a natural virtue is determined to one single thing, whereas a rational virtue conditions several things. Now, in order that a rational or an animal desire be inclined towards an object, it is necessary that this object be known; for when the inclination to an end is not preceded by knowledge, it is that of a natural appetite, as of a heavy body which tends downward. Hence, though there must be a known good to serve as object of either animal desire or rational desire, when this good is always the same, there can be a rational inclination in the appetite and a natural judgment in the faculty of knowledge, as is the case with the animals. And as in fact they carry on only a few operations, on account of the weakness of their active principle, which has but a limited field of action, there is a uniform value for all animals of the same species; this is what causes their desire to tend to this good by natural inclination and causes them to pass, in virtue of their power of knowing, a natural judgment on a value that is proper to them and is ever the same. It is this natural judgment and this natural desire that cause every sparrow to build her nest in the same way and every spider to spin her web in the same way, and we can observe the same thing among other animals. Man, however, performs many different operations, because of the dignity of his active principle or soul, whose power in a sense (*quodammodo*) reaches to the infinite. And this is why a natural desire of the good and a natural judgment are not enough for man, if he is to act rightly; he must be farther directed and perfected.

It is by a natural desire that man is inclined to seek his

own good. But man's good takes very different forms and can consist in any one of several things. Accordingly, it is not possible that man should have a natural desire for such a determined good as would satisfy at once all the conditions required for being his good. Indeed, his good varies in many ways, according to the diverse circumstances of persons, times, places, and the like. And for the same reason a natural uniform judgment is not enough for seeking a good of this kind, but it is necessary that man be made fit to search out and pass judgment on his own goods (with all the conditions which make them desirable in determined circumstances) by use of reason, whose business it is to make a comparison among several objects. Now, to do this, reason, without a habit to perfect it, is as speculative reason would be if it had no habit of science. It could not do it, except poorly and with difficulty. Just as speculative reason, therefore, should be rounded out by the habit of a science, so that it be capable of judging correctly of the circumstances relevant to it, so the practical reason should be completed by a habit so as to be able to judge correctly what is good for man to do in each particular instance. We call this virtue prudence. Its home is the practical reason. It perfects all the moral virtues of the conative life, each of which begets an inclination of desire towards a determined kind of human value. For example, justice begets an inclination towards that value which makes for equality in all the circumstances of social life; temperance, towards that good which forms the mastery of our appetite; and so on, for each of the other virtues. Now all this can be done in many different ways and is not done in the same way by all. Hence, to set up a right way of doing it, requires a prudent judgment. So it is from prudence that all the other virtues get their rightness and perfection; and this is why

Aristotle says in the second book of his *Ethics* that it is right reason that determines the just medium in moral virtue. And as it is to this rightness and this rounding out of their perfection that all habits of the conative powers owe their quality of virtue, it follows that prudence is the cause of all the virtues of the conative powers; and they are called moral only in so far as they are virtues (*De Virtut.,* q.1, c.6).

In view of these facts it is evident that prudence is an intellectual virtue, and that without it none of the moral virtues would realise its own end, and as prudence itself supposes a knowledge of principles, these two intellectual virtues are necessary conditions of all the moral virtues.

Prudence is a virtue very much needed in human life. To live well means to act well. And to act well does not depend solely on what one does, but also on how he does it, that is on what he does in virtue of a right choice and not from mere impulse or emotion. On the other hand, choice has to do with means, and rightness of choice requires two factors: namely, an end which is what it should be, and a means in harmony with this end. As for what the end should be, man is suitably disposed by the virtue which perfects the conative part of his soul, the object of this being value or end. But as for the proper means in view of this end, man should be disposed directly by a habit of reason, because deliberation and choice, dealing with the means, are acts of reason. As a consequence, there necessarily should be in reason an intellectual virtue, so that reason is perfected by squaring itself as it must with the means. This virtue is prudence. Prudence is thus a virtue

necessary for living well (1–2, q.57, a.5; for the relations of art to prudence, see *ibid.,* a.4).

We must not let ourselves be led astray by a false analogy between prudence and art. Prudence is not an art of producing virtues which, once produced, can subsist without it, as the works of art survive the art and the artist who made them. Art is reason made capable of producing objects exterior to it, and art introduces into these objects that perfection which they will henceforth possess. Prudence is reason made capable of knowing how we must act, and so it does not have to do with finished works, but with doing. The result of art, therefore, is the beauty or excellence of the work of art. The result of prudence is not the goodness or perfection of the man who so possesses it that he could dispense with prudence once he is enriched with its effects; its result is the goodness or the perfection of the very acts performed by the man. This is why we have said that prudence is necessary if a man is to live well; because to live is to act, and prudence is the lasting regulator of our actions.

If we go on to consider the moral virtues, we shall see them marked off from the intellectual, first, in the way the two kinds are formed. Not all philosophers admit this distinction, because not all conceive properly the relations of the faculties of the soul to reason. Socrates, for example, taught that reason

rules the body as a despot rules his subjects. If this were true, we should have no need of other virtues beyond those of reason; he who had prudence and the science of intellect would never commit any fault, and no fault would ever have any cause but ignorance. We know, however, that reason does not command the other faculties as slaves; it is an enlightened monarch who gives directions to free men. The conative part of the soul is notably a master in the use and specification of its acts; it therefore requires its own virtues, which are not mixed up with prudence or the other virtues. Consequently, intellectual and moral virtues are two distinct classes (1–2, q.58, a.2 and 3) and there cannot be more than the two, because there are but two principles of human acts: intellect (or reason) and will.

Viewing them in a general way, let us see, first, what part the moral virtues play as controllers of our activity. We shall note at the outset that they condition intellectual prudence, and that prudence conditions them. For prudence is a good disposition, which gives the intellect a chance to choose the means in view of the end; but it is desire, perfected by its moral virtues, that judges of the end and decides what ought to be (*ibid.*, a.5). A prudence exercised on a desire minus moral habits would be exercised then on a desire enslaved by its passions and would place the virtue of the intellect at the service of a morally evil cause. In fact these two or-

ders of virtue, which we have specifically distinguished, work together through the intermediary of prudence.

In the second place, we shall note that the moral virtues are in contact, and as it were at blows, with the emotions. For the two of them register at the same office—the conative side of the soul. Not that there is between the emotions and the virtues the incompatibility supposed by the Stoics; we have pointed out the source of that error (p. 104). But certain virtues are applied to the emotions as the remedy is applied to the disease which it is designed to cure, or as the virtues are applied to the faculties which support them and which they direct and use. Of course, it is necessary to grant that not all the virtues are related to the emotions, for we have a rational appetite or will, and the virtues of the will—justice, for instance—have to do, not with the emotions, but with the activities of the soul (1–2, q.59, a.4). Yet even when virtue does not directly apply to emotion, it accompanies it, and so, contrary to the view of the Stoics, there are no perfectly virtuous acts unless man is quite fully concerned in them.

If we call *disordered affections* emotions, as the Stoics did, it is plain that there is perfect virtue without emotions. But if we call *all the movements of sense desire* emotions, it is clear that those moral virtues that are related to the emōtions as their proper matter, cannot exist without emotion.

The reason is that otherwise moral virtue would result in making sense desire wholly useless; and the part of virtue is not to cause the faculties subject to reason to cease from the exercise of their proper acts; it is rather to cause them to carry out the orders of reason through the use of their proper acts. It follows, therefore, that, as virtue disposes the members of the body to the exterior acts they should do, so it fits sense appetite to accomplish its proper and orderly acts.

If, on the other hand, we study the moral virtues, which are related not to the emotions, but to activities, they can exist independently of the emotions. The virtue of justice is of this kind, for it applies the will to its proper act, which is not an emotion. It is none the less true that from the act of justice there results, at least in the will, a joy which in the beginning is not an emotion, but if it is developed for the perfection of justice, manages in some way to flow over from joy to the sense appetite, because, as noted before (q.17, a.7), the lower powers follow the movement of the higher; and the more complete this overflow, the more emotion it arouses (1–2, q.59, a.5).

We should pause, however, at this first distinction between the points of application of the virtues, to make out the two principal classes of moral virtues, and we therefore leave the general consideration of virtue to attempt a classification of the latter. At the outset, let us put down as the first group of moral virtues all those that have to do with action. In one sense, all of them share more or less the nature of justice, for to act well is always to give everyone his due. But in another sense they are dis-

tinct from one another because we do not owe the same to everyone and for the same reason. For example, to give to God what is His due, is religion; to give our parents their due, is filial piety; and, on the other hand, to return a favor, is gratitude, but to pay a debt would not be. Thus the grouping of all the virtues that deal with action and that govern our special relations, is formed by the many specific virtues ranked, because of their kinds, under the one virtue of justice.

Thus the first class of virtues is built up. But there remains a second group: the virtues which have to do with the emotions. We might at first be tempted to make the virtues correspond to the emotions by applying each of them to a particular emotion. Yet this is the one method that would halt our progress, for a single virtue is enough to moderate two contrary emotions, such as fear and boldness, because virtue takes up precisely a middle position; and one single virtue is enough to repress two emotions directly deriving from each other. We shall, therefore, put temperance against the emotions of the first kind, courage against fear and boldness, and so for the other virtues. But because the ranking of the moral virtues that have to do with the emotions does not always follow the grouping of the emotions, such classification is impossible; we know only that it will be complex and that it will refer simultaneously to several different principles: subjects, emotions, or objects of virtues. By combining

or substituting the three principles for one another, St. Thomas restates the ten moral virtues that are related to the emotions and are given by Aristotle in his *Ethics* (bk. 2): *Courage,* which moderates fear and boldness in the second type of emotion; *temperance,* which moderates too strong a desire for goods known by touch and relating to the conservation of the individual or the species; *generosity,* which tempers our desire for the bodily goods perceived by an inner faculty; *magnificence,* which tones down the vehement desire and hope for money; *honor,* the very name of which expresses the desirable quality of the object; *magnanimity,* which carries us on in the hope of winning a difficult honor; *meekness,* which mollifies the emotion of anger; *affability,* which consists in showing ourselves agreeable with others, in word or act, in serious matters; *sincerity,* which consists in showing ourselves, in words and acts, just as we are; and lastly, *playfulness,* a virtue which makes us agreeable in games and pleasant exercises (1–2, q.60, a.5). Among all these virtues, whether of mind or character, four stand out from the others. These are the so-called cardinal virtues: *prudence, temperance, fortitude,* and *justice.*

We can number things by beginning with their formal principles or with their subjects; and in either way we find four cardinal virtues. For the formal principle of the virtues of which we speak is the good of reason. We may view this

good in two ways: first, so far as it lies in thought and reasoning, and we then have a principal virtue which we call justice; secondly, in the sense that a reasoned order is put into things: if it is introduced into activities, we have justice, but if it is introduced into the emotions, we should have to name two virtues in order to give an account of the twofold repugnance of emotion to reason. For emotion in the first place can impel to some act contrary to reason, and it is needful that the emotion be repressed; then the virtue gets the name of temperance. But emotion can also keep us from doing what reason prescribes, as fear turns us away from danger or fatigue, and it is then necessary that man be made firm in what is reasonable, lest he should run away; and the name of the virtue in this case is fortitude. And when we glance at the subject of the virtues, we find like ones, and an equal number of them. For there are four subjects of the virtue of which we are now speaking: first, reason taken in itself, which prudence perfects; then, that which only shares reason, and this in its turn is subdivided into three kinds: the will, which is the subject of justice, emotions of the first type, which form the subject of temperance, and of the second type, which form the subject of fortitude (1–2, q.61, a.2; *cf. De Virtut. Cardinal.,* q.1, a.1; see below, p. 176).

These virtues are named cardinal virtues because they are in a sense the hinges (*cardines*) on which all others turn, and because the others presuppose them. For every virtue that effects good in the name of reason is related to prudence; every virtue that directs our activity towards the good relates to justice; every virtue that tempers the emotions is in the field of temperance; and every virtue that makes

the soul firmer against emotion is close to fortitude. These, then, are the basic moral virtues; but they are not the highest virtues, for the theological in turn perfect and crown them.

The study of the theological virtues as such certainly has nothing to do with the competence of the moral philosopher and, as their name shows, they belong to the theologian. But though moral science may not take the description of them for its object, it cannot be polished off without postulating them. When we define the sovereign human value, we see plainly that man's essence implies a demand of the infinite which no human good can meet. Hence the two kinds of happiness, distinct though co-ordinate, the nature of which we have described and which we ranked in hierarchical fashion (p. 41). Now, it is clear that if it is of the essence of man to be meant for an end beyond that which his essence can realise, it is necessary that fit means be given him, or he will despair of ever attaining it. Therefore, just as ethics requires, for strictly philosophical reasons, a religious morals to round it out, so the intellectual and moral virtues need the theological virtues to crown them and to carry on to perfect achievement the work they have begun.

Man is perfected by virtue for doing the acts which lead him to happiness, as is evident from what precedes (q.3, a.5). But human happiness or felicity is of two kinds; one kind is proportioned to human nature, that is to say, man can attain

it by the mere principles of his nature; whereas the other is a happiness which exceeds man's nature and which he can reach only by divine help by a sort of participation in the divinity. In this sense it is said that, through Christ, we are made *"partakers of the divine nature"* (2 Pet., c.1). And because this happiness exceeds the limits of man's nature, the natural means which man uses for acting as well as he can are not enough to direct him to this aforesaid happiness. It is necessary, therefore, that other principles be superadded to man, so that he be conducted to supernatural happiness, as natural means lead him to his natural goal, though even this is not independent of God. These extra principles are called theological virtues, because they have God for their object, in the sense that they turn us properly towards God, because they are given us only by God, and, lastly, because they are known to us only through Holy Scripture, in which God reveals them to us (1–2, a.62, a.1; *cf.* 1–2, q.65, a.2, and 3 *Sent.,* d.33, q.1, a.4).

With *faith,* which perfects our minds by giving them habits of the truths to believe; with *hope,* which perfects the direction (*intention*) of our wills by pointing them toward their supernatural end as something accessible to man; and *charity,* which spiritually changes our wills by attaching them to this end, we attain the full reach of the human soul, thoroughly fitted to work with effectiveness for the attainment of the master value. The bases of the edifice, vaulted over with supernatural gifts and beatitudes, are thus laid down wholly; and we shall pause a moment to take a look at the foundation of

the building. First, the intellect viewed in its theoretic function, with its virtues of knowledge, intelligence, and wisdom; then in its practical working, with the habits of art and skill, the virtue of prudence and the related virtues of judgment and good counsel. Afterwards, desire, studied in its rational form with the virtue of justice, which perfects the will; and in its sense form, with the ten virtues of fortitude, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, love of honor, meekness, affability, truth, and playfulness. Lastly, there comes a supernatural perfection which brings faith to the intellect, and hope and charity to the will, so as to make man capable of his high destiny. Such is the soul wholly equipped—*"expedita,"* as the Scholastics say. We have now to see the soul love and act, to see it acquiring and developing the several virtues, uniting them and putting them to work.

III. THE LIFE OF VIRTUE

In defining virtue we have noted that it always implies an original disposition of the subject brought step by step to its full development through the exercise of reason. This conclusion is the same for every moral virtue properly so-called, excluding, of course, the theological virtues which are not acquired by reason, but are infused into the soul by God, and also excluding whatever moral virtues God may infuse into us to make ready the ground

for the theological virtues with which he aims to crown the moral (1–2, q.63, a.3). Let us consider, then, a merely human moral virtue, won little by little through repeated acts conformed to reason, and let us ask how it works. Its proper and constant effect will always be to outline the middle road that an act should take so as to be morally good.

From what has been said (q.55, a.3) it follows that by its nature a virtue disposes man to the good, and that the peculiarity of moral virtue is that it perfects the conative part of the soul with regard to some determined object. The measure and rule of the movement of desire toward the desirable is reason itself. On the other hand, the value of all that is measured and ruled lies in being brought into conformity to its rule, as the value of a work of art is to obey the rule of the art; and evil for an object of this kind consequently consists in being out of harmony with its rule or measure, which lack of harmony comes of the object's exceeding its measure or not living up to it. This is easily seen in all objects which are ruled and measured, and it appears that the good of moral virtue consists in a squaring up with reason as measure. But it is plain also that the midway between overdoing and underdoing is the agreement or conformity; so it follows, no less plainly, that moral virtue takes the middle of the road (1–2, q.64, a.1; *De Virtut.*, q.1, a.13).

This middle way, however, cannot be settled by an abstract rule that gives us a definitive estimate in one word; for in the degree that moral research approaches its ideal limit, that is to say, the de-

termination of the detail of particular acts, it is itself particularised so as to be fitted to all the circumstances defining the nature of each act in its individuality.

In the case of actions and passions, means and extremes are fixed only by taking account of circumstances. There is, therefore, no reason why a thing could not be extreme for a virtue in one circumstance and yet be the middle way and reasonable in other circumstances. And this is precisely what does happen in (the virtues of) magnificence and magnanimity. For if we consider the absolute quantity of that toward which the magnificent or the magnanimous man tends, we shall qualify it as extreme and the limit; but if the same matter is studied in the light of other circumstances, it will have a medium look, for virtues of this kind justly tend towards the maximum, and reasonably so, that is to say, where and when on some good ground they ought to do so. However, it would be an excess to tend toward the limit when we should not, or where we should not, or if for some good reason we should not; and it would be a deficiency if we did not tend toward this extreme where we should and when we should. And so Aristotle says in the fourth book of the *Ethics* that magnanimity is assuredly at the extreme, but since that is where it should be, it keeps the mean (1–2, q.64, a.1, ad 2).

In relation to what is reason to fix this mean? Will it have to consider something of the thing, or rather something that seems such to it through relation to the subject who acts?

We may call the mean of reason that which reason determines in any matter, and in this sense the mean of every moral virtue is a mean of reason, since, as we have just shown, moral virtue consists in the mean conformed to reason. Now it can sometimes be that the mean of reason is equally the mean of the thing (*medium rei*), and then the mean of moral virtue ought to be the mean of the thing, and this is the case in the virtue of justice. But sometimes the mean of reason is not the mean of the thing, but a mean fixed in reference to us; and this is the kind of mean found in all the other moral virtues. The reason is that justice rules the acts which have to do with exterior things, where right should be established in itself and absolutely; for, as justice gives to each one his due, no more and no less, the mean of reason is one with the mean of the thing. The other moral virtues, however, are concerned with interior emotions, in which this right could not be set up in the same way, because with regard to the emotions men are not the same. And, therefore, when it is a question of the emotions, right reason should be determined in relation to us, who are affected by these emotions (1–2, q.64, a.2).

We may add that what is true of the moral virtues in a proper sense, is true equally of the intellectual virtues, and especially of that virtue of the practical intellect which we have said rules all the moral virtues, namely, prudence. For as to the speculative intellect, its object or proper good is truth; and the measure of truth is none other than the thing which it expresses. If intellect misses this object by running over or under, it misses at one

stroke its middle way, its good and its object. As for the practical intellect, its proper good is that which appetite truly ought to desire, and, taken in relation to its object, it is in this object again that its measure is found; but once the practical intellect has laid hold of the object, this becomes the measure of desire for it. Rightness of reason, consisting in the just mean, is thus also found to be the rightness of the moral virtue which reason rules, reason itself, measured by its object, becoming in turn the measure of virtue (*De Virtut.*, q.1, a.13).

Let us take up now a new problem, that of the relation and interconnection of virtue with virtue. Its practical importance is considerable, for on the solution which we shall give to it will depend the method which we are to follow in the acquisition of virtue, and to solve it for the cardinal virtues is to solve it for all the dependent virtues.

Moral virtue may be regarded either as perfect or imperfect. In its imperfect form, a moral virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, is merely an inclination in us to do a good act, and this inclination may be from our nature or it may be the result of habit. Taken in this sense, the moral virtues are not linked together; for we notice that such or such a person who by his native disposition or habit would be ready to do a work of charity, is not so prepared for a life of chastity. Now perfect moral virtue is a permanent disposition which inclines us to the doing of a good action, and if we view the moral virtues in this way, it must be said that they are inter-dependent, as indeed almost anyone will admit.

We may give two reasons for this, following the different ways in which the cardinal virtues are distinct from one another. For, as we have said (q.61, a.3 and 4), there are some who divide them according to the general properties of these virtues. They admit, for example, that discretion is a part of prudence, right of justice, moderation of temperance, and firmness of courage; and they admit this, whatever the content of these virtues may be. The connection of virtue with virtue is thereby readily evident. For there is no praising firmness as a virtue, if it lacks moderation or right or discretion, and so on for the other virtues. And this is the meaning of their connection given by Gregory in the twenty-second book of his *Morals* (ch.1), where he says that if the virtues be disjoined, they cannot be perfect virtues, because that prudence which is not just, temperate, and courageous, is not genuine; and so, too, of the others. Augustine likewise gives an argument of this kind in the sixth book *On the Trinity* (ch.4).

Others draw a line among the cardinal virtues according to their several contents, and take the view that Aristotle took of their connection in the sixth book of the *Ethics* (ch.12). As we said earlier (q.58, a.4), a person cannot have any moral virtue without prudence. For it is the way of this virtue to make a right choice; and in order that choice be right, it is not enough that there be an inclination toward the legitimate end which the possession of moral virtue fixes, but a person must directly choose those things that lead to the end, and these things have to do with prudence, which is counsellor, judge, and master of the means. On the other hand, one could not have prudence if he had not the several moral virtues; because prudence is a right knowledge of what to do (*recta ratio agibilium*), and it proceeds from the ends of

actions as well as from its beginnings, and to these ends we are directed only by the moral virtues. Just as we cannot have a speculative science without a knowledge of principles, therefore, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues. The plain conclusion is that the moral virtues are linked together.

As for the objection that we can practice one virtue without practicing the others, it is to be said that some moral virtues are limited to lifting us to the level of common duties, that is to say, those that are met ordinarily in every human life. Man, in this order, should bring himself to the practice of all the moral virtues and, if he does all well, he will acquire the habits of all virtues at once. But if he goes to work to master the matter of only one of these virtues, and neglects that of another, for instance, to get the better of anger, but not of lust, he will attain a certain settled way of controlling his temper, yet this disposition will not truly be a virtue, since prudence, run over by sensuality, will then be behind time. So too the natural inclinations cannot become perfectly virtuous where there is no prudence. Other moral virtues, however, raise man above the common level, such as magnificence and magnanimity. And as occasion is not usually offered to all for practice in the matter of these virtues, we can have the other moral virtues without actually having these, that is, without having them effectively acquired. All the same, if one has gotten possession of the other virtues, he almost has these too, and he has them virtually. For when we have practice and become adept at generosity in little gifts and little expenses, then, if there is any cash left over, we shall acquire the virtue of magnificence at the cost of little exercise. So the geometrician with a modicum of study gains a knowledge of a conclusion on which he had never reflected,

for we say that we already have that which we easily achieve. And this is the dictum of Aristotle in the second book of his *Physics:* when very, very little is lacking, it is as if nothing were lacking (1–2, q.65, a.1 and ad 1; *cf. De Virtut. Cardinal.,* q.1, a.2).

The relation which we have just established holds only for the moral virtues, and thus only for the virtues won by exercise; we should have to draw up a different formula to solve the problem of the interconnections of the theological virtues. For we must not be unmindful that the theological virtues, infused by God into the soul, are the only perfect virtues, because only they direct man in view of the end of ends, whereas acquired virtues are but relative virtues, since they prepare man only for the good things that serve as steps toward this end. There is a difference in kind, then, between these two classes of virtue, and this is why we may practice the natural moral virtues without the theological and supernatural ones. Many pagans practiced the former without receiving the others, and this experience is enough to decide the question (1–2, q.65, a.2). As for the interconnection of the theological virtues, the problem is simple. The addition of these virtues to the moral virtues is a direction of our actions to a final supernatural end. Now it is the virtue of charity that attunes the will to this end, and we cannot receive charity from God without at the same time receiving faith and hope, as we cannot

lose charity without at the same time losing the other two virtues. On the other hand, faith and hope enjoy in a way the rôle of virtues preparatory for charity and beget each other, so that we can receive faith without as yet possessing hope and hope without possessing charity. The proposition holds only if the case is of these virtues in an imperfect form, when hardly meriting the name of virtue; for without charity they miss their proper end and do not go through with their acts as they should. To sum up: there is no necessary connection between the realm of the moral and that of the theological virtues, but we cannot have the theological virtues without having the moral. And within each order of virtues, we can well have the rough outlines of the lower virtues without the higher virtues, but we cannot have any virtue in its perfect form, nor the highest virtues which crown the others (as moral justice or divine charity) without having all at once. It is true that we thereby suppose the existence of hierarchical degrees among the virtues, and this is the hypothesis that we must now examine.

From the point of view of the specific difference of virtue from virtue, the need for putting them into hierarchic form is at once apparent. For it is reason that gives man's acts their quality of genuine human good; but the virtue which perfects reason as to what should be done is prudence, and, therefore, prudence is superior to all the moral virtues, which share the rule of reason only through it. For the

same reason justice surpasses the other virtues of will as the most rational, and courage, which is in the field of the second type of emotion, excels temperance, which is in the first (*cf.* q.66, a.1). Besides a virtue taken in itself can be more or less perfect in different individuals, or in the same individual at different times. The virtuous life has not that rigidity which the Stoics imagined, and there can be virtue without there being absolute virtue. The degrees due to habit and the point which a virtue has reached, the more or less excellent natural dispositions, the more or less penetrating clearness of reason, the more or less abundant gift of grace, should always be taken into account by the moralist who wishes to describe the complexity of virtues. Only by supposing all things equal and taking the vantage ground of absolute value, are we in a position to introduce a set hierarchy of the many virtues. Their order will be like this: the intellectual virtues absolutely excel the moral; the highest moral virtue is justice and the highest intellectual virtue is wisdom. We shall try now to establish this position.

The kind of virtue depends on the object, as was said before (q.54, a.2). This is why, in absolute terms, the noblest virtue is that which has the noblest object. And it is plain that the object of reason is nobler than the object of desire. For reason seizes something of the universal nature of things, whereas desire tends to them in their particular being. As perfecting reason, then, the intellectual virtues are essen-

tially nobler than the moral virtues, which perfect only desire. Yet if we regard virtue from the point of view of action, then moral virtue is the nobler, because it perfects desire whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as we have seen (q.8, a.1; p. 64). For since virtue is the perfection of a capacity, the word "virtue" means the source of action, and consequently, the moral virtues merit the name of virtue better than do the intellectual, though in an unqualified sense the intellectual are the nobler (1–2, q.66, a.3).

On the strength of this principle we shall rate justice as head of the moral virtues and, by the intermediary of the two cardinal virtues of fortitude and temperance, shall subordinate to it all other virtues.

People, strictly speaking, regard as the most excellent, that virtue in which the good of reason is most resplendent; and in this sense justice excels all the other moral virtues, as nearest to reason in both its subject and object. First, in its subject, because justice resides in the will, and the will is a rational appetite, as we know from what was said (q.50, a.5). Secondly, in its object or content, because it has to do with operations which rule not only a man himself, but his conduct toward others, and this is why it is said in the *Ethics* (bk.5) that justice is the most illustrious of the virtues.

If we go on to the other moral virtues, those having to do with the emotions, the good of reason shines out the more in each, the greater the objects towards which there is a movement of desire subject to reason. Now the greatest value a man possesses is life, on which all else depends. And therefore courage, which subjects the movement of desire

to reason in everything bearing on life and death, holds first place among those moral virtues that rule the emotions, though it is ranked below justice. That is why Aristotle remarks in his *Rhetoric* (1, c.9) that the noblest virtues are essentially those that are most honored, for a virtue is a power that does good, and this is why we especially honor the brave and the just, the virtue of courage being useful in war, and the virtue of justice in both peace and war. After courage, temperance gets the highest rating, because it subjects desire to reason in everything that has to do immediately with life, either for the individual alone or for him in relation to the species, that is, in matters of nourishment and sex. So these three virtues, together with prudence, are the main ones and the most worthy (1–2, q.66, a.4).

We still have to settle the place of prudence. It would evidently be first, since it is the first of the cardinal virtues, if we could class it with the three moral virtues of justice, fortitude, and temperance, over which it presides. But properly it is the keystone of the edifice of moral virtue. We must, therefore, compare it to the virtues of the intellect, and we are then constrained to subordinate it to wisdom. For if the grandeur of virtue is measured by the grandeur of its object, no virtue can surpass that which considers the supreme and first cause, God.

Since prudence looks to human things, and wisdom to the cause of causes, it cannot be said that prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom, unless, as is said in the *Ethics* (6, c.7), the greatest thing in the world is man. It must be said then,

as it is said in the same passage, that prudence does not command itself, but that the contrary is rather the case; for "the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man" (1 *Cor.*, c.2). Prudence does not meddle with the very high matters which wisdom studies, but it commands affairs subordinate to wisdom and prescribes how men should act to arrive at wisdom. Hence, prudence or political virtue is here the servant of wisdom, for it leads to it and prepares the way for it, as the porter keeps the gate for the king. Besides, prudence studies the means of attaining happiness, whereas wisdom considers the very object of happiness, which is the highest knowable thing. If, then, the study which wisdom directs toward its object were perfect, there would be perfect happiness in the exercise of wisdom; but as the exercise of wisdom in this life remains imperfect as to its chief object, which is God, the act of wisdom is a kind of outline or sharing of the happiness to come; and so this act of wisdom is nearer happiness than prudence (1–2, q.66, a.5, ad 1 and 2).

Such is the ideal system of the virtues, with the order and required connection ranking them and tying them together in their perfect form. And even in the approximate realisations of them which the living of a moral life affords us, the relations as defined are respected. A virtue never grows up isolated in the human soul or dies there, but the complete system of the virtues is either enriched or impoverished, yet each virtue remains on the rung of perfection proper to it. The fingers of the hand are unequal, but they all grow at once without their pro-

portions being changed; the virtues, though they are more or less noble, wax strong and wane, but they do not, any more than the fingers, change their proportions (q.66, a.2, c.). To say that two men are equally strong but one of them is more prudent, is to forget that the strength of the other lacks prudence and that consequently he is weaker. The moral life has the perfect cohesion of an organism whose elements are at once integral and ranked or ordered.

IV. ON FAULTS AND SINS

Virtue, as we have defined it, is essentially *ordered* towards the doing of good acts. *Disordered* acts and those which are not related to their end as they should be, are given the contrary name of *sins*. Moreover, virtue is in itself a *good* disposition, independent of the works which it does. The evil quality opposed to it goes by the name of *malice*. Lastly, virtue is above all a habit, an acquired and set disposition, and what is directly opposite to it as habit is called *vice*. Sin then is an act contrary to the act which produces virtue; malice is the quality contrary to the quality of virtue; vice is a habit contrary to the habit which builds up virtue. That is to say, the study of vices amounts to taking the direction reverse to the study of the virtues, by pointing out that vices are dispositions contrary to nature and reason, which is the peak of human nature, as virtues are dispositions conformed to the order of na-

ture and to reason. This is why St. Thomas does not stop to give a general definition of them, but brings the whole weight of his effort to bear upon the study of the evil acts which the vices give birth to, and these evil acts are sins.

An evil human act is what we call a sin. To be human, this act must be voluntary; and to be evil, it must violate, first, the rule of reason and, in addition, the law of God (1–2, q.71, a.6). With the genus of sin thus defined, we can classify sins according to the different objects to which they are related. Some consist in the disorderly enjoyment of spiritual values (fame, praise, and so on) and are called spiritual sins. Others consist in the disorderly enjoyment of corporal and natural values, which are tangible, and these will be named carnal sins (*ibid.*, q.72, a.2). These objects themselves can, furthermore, be divided differently according as a sin of either the spiritual or the carnal type violates the law of God, or the law of society, or the law of human reason.

As we have just noted (q.71, a.6), sin is a disorderly act. Now the order which man should fulfill is threefold: first, with regard to the rule of reason, in the sense that all our actions and reactions should stand by the rule of reason; secondly, with regard to the rule of the divine law, according to which man should direct himself in every affair. If man were by nature a solitary being, these two orders would be enough; but as he is by nature a social animal, as is proved in the *Politics* (1, c.1), a third order is needed to direct man in relation to other men with whom he must live. Now of

these three orders, the second contains the first and goes beyond it. For all that is contained within the order of reason is contained within the order of God himself, but certain things that are within the divine order are above reason, such as the truths of faith or the duties which are owed to God alone. So he who sins in such matters is said to sin against God, as does a heretic, or a sacrilegious or blasphemous person. Likewise, the first order takes in the third and goes beyond it, because in all our relations with our neighbor it is first required that we control ourselves according to the rule of reason, though in particular instances we follow reason in matters which concern ourselves only and not our external activity, and sin is then called a sin against ourselves, such as gluttony, lust, or extravagance. In other cases, however, sin involves relations with our neighbor, as in theft or murder. Plainly, they are not the same objects that we are concerned with in our relations to God, our neighbor, and ourselves. Hence, the distinction of sins comes from that of objects, the upshot of which is their specific divisions. So this distinction of sins is properly a distinction of the several kinds of sins; and the virtues also, of which the sins are the contraries, are put into different classes because of this same difference. For it plainly follows from what was said earlier (q.62, a.1–3) that the theological virtues direct man with regard to God, temperance and fortitude with regard to himself, and justice with regard to his neighbor (q.72, a.4).

We may now say summarily that what distinguishes the kinds of sin is their different motives, and consequently their objects, since it is the object that motivates them. From this there also result, as

from their chief and primal cause, the degrees of seriousness which enter into sins.

Sins differ in seriousness in the same manner as one sickness is more serious than another. For just as health, as a value, lies in a kind of balance of the animal secretions so as to accord with the nature of the animal, so virtue, as a value, consists in a sort of harmony between the human act and the rule of reason. Now, plainly a sickness is more serious when the equilibrium required among secretions is altered by the lack of proportion of a more essential principle; thus disease is more dangerous in the human body when it arises from the heart, which is the propeller of life, or from an organ near the heart. It must, therefore, be that sin is graver when the disorder concerns a principle that has a higher place in the order of reason. Now reason orders everything in the line of human acts from the point of view of the end, and as a consequence, the higher the end that a sin looks to in human acts, the graver is that sin. On the other hand, it follows from what we have said (q.72, a.1) that the objects of acts are their ends, and this is why seriousness in sins is measured by the difference in their objects. For example, it is clear that exterior things are ordered in view of man as their end, and that man in turn is ordered toward God as his end, so that a sin which attacks the very substance of man, such as murder, is graver than a sin that deals with exterior things, such as theft, and that sin which we commit immediately against God, as unbelief, blasphemy, and the like, is yet more serious. And within the order of each of these sins, one sin will be graver than another according as its object is more or less important. As sins are specified by their objects, the difference

in seriousness as measured from the nature of their object is the first and main difference, because consequent upon their species (1–2, q.73, a.3).

From this distinction all others flow more or less directly, because if the seriousness of sins increases with the dignity of the virtues which they contradict, it is because virtues, like vices, are distinct from each other in function of their objects. For the same reason, spiritual sins, if we suppose other things equal, are more serious than carnal sins. The latter imply a movement of turning towards the body, whereas the former imply a movement of turning away from God. And for the same reason, circumstances change the meaning of sins to the degree that they change the nature of the object they deal with and bring more relevant principles into our actions; as fornication becomes adultery, or theft sacrilege. The condition of the person against whom we sin, or the dignity of him who sins, also enters into these circumstances, just as do the extent and complexity of the evil caused by our unworthy actions.

If we ask in which powers of the soul sin can be, it will appear at once that as a willed act it can be in any power of the soul capable of causing such an act, directly or indirectly; therefore, first, in reason, which as a final court judges the acts we are to do, in view of the divine law (q.74, a.2 and 3); in sense desire, which should be subject to the orders of rea-

son; in the will, which is the immediate source of our activity, of our bad acts as surely as of our good ones. It is in each of these three seats of sin that we must seek its causes, and mainly in reason, which is the principle giving our acts their proper quality of humanness. The intellectual vice which keeps the road open to sin is ignorance. We ask, then, what is ignorance?

Ignorance is not the same as nescience, because this latter means that a thing simply has no knowledge (every being that lacks a knowledge of certain things can be said to be nescient or not to know them), whereas ignorance implies a privation of knowledge, that is, a lack of knowledge of something one is naturally capable of knowing. And there are things we are bound to know, namely, those things without a knowledge of which we cannot do in a fitting way the acts we should do: thus, everyone in general is bound to know what must be believed and the universal precepts of right, and each one in particular is bound to know what has to do with his station and its duties. There are other matters that we could know, but are not generally bound to know, such as the axioms of geometry or some particular laws. It is clear, then, that whoever neglects to have or to do what he is bound to have or to do, sins by omission, and this is why ignorance of what we are bound to know is a sin of neglect. We do not, however, impute negligence to a man for not knowing what he cannot know. Such an ignorance is called "invincible," because, however we may try, we cannot overcome it, and ignorance of this kind, since it is not willed and not within the power of the will to remedy, is not a sin. It follows that invincible

ignorance is no sin. As for the ignorance which we could overcome, this *is* a sin if it concerns what we should know; otherwise, it is *not* (1–2, q.76, a.2).

If we suppose that ignorance is vincible, but that it really exists, that it deals with something we are not bound to know, and that it keeps from us such a circumstance of the act that we would not do the act if we knew the circumstance, the effect of such ignorance is to make the act really involuntary. And in fact we then do one thing, though we think we do another. In such teaching as that of St. Thomas, in which the willed act is based on the rational knowledge of the possible ends that desire could embrace, the voluntary quality of acts that are done is in rigorous proportion to their rationality. As for measuring in each particular case the degree of ignorance which is mixed with the act, and the resulting degree of freedom, this is plainly a complex task, and we cannot formulate *a priori* any but general directions for it.

Just because every sin is willed, ignorance can cut down the sin just as far as it cuts down the freedom of the act; but if ignorance does not restrict freedom, it in no way lightens the sin. And certainly the ignorance which excuses outright from sin because it takes away freedom, does not merely make the sin less, but does away with it. On the other hand, an ignorance that does not cause, but simply accompanies sin neither decreases nor increases the sin. The only ignorance that can lessen sin is that which is the occasion of

sin, yet this is not a blanket excuse from sin. It may be, first, that the ignorance, directly and in itself, is willed, as when one of his own will remains ignorant of something so that he can the more freely sin; such an ignorance seems to increase the voluntariness and the sin, for it is the attachment of the will to the sin that makes one willing to bear the evil of ignorance so as to have the liberty to sin. But sometimes the ignorance which causes sin is willed not directly, but indirectly and by accident; for instance, when a man is not willing to trouble himself with studies, and the result is that he is ignorant, or when he wills to take an immoderate sip of wine, and the result is that he gets drunk and lacks discretion. Such ignorance does lessen freedom and, therefore, the sin; for when a man does not know that a thing is a sin, we may not say that his will directly and of itself commits the sin, but only as a by-product, and there is then less contempt and, as a consequence, less sin (1–2, q.76, a.4).

Let us now proceed to the causes of sin in sense desire. One recalls, of course, that the part of the soùl that perceives sense goods by the aid of the body and at the reckoning of the body is the proper place of the feelings. And feeling can exercise an indirect influence, if not a direct one, on the will; for all the powers of the soul run their roots into the unity of its substance, in such a way that when one of the emotions is wholly engaged in an act, the others are obliged to slacken theirs, or at least it makes no effort to help them (q.77, a.1). We may easily prove this by examining the influence which feeling can have on the knowledge possessed by reason.

The opinion of Socrates, as Aristotle reports it in the seventh book of the *Ethics* (c.2), was that knowledge can never be overcome by the emotions; whence he concluded that all virtue is knowledge and all sin is ignorance. There is a measure of reason in this view, for the will looks always toward good, at least the apparent good, and never does the will choose evil, unless that which is not good somehow appears as good; and therefore, the will never tends toward evil, if there be no ignorance or error on its part. Whence it is written in Proverbs (c.14): "They err that work evil." Yet it is a fact of experience that many act in a way contrary to what they know, and we can confirm the point on divine authority. We have for example the word of St. Luke (c.12): "And that servant who knew the will of his lord, and prepared not himself, and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes"; or the word of St. James (c.4): "To him therefore who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin." And so Socrates had a clear-cut reason for his opinion.

It is of importance to make a distinction here, as Aristotle teaches in the *Ethics* (bk.7, c.3). For as man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge—universal and particular—the lack of either is enough, as was said (q.76, a.1), to put a stop to correctness of both will and action. It may happen that a person has a general knowledge of some matter, for instance, that no one is to commit any act of fornication, but does not know that this act in particular, which is fornication, is not to be done; and this is enough for his will not to follow the universal knowledge of reason on the point. We should remember, too, that there is nothing to hinder one's having correct knowledge of a particular case, and not merely of a general principle, and still not thinking about it in fact,

and it seems not difficult for a man to do the opposite of that which he knows, but to which he gives no actual thought. And that a man should not consider in particular what he habitually knows, occurs sometimes from mere lack of attention, as when a man who knows geometry does not take time to reflect on the conclusions of geometry, if he has to think of them all at once and impromptu. And if sometimes he does not reflect on the knowledge which he has, it is because of some hindrance, as, for example, an exterior occupation or some bodily ailment.

It is precisely for this reason that he who is in an emotional state does not reflect specifically on what he knows in a general way, for the emotion interferes with his thought. Emotion so hinders in three ways: first, by a kind of distraction, as we have just explained (q.77, a.1); secondly, by a contradiction, because emotion generally inclines to the contrary of what in a broad way we know is to be done; and thirdly, by a kind of physical perturbation, in consequence of which reason is as it were bound and kept from freely doing its work. It is in this last way that sleep or drunkenness, by the bodily change which they induce, impede the use of reason. And it is plain that, in certain instances, the same effect follows from the emotions, because when these are most intense a person loses all control of reason and very many, when too much in love, are led to do witless things. This is the way that emotion draws reason to judge, in a particular case, against the general knowledge it has of what should be done (1–2, q.77, a.2).

Emotion in such instance plays the part of a kind of infirmity. For though, in a healthy soul that has a normal balance, all the powers ought to be subject

to the guidance of reason, in a soul whose emotions are not controlled, it is reason that is dependent on sense desire. Self-love, by which each of us wills his own good, is disorderly; it wills sense values and temporal values, and it carries on as if the higher values existed for the sake of the lower. It is not that self-love as such is bad, since it is a fitting thing and it is natural that a person should love himself; but he must love himself with an orderly love and will the good that is becoming to him. But all love of self that departs from order implies the preference of man to God, and this is the very definition of sin. A disordered love of self is thus at the bottom of all sin. Yet if it is the emotions that disorder love, and if the emotions are a disease, we may believe that they decrease the seriousness of sin and excuse it. We have still to make an inquiry on this point.

The one cause that can wholly excuse from sin an act that is evil in its nature, is whatever makes it perfectly involuntary. If there is any emotion that makes the act following it quite involuntary, that emotion is an excuse from the sin; otherwise, not a total excuse. On this subject, two points are to be considered. First, an act may be voluntary either in itself, as when the will goes directly for the object, or by reason of its cause, when the will goes for the cause, but not for the effect, as is evident in the instance of a man who gets drunk and to whom, in consequence, we impute as voluntary all that he does in the drunken state. Secondly, we should draw a line between what is directly voluntary and what is but indirectly so. That upon which the will moves

is directly voluntary; and that is indirectly so which the will could but does not prevent. Therefore, we must keep several different cases distinct. Sometimes an emotion is so strong that it fully overbears the use of reason, as it plainly does with those whom love or anger makes delirious; and in such case, if this emotion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin, being voluntary in its cause, as we just noted in the example of the drunkard; if, however, its cause was not voluntary, but natural, as when sickness or some such cause throws us into so strong a feeling as quite to overturn the use of reason, the act becomes involuntary, and is altogether excused from sin. But in certain instances the emotion is not such as totally to break off the use of reason, and then reason can thrust the emotion aside by giving itself to other thoughts, or prevent it from realizing its effects, since the members go to work only with the consent of reason, as we remarked some time ago (q.17, a.9). Accordingly, emotions of this kind do not wholly excuse from sin (1–2, q.77, a.7).

The third and last interior seat where there resides a cause of sin is the will. Just as the intellectual cause of sin *par excellence* is *ignorance,* and as its great sense cause is *emotion,* so its supreme voluntary cause is given the name *malice,* or, to use the complete expression of St. Thomas, *certain malice.* The meaning of this is as follows. To sin by certain malice is not to commit evil through ignorance nor under the urge of violent passion, but by the deliberate will to choose evil instead of good. That this disorder occur, it is necessary that a permanent vicious disposition, otherwise called a habit, incline

the will toward the evil act, as the habits which are virtues incline it toward well-doing. Each time, then, that a habit, or a permanent and acquired disposition, is the cause of the evil act which the will chooses, we say that the sin is committed with a malice certain of its deed and fully responsible for its choice. Yet the reverse is not true. While every evil act chosen by a vicious disposition is of certain malice, there are some acts of certain malice that are not born of a vice. We can do some acts conformed to virtue without being virtuous, and we can equally commit some evil acts without falling into the vice to which they correspond, for virtues and vices are habits, whereas an isolated act is not a habit. It will thus be necessary to work out, as we proceed to do, a list of the interior causes of sin.

The will associates differently with good than it does with evil. Because of its very nature, this power of the soul is inclined to the good of reason, as to its own object, and that is why we say that every sin is against nature. In order that the will be inclined to evil in its choice, therefore, something more is needed. For sometimes the evil occurs because of a defect of reason, as when a man sins through ignorance, and sometimes through an onset of sense desire, as when he sins through feeling. In neither of these cases, however, does one sin with certain malice. For there is sin of certain malice only when it is the will itself that moves its very self to the evil. And this can be done in either of two ways.

The first is this. A man has, let us say, a disposition that is ruined and inclined towards evil, so much so that in his

disposition some evil is in a sense suited to him and is like himself; the result is that the will tends to this evil as towards a good, because of itself each thing tends toward what is fitting and proper for it. Now, depraved dispositions of this kind are either habits acquired by a custom that turns into nature, or they are diseased dispositions on the part of the body, as those persons have who feel a natural inclination towards certain sins because of a natural weakness of the body. The second way is this. The will of itself tends toward some evil because that which would say nay to the will is removed. Suppose, for example, that a man keeps from sinning, not because sin displeases him, but because he hopes for eternal life or fears hell-fire, so that if the hope were deadened by despair, or the fear by presumption, he would sin without check and with certain malice. It is plain, then, that the sin which is committed with certain malice always presupposes a certain disorder in a man, but that this disorder is not always a vice, so that it is not needful that every one who sins with certain malice sin by reason of a vice. (1–2, q.78, a.3).

Sin that is committed with certain malice is in every way the gravest of sins. For, first of all, sin lies chiefly in the will, and never is the will more fully responsible for its act than when of itself it commits the act, as is here the case, instead of committing it through ignorance of the intellect or some feeling of the senses. Besides, feeling passes and ignorance is easily corrected, but vice is a disposition that gives way but slowly; it is even a quality which is in a sense permanent. Vice is to emotion what a chronic disease is to the momentary paroxysm of a

fever which seizes the sick man only at intervals. Let us add in particular, also, that the vicious man is badly disposed with regard to the very purpose of his moral acts, whereas the emotional man perhaps is turned away from his good resolve only for the moment while the emotion lasts. The principle of morality is undermined in the first, but left standing in the second, the one giving up, and the other only interrupting, his excellent project (*ibid.*, a.4).

With the study of vice, and of the consequent sin, we have completed our study of the inner principles which preside over the doing of our good and bad acts; and now, in line with the scheme we laid down as a preamble, we proceed to study the several moral laws, that is to say, the exterior principles by which human acts are to be controlled.

Chapter VI

LAW ON THE HUMAN LEVEL

The theologian knows an exterior source of the evil acts of man: it is the devil, whose solicitation leads us into sin. He knows just as well an exterior source of good acts: it is God, whose grace is a sufficient help against temptation and a remedy for the troubles of a nature weakened by sin. The philosopher also knows an exterior source of good actions, and his reflection can understand this principle, though here as elsewhere reason and nature in the long run find within themselves an inner need of going beyond themselves. This principle or source is law, which regulates and obligates our activity from the outside. This outer character of law, however, brings no heteronomy into the moral life, for law is of precisely the same order as reason, the inner principle from which human activity gets its human and, therefore, moral character.

Law is a rule or measure of action, and it brings man to act or keeps him from acting. The word *law* is from *ligare,* to bind, because it obliges one to act (*lex, ligare, obligare*). Now the guide and standard for human activity is reason, and this is the first principle of man's action, as follows from what was said earlier (q.66, a.1). For it is reason that ar-

ranges things for an end, and, in Aristotle's view (*Ethics,* 7, c.8), the end is the chief director in what is to be done: but in any class or group whatever the main or chief thing is the measure and standard in that group: as, for instance, unity in the matter of numbers and the first motion in the matter of physical movement. So law is a function of reason (1–2, q.90, a.1).

In what sense does law belong to reason? Evidently, it belongs to practical reason, and within practical reason to the end of ends, which is the one principle capable of binding man's will in each individual act. And the end of ends, as we saw (p. 37), is vital welfare or happiness, and thus law is a rule that obliges us in view of conducting us to happiness. It is not always the same as the specific reason whose practical work is to regulate our actions for our welfare, for reason directs a person's acts for his own welfare; but this individual lives in society and is a member of the body politic, and, as is always the case with groups, he is directed in view of the whole of which he is a part. This or that man's reason, though qualified to guide his actions for his welfare, is not, therefore, qualified to shape them for the good of the community to which he belongs, and to subordinate them to it. Here is the basis of the *exteriority,* so far as the individual is concerned, of the principle which obliges his activity. Law, then, will express the demands of reason ordering the individual's life in view of the common good of his

group and speaking from the outside in the name of that group.

In its first and main sense law means an arrangement for the common good. But to manage things for the common good is the work either of the whole group or of its representative. So, to pass a law is the business either of the group or of some public person who has charge of the group, since to guide to a goal is always the right of him of whom it is the proper goal (1–2, q.90, a.3).

Law may become an inner principle of our actions, therefore, and it should do so, but it is within us only as a sharing of a principle promulgated from the outside. This is why no private person can make a law or constrain us, but can only caution, urge, or at the most enjoin. The father commands in his household, but he does not make the law. "For just as the individual is one of the family, so the family is a member of the city or state, which is the rounded community, and this is why, just as the good of one man is not the end of ends, so the good of each family is for the good of the whole settlement, which is a perfect group; he who rules a family, therefore, can give precepts and orders, but they have not the force of law" (*ibid.*, ad 3). Summing up all these marks of law, we obtain the following definition: *Law is an ordinance of reason promulgated for the common good by one who has charge of the community.*

We shall go at once to the sources. What is the biggest community? The universe. And who governs it? God. What, then, will be the original and broadest of all laws? The *eternal law* of God.

Law is simply a dictate of practical reason given by the ruler of an independent community. This makes it plain that if, as was shown (1, q.22, a.1 and 2), the world is ruled by divine providence, the entire universe is governed by divine reason. And so the very basis of the government of things, resident in God as in the king of the universe, has the nature of law. And as the divine reason is an eternal concept, and not one of time, as Proverbs says (c.8), so a law of this kind should be called eternal (1–2, a.91, a.1; *cf. C.G.*, 3, c.115).

The eternal law is thus simply the eternal reason of God, seen as law-giver for all works, acts, and movements done by created things, whatever these be (q.93, a.1), and, in consequence, it is the primal source of all other laws.

As we have seen, law supposes a mind directing activities to their end. Now in all actions it is required that the power of a secondary mover be got from the power of the first mover, for the secondary agent does nothing except as started by the first agent. So in governors. The nature or plan of government is got from the first ruler and given to others. Thus the outline of what is to be done in the state is passed on, at the king's word, to the lower officials. In art we have a like procedure; the design, which is the architect's, is carried out by craftsmen and manual laborers. Since the eternal law is the supreme ruler's plan of government, all plans of

government done by lower rulers must be derived from the eternal law. These governmental plans are laws additional to the eternal; thus all laws, so far as they have a part with right reason, are based on the eternal law. That is why Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.,* c.6) that nothing in the laws of time is just or legitimate that men do not work out for themselves from the eternal law (1–2, q.93, a.3).

If we try now to define the field in which this law applies, we shall see that it takes in all that is not eternal and uncreated like itself, in a word, all that is neither itself nor God. The totality of creation, therefore, of both free and determined things, is subject to the eternal law, but things that have not intellectual knowledge are not subject in the same way as those that have reason. The former are subject to the divine law written into the structure of their being, but they do not recognize it (*ibid.,* a.5). Man, on the contrary, is subject not merely to the law of God, but to the prescriptions of this law, that is, to the knowledge which he has of it. Hence, man's subjection to this law is twofold: first, as a natural being he is subject to the overruling of providence as is all creation; then, as a being with mind and capable of sharing in an interior notion of this exterior divine law which rules him. The perfectly good man is he who is a perfect subject of the divine law and always acts in accordance with it; and men are evil or bad just so far as, knowing the divine law and keeping it poorly, they tend to avoid it. Their attempts make only a show of success, how-

ever, for what the wicked man does not observe of the eternal law, he must make compensation for in the form of chastisement, so that his account is quite strictly squared in the end (*ibid.*, a.6). We shall see in what way the other laws derive from this primary law, and first what is this eternal law.

A law can be a rule and measure in either of two senses: first, as in the ruler and measurer; again, in the ruled and measured; because so far as anything has a share in a rule or measure, so far it is ruled and measured. Since all things that are subject to divine providence are regulated and guided by the eternal law, as is evident from the preceding article, it is plain that all things have some part with the eternal law, in so far, that is, as they have from its impress an inclination to their specific activity and their specific ends. Now the rational creature, as well as others, is subject to divine providence, but in a more excellent way: it becomes itself a partaker and dispenser (*particeps et providens*) of providence; it looks out for the welfare of itself and others; the eternal reason, through which it has a natural inclination to its due activity and its goal, is shared in it. Such sharing of the eternal law by the rational creature is called the *natural law*. Hence when the Psalmist, having said (Ps.4): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," adds, as if speaking to those who want to know what are the works of justice: "many say: Who showeth us good things?" and he answers: "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." What we may call the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what evil, a function of the natural law, is simply the imprint of the divine light in us. It follows that the nat-

ural law is a sharing of the eternal law in a rational creature (1–2, q.91, a.2).

Our business now is to study the content of this law. We can safely infer it from the rôle which the natural law plays as chief regulator of our activity. As all knowledge derives from first principles intuitively known to us, so all desire of the means derives, directly or not, from our inborn desire of the end of ends; and since it is the natural law that directs us towards the goal of the universe, it is from this law that the original direction of all our acts comes (*ibid.*, ad 2). But the bearing of specific means on the end of ends is far from being simple and clear, for the particular reason that each power of the soul will turn towards that end according to the individual light in which it sees it, and so the universal natural law which directs us towards God is broken up or diversified, from our point of view, into several subordinate natural laws.

In an absolute sense, being is the first thing the mind knows. Similarly, good is the first thing that comes within the range of the practical reason, whose end is action. In fact, every agent acts for an end which has the nature of good. The first principle of practical reason is that it is founded on the good; it may be defined: The good is what all desire. This, then, is the first precept of the law: Good is to be pursued and done, evil is to be avoided; and on this all other precepts of the natural law are based, namely, that all that is to be

done or avoided is in the realm of the prescriptions of the natural law, and the practical reason naturally knows them as human values (or disvalues). But because value or the good has the nature of an end, and evil or disvalue the contrary nature, all those things to which man has a natural inclination are seen in the natural light of reason as good and to be sought and worked out, and their opposites are seen as evil and to be avoided. According to the order of natural inclinations, therefore, is the order of precepts of the natural law. Man has, *first,* an inclination to good or value in line with the nature which he has in common with all substances; that is, every substance strives for self-preservation according to its kind; and in keeping with this inclination those things that conserve human life are in the field of the natural law. *Secondly,* man has a natural urge to some more special values, in which urge he is one with other animals; and on this score we say that those things are of the natural law which nature teaches to all animals: such as the union of male and female, the training of the offspring, and so on. *Thirdly,* man tends to a good or value in keeping with his rational nature, which good is distinctively his own; for instance, he has an inborn impulse to know the truth about God and to live in society; and so the several matters needed to carry out these most human tendencies belong to the natural law: namely, that man avoid ignorance, that he take care not to offend others with whom he must live, and so of whatever is pertinent (1–2, q.94, a.2).

While manifold in its specific determinations, the law of nature is one with the oneness of the primary precept, which we have said contains all others, and it is one also from the fact that it is the same for all

This is why natural rights are the same for all peoples. One may, of course, ask how it is that usages and customs are so different in different countries, and how it is that men with the same human nature draw from the same principles of the natural law conclusions that are so basically different. It is because of the difference between the sciences and speculative reason, which relate to law as universal and necessary, and the moral and practical reason which relate to law as particular and contingent. The principles of the natural law are the same in all countries and among all peoples, and the most general deductions from them are usually the same among all. But the farther we come down toward more and more specific prescriptions, the more the chances of error in the deduction increase; interest and sentiment enter in, evil dispositions interfere with thought, so much so that, though a man sets out reasoning from principles of natural law, he comes to will acts that contradict it (*ibid.,* a.4). This is why the natural law, which is one for all men, seems manifold and discordant among different individuals. It is unchangeable in itself, and its principles cannot be torn from the heart of man, but it appears variable and is sometimes obfuscated by error in its application to details.

Besides the divine law which embraces all laws, and the natural law which is its immediate application to a group of beings, we have *human law,* which undertakes to cut down the interval between the

universal principles of nature and the endless multiplicity of specific instances (1–2, q.91, a.3). The special laws enacted on the authority of kings or the groups whom they represent do not add anything to the content of the natural law; they only define that content and make it more precise, so that those who do not know how to observe it or are unwilling to do so, should find worked out and imposed for their acceptance a deduction which draws from the universal principles of the law of nature the particular conclusions required by the social life. St. Thomas well notes what we may call this pedagogic character of the positive law and remarks that it is a necessary educator because of the inadequate morality of men who are still young and because of the danger that may come to the social peace of persons ill disciplined. The well trained and upright man has no need of the law, as he is already in accord with it, but it is indispensable for the welfare of the social body taken as a whole, for it is the law that brings to reason those whose own reason is not a guide to them.

There is in man a natural aptitude for virtue, but he must have some discipline to reach the perfection of virtue. Indeed, we see as much in the fact that a man must work to obtain the necessities, food, for instance, and clothing; he has from nature a beginning of what he needs, that is, a mind and hands, but not the complete equipment, as have the other animals to which nature has given sufficient covering and food. Now for such discipline and work a man is not

readily sufficient to himself, because the perfection of his virtue mainly consists in keeping himself away from unwarranted pleasures, to which men are strongly prone, and especially the young, with whom discipline is more effective. And so it is needful that men get from others this discipline through which they advance in virtue. As for those youths who are ready for excellent living because of a good natural disposition or because of custom or a divine gift, a father's care and advice are enough. But because there are some heedless young fellows who are ready for wrong-doing and cannot easily be moved by words, it is necessary that they be protected from evil by force or fear, so that they may at least cease cutting up and let others live in peace, and that in this way they may by custom come to do voluntarily what at first they did through fear, and thus become virtuous. Now, a discipline of this kind that checks through fear of the penalty is a discipline of law, and laws must be made for the sake of human peace and excellent living; because, in Aristotle's comparison (*Politics,* 1, c.2), as man, when he is perfect in virtue, is the best of the animals, so, when he breaks with law and justice, he is the worst of them, because he is armed with reason, as the other animals are not, to fight against concupiscence and ferocity (1–2, q.95, a.1).

The other qualities which we may allow to human law come from this essential character. First, human laws look in principle to general situations and not to specific instances; for the means should be proportioned to the end, and as the end which human laws have in view is the common welfare, that is, the good of the group made up of many persons engaged in different activities at different times, it is

needful that laws be made for the whole duration of the community and the mass of citizens composing it (*ibid.*, q.96, a.1). Civil laws then do not condemn absolutely all vices; not, of course, that they approve any vice, but human law is promulgated in view of civil order and is interested only in what immediately concerns that order, or at any rate does not rigorously proscribe vices unless they directly attack that order. Also, because they are meant to apply to the whole civil body, they should be adapted to the average of the citizens in that body, and not to some tiny little minority of an élite.

As Isidore of Seville says in his *Etymologies* (bk. 5, c.21), a law should be possible, from the point of view both of nature and of the custom of the country. Now a faculty or power of action proceeds from an inner habit or disposition, the proof of which is that the same thing cannot be done by him who has not a habit of virtue and him who has, just as the same thing is not possible to a boy and to a grown man. So the same law is not to be passed for children as for adults, because many things are allowed in children that are punished, or at any rate found fault with, by law in grown persons; and a good deal is let go in imperfect men that is not borne with in the most virtuous. Human law, of course, is made for the generality of men, the most of whom are not of consummate virtue, and therefore, it does not prohibit all vices, from which the excellent keep themselves in any case, but only the worse vices, which it is possible for the majority of people to avoid, and mainly those that are a nuisance to others, for if these were let go, human society could not be

kept together: human law forbids, for instance, murder, theft, and so on (1–2, q.96, a.2).

We have defined human laws and their nature, but have still to consider two serious problems: How far do these laws obligate a person's conscience? and: In what cases and on what grounds is it allowable to change the laws of the State or to pass over certain details of them? We shall begin by examining the first question, and shall see that three main conclusions force themselves on our minds: any law, so far as it is just, binds conscience; the law is imposed on all; but it is less the letter than the spirit of the law that is imposed on us.

Some of the laws that men make are just and some are not. As for just laws, they have a binding force in conscience from the eternal law whence they derive, as Proverbs (c.8) says: "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Laws are regarded as just, first, *from the end,* that is when they are directed to the common good; secondly, *from their author,* that is when the law that is passed does not exceed the authority of the legislator; third, *from the form,* that is when a proportionate and equitable burden is imposed on subjects for the general good. For since the individual man is one of a group, a man's existence and whatever he has are of the group, as the existence of the part depends on the whole. For this reason nature inflicts injury on the part to save the whole. So laws that distribute burdens equitably are just and bind in conscience.

Unjust laws are of two kinds. First, they may oppose hu-

man welfare by contradicting the requirements just mentioned: from the point of view of the *end,* if any ruler, say, should pass laws imposing burdens on the people and making rather for his own vanity or aggrandizement than for the public good; or of the *authority,* if a man legislates clearly beyond the power given him; or of the *form,* if burdens, though for the common good, are inequitably imposed. These are not laws, but acts of violence or tyranny; as Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.,* 1, c.5), an unjust law is no law. We conclude that such laws do not oblige anyone's conscience, unless perhaps to avoid scandal or rioting, in which case a man had better yield his own right, as St. Matthew says (c.5): "If anyone force thee one mile, go with him other two, and if a man take away thy coat, give him thy cloak also." Secondly, laws may be unjust as opposed to religious values, as the laws of tyrants prescribing idolatry or any such thing against divine law. No one may observe such laws, because, as we read (Acts, 5, 29), "we ought to obey God rather than men" (1–2, q.96, a.4).

As for the second conclusion, that law obliges all, a difficulty may claim our attention. The law is made for the good of the many and ought to apply to each person of the many with three possible exceptions that are really only apparent. A man is bound to obey only the law of his country, for the law of a group of which he is not a member is not his law. An inferior officer cannot force on us a law from which a superior dispenses us, for the former acts lawfully only on a mandate from the latter. Lastly and particularly, the law is for all, but it *compels* only the wicked. In this connection we remark: "Vir-

tuous and just men are not under the law, but only wicked men, for anything forced and constrained is contrary to the will, but the will of good men is in agreement with the law, and the will of bad men is out of agreement with it; so not the good but only the evil are under the law" (*ibid.*, a.5). As for the third point, about interpreting the letter of the law, this matter should be handled in the same way and related to the fundamental notion of legality. Every law is enacted for the general good of the people who support it, and it is its usefulness that measures its lawfulness.

It sometimes happens that an observance serves the good of all in a majority of cases, but that in some instances it is terribly burdensome. Because the legislator cannot foresee every individual case, he passes the law in line with what ordinarily happens and keeps in mind the service of the public; and if it so happens that the observance of the law is injurious to the common weal, the law is not to be observed. Take the example of a besieged town; a law is passed that the gates should remain closed, and this is useful and for the general good in most instances; but there might be a case in which the enemy would harass the citizens keeping the town, and it would be calamitous for the town if the gates were not opened. In such a fix the gates should be thrown open, contrary to the letter of the law, but to protect the general good, which is the purpose of the lawgiver. It is to be kept in mind, however, that if the literal observance of the law has not an element of immediate danger, which should at once be remedied, it is not the business of everyone and anybody to interpret what is useful and what not useful

for the group; rather, it is the function of the rulers, who have authority to dispense from the law in such cases. It is when peril suddenly arises and allows no delay for recourse to a higher officer, that the necessity itself carries the dispensation with it, for necessity knows no law (1–2, q.96, a.6).

The reader certainly perceives at this point how to settle the second problem that had arisen: May we ever change a law? Made for the good of all, laws should be fitted to the needs of those whom they govern, they should be perfected and keep step with the changing needs of the men who uphold them.

Human law is a dictate of reason to direct human action. There are two reasons why such a law may justly be changed: one on the part of reason, the other on the part of the men whose action the law regulates. As for the first, because it seems natural for human reason to advance step by step toward perfection, we see in the speculative sciences that those who were the first to philosophize left us imperfect works which their successors elaborated with great perfection; and it is the same in the life of action. Those who first tried to discover what is useful for the generality of men were unable to study out the whole problem at once by themselves, and left institutions in part achieved and full of defects; but those who came after them did the work over and left institutions that are less inadequate from the point of view of human welfare. Secondly, on the part of the men whose activities the law regulates, a law may justly be changed because of changed human conditions, for in dif-

ferent circumstances different conditions are expedient for the people. Augustine offers this example (*De Lib. Arb.*, 1, c.4): Suppose a people is well ruled, is not frivolous, and is very careful to protect the general good: it is quite right that the law should allow such a people to elect their own officers and in that way carry on their civil affairs; but if the same people become depraved and sell their votes and turn the government over to villainous fellows and rascals, it is just to take away from the people the power of giving honors, and to leave it to the discretion of a few good men (1–2, q.97, a.1).

From the fact that the law should be changed when there is a chance to better it, does it follow that it should be changed as soon as people see the possibility of bettering it? In a sense, yes; otherwise we should be contradicting the principle which we meant to apply. But the notion of betterment ought not to be understood of the law in the abstract and in itself, but of the situation of the men subject to it. Changes in the law ought to have as a result not the betterment of the law, but the betterment of the real situation of the people. In most such cases an attitude wisely conservative is to be recommended.

As we said a minute ago, human law is correctly changed when the change provides for the public welfare. Change of law, however, precisely as change, is a kind of hindrance to the common weal. This is because custom is a great help to the observance of law. This is so true that what is done contrary to the common custom, though it is of small conse-

quence, seems a serious matter. When a law is changed, the constraining force of the law, so far as custom is undermined, is cut down, and for that reason human laws should never be changed unless human welfare gets back in some other direction as much as it loses in this. And this may happen, either because some great and very plain advantage comes from the new statute, or because it is exceptionally necessary, or because the accustomed law contains a manifest inequity, or its observance is exceedingly mischievous. So the jurist Ulpian declares (*De Constit. Princ.,* l, 1) that, in making new laws, there must be an evident gain for giving up the legislation that for a long time has seemed just (1–2, q.97, a.2).

This practical conservatism of St. Thomas, based on the dictates of justice, is a kind of presage of analogous formulas and conclusions found in Montaigne and afterwards in Pascal. But the inspiration animating it is very different in the intellectualism of Thomism and in the scepticism of the *Essais.* If custom is respectable and beneficent in the eyes of St. Thomas, it is not merely as custom, it is only so far as it concretizes and condenses a sort of practical judgment of reason which, though not cast into a worded formula, teaches by the reiterated acts of many people the actual agreement of those acts with what the people take to be good. That is also why custom can go so far as to be the basis of new laws. The intellect that sets up laws does not show itself simply in words, but also in deeds; this is so true that the inner movement of the will and the

concept of reason may be expressed in many exterior and repeated acts of many men witnessing to the fact that an old law no longer answers to the needs of the actual situation, but has become useless and must be reformed (a.3, c. and ad 2). Thus the people have the right to take their own customs as law, as in the instance of a free people who enjoy the legislative power; and farther, the repeated acts done by the subjects of a ruler show by the fact of their repetition a character that is not accidental and is therefore reasonable and, when accepted in fact by the ruler, they take on the force of law.

With the definition of human law, general morals rounds out the description of the most immediate exterior principle of moral acts which the thought of the philosopher can reach. If it is not given to reason to go farther by itself, it may at least mark off the place that transcends it and remember that the exigency of going farther is written within its own nature (see p. 163 and p. 35). Reason is a faculty capable of the infinite and it requires a transcendent and infinite end for us: "because man is meant for eternal happiness, an end out of proportion to his natural human powers, it is necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, he be directed to that goal by a law divinely given" (q.91, a.4). Such precisely is the divine law. It comes to the aid of reason and frees it from the uncertainties which it suffers even in the realm of the natural law;

it penetrates to the inside of consciences to direct their interior, which human law does not reach, and it guides man in view of his supernatural goal, which is God.

Part Second

THE MORAL LIFE IN PRACTICE

Up to this point we have studied in a general way the virtues, the vices, and everything that is comprised in the domain of morals. But we must now turn back and consider them again, this time in a particular way. The reason is that, so long as they remain general, ethical studies have not their full utility, since they need in the end to prescribe what men are to do, and because human actions are in the domain of the particular.

If we look at them one by one, ethical problems are of two kinds: first, those we shall examine at once (ch. 1–5) have to do with the study of such or such particular virtue or that vice which is contrary to it; the others, which we shall investigate in a later place (ch. 6) are concerned with the various states, that is, the situations in which men in fact are and the kinds of life they can lead.

Chapter VII

LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOR

If we attempt to classify the virtues which flow from general ethics, we see that they range themselves under seven chief ones: three of which are theological—faith, hope, and charity; and four are cardinal—prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The study of these theological virtues, supernaturally infused into us by God in view of ends which also are supernatural, is not within the philosopher's field as such; but as their name indicates, they belong to the theologian. This is not to say, however, that life can disregard them, or that the moralist can lawfully ignore them; for though moral science is formally distinct from theology, the man who in the concrete leads an individual moral life will lead it differently according as he does or does not subordinate it to a supernatural life. Thus in a scientific architectonic order which arranges all in line with Christian wisdom, theology includes morality, but morality does not therefore include theology. From this it follows that a complete exposition of morals, properly speaking, does not require a study of the theological virtues, and yet the theological virtues are the necessary condition of

a complete moral life. We think it needful then to point out first, the place held by this keystone of the moral life, and especially of that one virtue that keeps in place all the others, namely, charity.

Charity is in its essence a "love of friendship," that is to say, in line with the distinction we made above (see p. 106), a love by which we wish good to another. To wish good itself is a "love of concupiscence," and no one would pretend to entertain friendship for the good things of which he experiences a desire; one can love wine or horses, but he cannot have them for friends. If, then, we are to have friendship, it is toward the very person to whom we wish this good that our sentiment should go: "besides, there must be a love on both sides, for the friend is a friend to his friend; such a benevolence can never in fact be without a certain communication, and as there exists between man and God a communication by which He gives us His happiness, this communication must become the basis of a certain friendship." The precise love on which this communication rests is charity, and it plainly follows that charity is a kind of friendship between man and God (2–2, q.23, a.1). And it is for this reason that charity seems to us the most sublime of all the virtues. "Human acts are regarded as good in the measure in which they are guided by the standard which they should meet; and since human virtue is the principle of good acts, it necessarily follows that it consists in coming up to the standard of human acts.

Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as we have seen earlier (p. 84): human reason and God. But it is God who is the primal standard, since human reason itself ought to be guided by that model; and since it is the proper nature of the theological virtues, of which God Himself is the object, to come up to this original standard, they excel the moral and intellectual virtues, the nature of which consists in measuring up simply to human reason. For the same reason, that one among the theological virtues themselves should be chief which most directly reaches God. And that which exists of itself is always more sublime than that which exists through some other, and from this point of view faith and hope reach up to God only in so far as we receive from Him knowledge of the true or possession of the good, whereas charity attains God himself as the end in which we rest, and not as that through which we attain something else. This is why charity surpasses faith and hope, and, as a consequence, all the other virtues, precisely as prudence, which in itself measures up to reason, excels all the other moral virtues, which come up to the standard of reason only in so far as it allows them to determine the just means in actions and in the human emotions (2–2, q.23, a.6).

If this is so, for all the greater reason we have in this supreme virtue the source of all the acts of charity that a man can perform. This reciprocal friendship of man and God cannot in reality be

limited to the divine being taken in itself; it extends necessarily to everything that comes from the divine being and in some way shares from Him that which it is. To grasp the need of such a conclusion it is enough to recall the relation which binds us always to the good of those whom we love. When a man is our friend, with the same friendship that unites us to him we love his children, his admirers, and everything that belongs to him on any title. And farther, we may love our friend with an affection so deep that we come to love his for the sake of him, even though they offend us and hate us (*ibid.*, a.1, ad 2). Thus, the charity we experience toward God, thanks to the gift of God Himself, spontaneously becomes the spring of our love for men, inasmuch as they derive from God and belong to Him (*ibid.*, q.25, a.1). Hence the hierarchy of our acts of love is evident to us, at least in its basic principle. There will be excluded from our love, first, all creatures not capable of engaging with us or with God in this friendship on which charity rests. And these, to be precise, are creatures devoid of reason. How indeed would we wish their good, since they are not rational and free and as a consequence, not capable of using our love? Besides, how would there be between them and us that interrelationship on which friendship depends, since they are without the reason through which we could have part with them? And, as a last word, how would charity, itself based on the sharing of an eternal beatitude, unite us to beings unqualified

for an eternal beatitude? We could only love irrational creatures, then, with a friendship or charity which is figurative and takes them in by indirection, that is to say, in so far as we desire to conserve them for God's honor or man's good, but not directly and for themselves (2–2, q.25, a.3). But once you grant this principle of exclusion, we may say that the love of man for God naturally takes in everything that can associate with him and share in his happiness.

How shall we pass from this universal principle to the hierarchy of the acts of charity which it is permissible to build up? Plainly by a classification of these acts according to the more or less immediate kind of relation which binds them to the first charity whence they come. There is, therefore, an order in charity, and this order is based on the relation of the love with which we love each being to the first source of this love, which is God (2–2, q.26, a.1). Let us apply this rule to the most outstanding cases on which the moral experience invites us to reflect, and first to the relation between the love we owe to God and that which we owe to our neighbor.

Every friendship has to do, in the first place, with the object in which the good upon the sharing of which it is founded chiefly resides. Now we just saw that the primary source of all charity is happiness, because it is in it that those who love each other have inter-communings; and since it is in God that happiness directly dwells, evidently it is God that we must love chiefly and directly with a love of char-

ity. Hence, God is the object *par excellence* of charity, because He is happiness itself, whereas the love we have for our neighbor comes from a derived charity so far forth as he, like ourselves, shares in this happiness which is God (q.26, a.2). For the same reason every man ought to love God more than himself (a.3) and, within himself, he should love his soul more than his body, because he loves his body by reason of the happiness which it shares in only an indirect way. This love of the body should, moreover, express itself in a constant endeavor to purge the body of all contamination and to minister in the soul's work, which is the attainment of complete joy in God (2–2, q.25, a.5). A question which it takes more penetration to answer is, whether man ought to love his neighbor more than himself. As a matter of fact, God has spoken to us— "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Levit., 19, and Matt., 22). It seems, then, that the love we feel for ourselves should be taken as the model to be imitated in the love of others, and that, as a consequence, the love of ourselves would be superior. In strict truth, the first source of all love is God; man loves himself only in relation to God, and he loves his neighbor even more indirectly still, and only in so far as he is associated with his neighbor in the enjoyment of the same good (namely, God). It follows plainly that if we keep as center of reference the primal charity on which all other charity is founded, the love we have for ourselves goes before and directs the love

we should have for our neighbor. Evidence that well ordered charity begins at home lies also in the fact that no one should yield to the commission of a sin so as to free another from the sin, for sin hinders us from sharing in complete happiness (2–2, q.26, a.4) and this latter is the *raison d'être* of charity. But it would come out far otherwise if we were to compare the love which we allow our own bodies to that which we give our neighbor. For if we love our neighbor as linked to our love of God, and so, too, to our happiness, we ought to love his soul, as sharing directly in this happiness, more than our body, which has only an indirect share in it (a.5).

If we next consider "our neighbor" in relation to the multiplicity and diversity of beings which make him up, still finer gradations of charity can be predicated. Since, as a matter of fact, charity consists in wishing the good of others for the love of God, we should feel in reference to others a degree of charity proportioned to that of the good which we ought to wish them. And at this point there is an important distinction between the nature of the good we wish others and the intensity of the internal act with which we wish it to them. If one takes the first point of view, it is clear that our charity would wish the same good to all beings, without distinction; our love, because it wishes that all men share the same blessedness, wishes that they all share God. Besides, from this point of view, our charity would not admit other degrees in the welfare of our neighbor than

those which come necessarily from his actual attitude toward the sovereign good; that is to say, a charity that loves others only because God's love wishes that these others, whoever they be, share in blessedness in a degree corresponding exactly to their merits. How, indeed, could we love others with a view to God unless we were to put before all else a love of God's justice, since God wishes that better persons share more fully than others in his blessedness? If, however, we take the second point of view, that of the intensity of the act by which we love our neighbor, it is a wholly different matter. Though we do not cease to desire that the justice of God be fulfilled and that the better be better rewarded, we cannot fail to wish that the better be also our nearest associates, to like it that more of welfare accordingly come to those who have to do more with us, and to love them with a more intense charity (q.26, a.7). Let us try to study out the order which charity should have in this domain that is so complicated and so full of thorny problems.

The first question that arises in this connection is the following: Should we put before all other love that which we bear the members of our own family? Strictly speaking, we should say yes, for no other tie is so intimate or so fixed as that of blood. We shall remark, however, that in particular given circumstances some accidental bonds can and should come before the bond of blood. The broadest formula that serves as a rule in cases of this kind is that

which bids us to put before all others the bond corresponding to the real and actual circumstance. For instance, when it is a question of a relationship in the natural order, we should put first those joined to us by a bond of blood; when it is a question affecting the civil order, we should put our fellow-citizens before everyone else; and when a war breaks out, we should give first attention to our comrades in arms. And in fact custom gives spontaneous confirmation to this view; for at a marriage one invites and gives the place of honor to his parents, whereas in a civic ceremony parents come after the official delegates (2–2, q.26, a.8). In a word, the love we have for parents remains in itself the deepest love, but other friendships can step in ahead of it and effectually take possession, because of what is peculiar to each of them.

If we go now into the very heart of the family, we shall find there a gradation of charity, yet the degrees of it can be reversed according to the point of view under which we study them. Thus, the father is a greater good to the son than the son is to the father, for the father holds towards his son the place of God. But if we view the matter under the aspect of the experienced feeling and its intensity, father loves son more than son loves father, for the father loves himself in the son, who is a part of his very self and is loved from his birth, that is since long before the son could know and love the father (a.9). In like manner the husband regards his par-

ents as worthy of a love more deferential than that which he has for his wife; but the feeling linking him to his wife will be that of a closer union, since he and she are not two, but one flesh; and this is why, though he has left his parents to live with her, he will nevertheless, when circumstances demand it, put the obligations he has toward her second to those he has to his parents (a.11). As a last parallel, and this is probably the instance in which appears most clearly what a difference separates the order of service from the order of feeling, benefactors merit to be loved by those whom they assist more than they love these latter, and yet they often love them more than they themselves are loved, a fact that Aristotle accounts for in several ways.

In the first place, the benefactor takes the one he serves as his own work, and he effectually speaks of his protégé as of his own creation; this is because, as a matter of fact, he has put into him, by his benefactions, something of himself. It is himself, then, that the benefactor loves in the one he benefits, as the poet loves his poems, for everyone loves himself, and does not find anywhere a better thing than what he himself does. And one may suggest a second reason. Man naturally loves to contemplate his own good; the one served sees in his benefactor only a good useful to him, whereas the benefactor sees in the one he helps a good that is an honor to himself; now utility passes, and honor remains, in such a way that the protégé is agreeable to the benefactor long

after the benefactor is useful to the protégé. Besides, we esteem what has cost us some effort, and as it costs us more to give service than to receive it, we love those who benefit us less than those whom we benefit (a.12).

These remarks, which are of a purely psychological kind, permit us to see at once why charity is not a moral virtue, but a virtue that transcends the scheme of morals. In themselves, all these movements of the soul through which we attach ourselves to our kin and wish them well, are no other thing than emotions of the soul, and we have already met them in this connection. What is the apex of love to which natural beings can reach? The most intense, if not the most noble, is maternal love. It is mothers who are the greatest lovers, observes St. Thomas. Yet such a love is less a virtue than an emotion through which the mother clings to her child as to that one of all values that is most inseparably conjoined to her. So for the other attachments we have spoken of, for it is clear that the benefactor is attached to the one whom he benefits as to a boundless source of inner satisfactions, or as to the mirror from which his own goodness is reflected. All these movements of soul are, therefore, natural, and it is because they are natural that a transcendent principle must enter to raise them up to the rank of virtues. Charity, as the sharing in us of divine grace, does not take the place in our soul of the origin of these movements; it is always we who love, and

as our will remains the origin of love, it has the merit of it; but charity points our will towards God and directs in view of this supernatural end all the acts which this will does (2–2, q.23, a.2). It comes then to gather up, to put in place, and to make holy that which of itself does not properly speaking get beyond the order of nature.

This statement allows us to grasp the reason why the theological virtues rule the moral life of man and, without ever being able to shut him up within their limits, lead him to perfection. Indeed, the movements of the soul which charity transforms, if they are considered apart and in themselves, never can rise from the order of natural affections or passions to that of virtues. And certainly they cannot raise themselves to the dignity of supernatural virtues, for nature has nothing in it that allows it to stand up above itself and to bring it about that what is good for it become good and of merit in the sight of God. Only God can crown it with this grace and make it "acceptable." Now he makes it such by a virtue, that is a settled disposition to do good; and as the good of which there is question is not included in the order of nature, the power which makes it acceptable cannot come from nature or belong to it, and it is for this reason that charity always transcends the order of morals. But for the same reason only this supernatural charity can transform into moral virtues what with us were at first only emotions. Mother loves child, citizen loves fellow-

citizen, soldiers love their comrades in arms: affections coming from nature, normal affections, legitimate and good in themselves because conformed to the spontaneous movement of a right will, yet they are not moral virtues and cannot in any instance become moral virtues. They are not moral virtues, for the reason that the mother (for instance) needs no fixed disposition got by practice and strengthened by custom to come to love as she should the child she has brought into the world. Likewise, the son doesn't go into special training to acquire a love of his father; and the citizen, born in a town, reared among its people, used since childhood to the manners, language, and moral code of his fellow-citizens, is without any bidding inclined to love them, and it takes no effort of his to be able to do this. With charity entering now to add itself to our moral life, it will but cause the love naturally rising from the mother's heart for her child to become a virtue, and it simply puts this love in a place suitable to it in an order which is not the order of nature. It cannot, therefore, cause what is not a moral virtue to become a moral virtue, but it can make a supernatural virtue of it (1–2, q.23, a.3, ad 1), and this charity transforms and re-orders that which could not of itself reach so far as the moral world. Grounded upon God as on its proper object, charity really shuts out all false virtue that is turned only towards man: the prudence of the greedy man who sells himself for gain; the justice of the grabber

who fears he might lose an advantage; the temperance of the miser who only fears spending something; the courage of the miser who is strong to work, but only to get rich. As for the true moral virtues, they are made perfect by subordering their ends, good in themselves, to the highest end and supreme value, which is God.

Let us study now in the last place the natural inclinations and emotions themselves. These become fit to put on, through charity, a worth from the supernatural virtues that they could not put on in the order of morals. So charity, with God as the goal of human life, enters into it from above and wholly transfigures it, and for this reason we may say that charity is the soul of all the virtues.

There is in human life also, as a kind of crucial experience, a point of discernment, a parting of the ways, between what is of nature and what is of grace. This is the gospel precept to love our enemies. "If you love them that love you," Christ says, according to St. Matthew, "what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this? And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more? do not also the heathens this?" (v, 46). Now this does not mean that it is not good and morally commendable to salute our brothers and to love our friends. Nay, it is certainly better to love our friends than our enemies, for love has the good for its object, and a friend, by the fact that he is a friend, is better than an enemy, in whom only hate is encountered; a friend

is thus an object more suited for love than is an enemy. But if on the other hand we consider *the reason* why we love the one and the other, then the love we have for our enemies puts on a character that is exceptionally worth while and even unique; it enters into that charity of which Pascal said that it is "of another order," a higher one, for "there can be other reasons than God why a man should love his friends, but God is the only reason man can have for loving his enemies." And we can easily appeal to God as the highest reason for loving those who love us, for our friendship for them is quite transfigured. But as the power of fire is known by the fact that it takes hold one by one of materials that are more and more difficult to burn, so the strength of our love for God is known by the fact that it reaches to and embraces objects that are the most difficult to love (2–2, a.27, a.7).

If we look at it in itself and in the supernatural effects that go with it, charity will appear to us as particularly laden with two of the most charming fruits that it can produce, a spiritual joy free of all sadness which the presence of the loved good gives, and a perfect peace, which everyone desires, but which is not found except in God (q.28, a.1, and q.29, a.3). Simply as moralists we should study charity in these transformations that it brings from above into our moral life and in the beneficent effects that it works there.

When we look at it from this point of view, the

field that it chooses to work in is that of mercy and succor of the poor, two fresh opportunities for us to be specific and exact with concrete instances of the order of grace and the order of natural morals.

Taken in itself, compassion is not a virtue. We will what is good for us, we naturally detest what is contrary to us; face to face with the evil our neighbor is suffering from, we get a painful and even a sorrowful impression, because our neighbor is part of ourselves and because in an indirect way we feel hurt by the evil under which our neighbor labors. To speak exactly, compassion is just an emotion of the soul, a view confirmed by the sudden, unwilled and unreflecting character of this impression which we experience. Now the non-volitional movement which disturbs us and which can even get us to lean toward some spontaneous gesture of compassion, is in some souls brought together by reason and is judged, ordered, and justified by it; it then becomes one form of the virtue of justice, and this reasoned mercy induces us to resettle the unfortunate person in the property to which, though injustice of some kind has deprived him of it, he has a right (2–2, q.30, a.3). Supernatural charity goes farther yet and does every last thing; for it takes this virtue, or even this mere feeling of a naturally good soul (*ibid.*, ad 4), and makes of it a Christian work *par excellence* in what concerns man's duties to his neighbor. Man's love for God certainly rules the whole Christian life, but immediately after the love of God

comes the love of our neighbor in God, and then, as a consequence, the Christian virtue of mercy, which, for the love of God, relieves men of the evils from which they suffer (*ibid.*, a.4, ad 1).

This is to say also that well-doing and succor of the needy, which are effects and outer manifestations of charity, follow mercy in the changes which grace works in it. To do good to those whom we love is a natural turn, for so far as we love them, we include them in the love we bear ourselves. But reason makes a virtue of this sentiment by regulating and guarding it to the end that our well-doing is directed first to those nearest us, in this way intending that we should do each one the kindness relative to the order according to which he is immediately associated with us: to our parents we do the kindnesses of family life; to other citizens, those of civic life, and so on for the others (q.31, a.3). Yet well-doing gets its full reward only by subordination to the highest of the supernatural virtues, and it is not unreasonable that the act of giving alms, a concrete materialization of the virtue, is commonly called the doing of a charity. Alms-doing indeed, taken with all the elements that define it, consists in giving something to the poor, in compassion and for the love of God (*ibid.*, q.32, a.1). Alms are of two kinds: *corporal* alms, which are realised in the seven works of mercy and are a remedy for poverty of body; and *spiritual* alms, which are realised in prayer for our neighbor's soul, in education to take

away poverty of thought and intellect, counsel to guide in a practical way the uncertain mind, in consolation to lighten the sadness brought on by emotions, and in brotherly correction to chide one effectively for his faults so that he will correct them (*ibid.,* q.32, a.2). Then, too, order and discretion come in, introduced by reason. For instance, it is clear that, in an absolute sense, spiritual alms is better than material alms; however, we are not to make use of silly methods, such as trying to succor a famishing man by teaching him philosophy: it is much better to feed the dying man than to teach him (*magis est pascendus moriens quam docendus*). It is equally clear that we ought to help all the poor people whom we can help, by denying ourselves things we do not need, and even things that sometimes, with too great indulgence, we think we do need; though we must make judicious choice and take account of every given circumstance. What remains common to all these acts of alms-giving is God's love, which is their soul and which lifts them up from mere movements of our natural pity into deserving acts of charity.

Chapter VIII

THE PRUDENT MAN

Prudence, we have noted, is a cardinal virtue whose court is in the practical reason. Because of it we are able to make out which means the will should take to reach its ends. On this virtue, then, lies the charge of guiding the doings of the other three great virtues, for it tells each of them what it is to do in order to act conformably to reason (2–2, q.47, a.7). If we study it in its concrete activity, as we are now to do, it seems to us that it makes itself known in a series of intellectual qualities which we may say make up the integral parts of it.

The prudent man is first of all a man of good memory, for prudence rests on experience, and experience comes to be a storehouse of remembered things by the help of which we can make our present life benefit by our past. The memory we speak of here is evidently not the mere power of recalling things, though this is the basis of it; rather, it is the art of keeping with care those memoranda that one may later have need to consult. The virtue of prudence neglects nothing that can make our actions more easy and orderly, not even the mnemotechnical processes that help us the more readily to fix

memory: association with sense images, which are easily retained because the sensible is the proper object of our knowledge, and only abstract ideas are hard to keep in mind; the putting of our ideas into order, in such a way that we recall one thing through another; reflection and meditation when the importance of things is such that we want to remember them, that is to say, on the one hand, impressing them strongly on ourselves by an initial effort of the attention, and on the other by going over them often and naming them so as to preserve a memory of them (2–2, q.49, a.1). Then again, intelligence necessarily plays a part in the virtue of prudence. Here what is in question is not intellect as a power of the soul to perceive the first principles of knowledge, but a certain quality of the intellect. As a faculty of the soul, the intellect takes for granted universal principles, and these become the majors of our moral syllogisms: *we must do evil to no one.* But prudence has for its object to determine what must be done in such and such a case in order not to do evil to anyone. Thus the difficulty is to find in each particular human instance the minor of the syllogism, the *now this would be to do evil . . .* In a word, conformably to our definition, prudence has the business of finding means so that the general end, never to do evil to anyone, may in a given case be realised. This is why prudence requires in the intellect a kind of divining quality, which quality will permit the intellect to formulate correctly the

particular principle of moral action in each set of circumstances. And there is here more than a natural aptitude, there is a special fitness to be acquired, as a kind of training to find out the means dictated in any particular instance (*ibid.,* a.3). In acquiring these qualities, he who wishes to become prudent will neglect none of the means: in the presence of those better informed he will be docile and always ready to be instructed (a.3); he will learn the art of reasoning closely, so as to make no errors in his deliberation (a.5); he will be watchful to take all circumstances into account (a.7) and will be cautious, so as not to let that act go awry; but, most of all, and this is the great art of the prudent man, he will be able to foresee the future. Prevision is hazardous, since it has to do with future contingencies and no science can be made of these, yet it is so necessary a thing that its very name is in some sense identified with that one of the virtues that it serves. Prudence is foresight, that is to say, prevision of the way acts and events will come to pass from the moment the end is willed until, by way of the means that prudence presently chooses, the willed end is reached (a.6, c., and ad 1).

Let us examine this virtue at work in the large field that belongs to it. No one doubts that it is at home when it attempts to rule the individual moral life, for this is its proper use, and therefore St. Thomas does not insist on it. But it is important to give evidence of its remarkable extension bringing

under its control the whole of social life, and it is yet more important to see why prudence becomes a virtue more and more perfected in the measure that its purview expands and its authority widens out. We shall grasp this clearly if we reflect on the fact that it is the virtue of governing well, and especially on the fact that it is the virtue of exercising authority well in that form of government that is best of all, namely, the monarchic form.

It is the part of prudence to govern and to lay down the law, and so wherever there is a special way of government and legislation, there is also a special corresponding instance of prudence. Now it is clear that he whose business it is to govern not merely himself, but a self-sufficing community, as a city or a State, does function as governor of a particular perfect system. Government indeed is more and more perfect when it is more general, and can take a wider scope and make sure of remoter purposes; and so prudence in an especial and completer way is a mark of the king, whose work is to rule State or city, and for this reason we think that the knowledge of how to govern is a kind of prudence (2–2, q.50, a.1).

Yet it is also a mark, and no less a mark, of prudence to know how to give obedience to government and to submit freely in view of the good of the State. We have a name for this virtue. It is "civic virtue" and it is a virtue just as suitable to subjects as the other is to kings.

The slave's activity is obedient to the master's orders; he yields to the one commanding him, yet he does not yield as do

inanimate and senseless things, for these are moved by an outsider. In fact, beings that have no life and no reason are moved from without, and are not themselves properly agents at all, because they lack the mastery of their acts, which lies in free will; and so rightness of governance is not theirs, but belongs to those who put them into motion. Men are different from these. Men, even when enslaved or in any way subject, are acted upon indeed by the commands of others, but in such a way that they act on themselves by their own free will; and thus there is needed in them a certain uprightness of being, so ruled that, though they obey others, they direct themselves by a kind of prudence, called "civic" (2–2, q.50, a.2).

This pivotal virtue can be and ought to be particularized further so that it comprises in a detailed way the objects which enter its purview.

Now, as a matter of fact the nature of the object, whether it be studied in general or in particular, in whole or in part, gives the diverse objects and the diverse virtues, and this diversity causes one virtue to be more important than another. For instance, it is quite plain that the family stands intermediate between the individual and the city or State, for as the individual is part of the family, so the family is part of city or State; and as we have seen that prudence in the broad sense, as governing the individual, is not the same as civic prudence, we also see that the economy of the household is necessarily different from both (*ibid.*, a.3).

For the same reason we add to the three preced-

ing kinds of prudence a last type, that of the leader of an army:

Works of art and of reason ought to be conformed to the works of nature, which were begun by the divine reason. Now nature tends to these two ends: first, to rule every single thing in itself, and secondly, to resist external things that attack it and might destroy it. To these ends, nature gave to animals not only a power of desire, so that they are led to those things that are adapted to their welfare, but also a pugnacious tendency, so that animals stand off their enemies (see p. 96). Hence, in those things that are reasonably done, there should indeed be a civic prudence, to put in their places things making for the common good, but there should also be a military prudence, to turn aside any aggression from enemies (*ibid.*, a.4).

With prudence studied thus in its various aspects there go three closely linked virtues, and we should give these their due here and look at them in particular. First, there is what we call the *virtue of counsel,* that is to say, the virtue that enables us to deliberate well. It is immediately subordinated to prudence, but should not be confused with it.

The distinctive mark of virtue is that it has to do with an action and that it makes this action good. And so, where there are different acts, there are differing virtues, and especially is this true where the nature of the goodness in the acts is not the same. For if there were the same nature of goodness in them, then diverse acts would appertain to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, and of desire, and of joy depends

on the same act, and therefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity. But acts of reason are different according as the intended effects are different, and there is not just one unvarying goodness in them. For it is one thing that a man be a good counsellor, another that he judge precisely, another that he make good laws; which is evident from the fact that a man may have one of these qualities without the others. It must be, then, that there is a virtue of good counsel fitting a man to consider matters carefully, and another virtue, namely, prudence, that enables him to frame laws successfully; and as counsel is meant for commanding, as an end of more importance than itself, so good counsel helps prudence, which is the higher virtue, without which there would simply be no virtue, as there are no moral virtues without prudence, nor any other virtues without charity (2–2, q.51, a.2).

The vice which in general is the opposite of prudence goes by the name of imprudence, and that which in particular is the opposite of good counsel and is most often the cause of trouble and error in deliberating is *precipitation.* This term is doubtless a metaphor taken from the sense world to express a purely interior movement, but it does express it. To be precipitate is, literally, to go head first into an abyss, that is to tumble instead of taking life easily step by step.

Well, the peak of the soul is reason, and the base is work done by the body; and there are midway steps, which we are to come down in an orderly way: there is memory of bygone things, knowledge of present ones, adroitness in looking into the future, reason to compare thing with thing, and docility

to respect the opinions of one's elders. These are the several steps one takes in deliberating well, and if anyone is hurried into action by impetuosity of will or of passion, and runs across these stages, he will be guilty of precipitation; and since disordered reflection is a kind of imprudence, the fault of precipitation evidently comes within the content of imprudence (2–2, q.53, a.3).

Now, in going into such detail on the acts that serve the virtue of prudence, we show the need of strengthening, by a related action, an operation that is at once even more important than deliberation: namely, judgment which gives prudence reason to command and concludes deliberation. By judgment we do not end abstract speculations in the field of the sciences, but we decide what is to be done in a particular case. Because experience is full of evidence that many learned men have not got good sense, we are dealing here with a virtue that is specific and distinct.

Good sense gives correct judgment not merely in speculative matters, but in the particular actions that are the concern of prudence. That is why the Greeks gave the name σύνετοι to those possessed of this virtue, that is to say, judicious men, or again εὐσύνετοι, men of good sense, while those that had not this virtue were called ἀσύνετοι, foolish men. Now, wherever there are different acts, coming even from different causes, there certainly must be different virtues; and it is evident that the good quality of counsel and the good quality of judgment are not reducible to the same cause: for there

are many persons who deliberate a great deal, yet they are not of thoroughly good sense, because they cannot judge rightly. For example, in the speculative sciences there are men who are good research students, because their reason is quick to run over all aspects of a question, probably by gift of the imaginative power to conjure up varying images readily, and yet because of some fault of intellect they are incapable of a correct judgment; and this is chiefly the result of common sense taking a wrong turn and forming a wrong judgment. And so besides good counsel we need the virtue of good judgment, or what we have called good sense (2–2, q.51, a.3).

The fault opposed to this virtue is the same as that opposed to the third virtue connected with prudence, namely, perspicacity. This latter virtue, like common sense, is related to judgment, but it is a judgment that is to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, where mere common sense is not sufficient. Nature acts in determined ways, and anyone who predicts the growth of a seed has reason to predict a normal growth, yet sometimes he is fooled and it is an unforeseen monster that is born. And he who could judge not only with an eye to the ordinary laws of nature, but in view of divine providence, would understand that this derogation from nature's ordinary laws must be effected according to broader laws known to God only. The man of good sense is he who can judge the normal situations of the moral life by the use of the general rules of conduct; but there are extraordinary circumstances, in which a departure from the habitual rules of conduct is re-

quired to satisfy higher and universal laws, and it is the virtue of perspicacity that gives it to judgment to discern these laws (2–2, q.51, a.4). The fault opposed to both good sense and perspicacity is lack of consideration, that is neglect to think over what ought to be thought over in order to form a correct judgment (2–2, q.53, a.4).

All the faults we have spoken of are obstacles to the several operations that we thought needed to lead to the good judgment a prudent man ought to pass. Still, the proper end of prudence is not judging; it judges only to impose laws, and even to do this is not enough: it is likewise necessary to keep to the laws one has prescribed. Here again, therefore, a fault would be a menace to prudence, and this time in the very permanence of its proper act. This fault is inconstancy.

Inconstancy means a backing down from the proposed good that one has set himself to, and the source of this weakening always lies in the conative powers. For one falls away from the good first intended only because of something inordinately pleasing to him. However, this foregoing is not completed without a fault of reason, the fault of abjuring what it had rightly accepted; and because the failure to withstand passions that could be withstood comes from the feebleness of that power that does not hold firmly to the good as conceived and proposed, inconstancy, so far as yielded to, is a fault of the intellect. Yet since all rightness of the practical intellect has to do in some way with prudence, so all lack of this rightness belongs to imprudence. And so inconstancy, so

far as yielded to, is a mark of imprudence; and as precipitation comes from a defect in the act of counsel, and inconsideration from a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy comes from a defect in the act of command, and a man is said to be inconstant from the fact that reason fails to order those things that have been considered and judged good (2–2, q.53, a.5).

To finish up this practical study of prudence, we have still to study a whole series of sins which consist much less in directly contradicting prudence than in imitating, nay, we might say, in parodying it. It will be enough to name, as an example, the prudence of the flesh, to understand at once what a deformation this sin causes in the virtue of prudence, by ordering all our actions in view of the good of the body instead of ordering them, as prudence would, in view of the Sovereign Good (*ibid.*, q.55, a.1). But we much less easily perceive what a disguise other vices, such as craft and guile, impose on prudence.

Craftiness consists in putting on manners that are not sincere, but seeming and pretended, in order to achieve an end, either good or bad. Now the putting on of such manners can be studied in two ways: first, as the very thinking out of such ways, and this matter belongs properly to craft, as indeed the working out of the right way to a legitimate end is a part of prudence. Secondly, we can look at the putting on of these manners from the point of view of carrying them into execution, and this is the work of deceit. Therefore, deceit is in some sense the fulfilment of craftiness, and is really an offshoot of it (2–2, q.55, a.4).

Fraud in its turn comes within the same category, for it is simply a species of deceit. As a matter of fact, we might give the name deceit to the whole procedure for putting craftiness into action, when it is a matter of words or deeds; the name fraud means more properly a deceit that is translated into acts (a.5), but it is a deceit and is amenable to the same definition. On the contrary, it is harder to mark off the difference between the real virtue of prudence and mere care for temporal things, which resembles prudence in certain of its aspects.

Anxiety or care supposes an effort made to obtain something. Now we evidently apply more effort where we have fear of failing, but where we are sure of achievement, we are scarcely anxious. With so much prefaced, we may say that anxiety over temporal things can be illicit in three ways. First of all, from the point of view of the things of which we are over-careful: if, that is, we seek transitory things as an end; and it is in this sense that Augustine says in his book *On Monastic Works* (ch. 26): "When the Lord said: Be not solicitous for your food nor for what you shall put on, He said this that we might not keep our eyes on these things and that we might not do for the sake of these things what we are commanded to do by the Gospel teaching." Secondly, solicitude for temporal things can be illicit because of excessive zeal given to get a hold of temporalities that draw a man away from spiritual concerns, where his chief service ought to be given; and so St. Matthew tells us (xiii, 22) that the care of this world choketh up the word. Thirdly, from the point of view of a superfluous fear, when, namely,

a man is afraid that, though he do what he should, he will not have the necessaries; which fear is for three reasons debarred by Our Lord: first, on account of the greater benefits, that is to say, body and soul, divinely given man without any solicitude on his part; second, because of the help God gives the animals and plants according to their nature and without any concurrence on the part of man; third, because of divine providence, the ignorance of which was the only thing that brought the pagans to put their main trust in the search for temporal goods. And so Augustine concludes that our solicitude should principally be for spiritual values, and that we should be confident that, if we do what we ought to do, temporal goods will come as we need them (2–2, q.55, a.5).

In this way we have also solved the problem of whether we are to be anxious for the morrow:

No work can be virtuous unless it have an entourage of proper circumstances, one of which is an appropriate time, as is said in Ecclesiastes (c.8): "There is a time and opportunity for every business." And this holds not only for exterior works, but also for interior solicitude. Indeed, with every season there goes a care proper to itself: in summer we have the work of the harvest, in autumn the vintage, and if anyone were taken up in mid-summer with worried thoughts of the vintage, he would burden himself uselessly with a work that belongs to a later date. Hence, Our Lord forbids this care as too anxious, saying: Be not solicitous for the morrow, and adds: the morrow will be solicitous for itself. That is to say, it will have its own cares which will be trouble enough for the mind; as indeed this saying shows: Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof (2–2, q.55, a.7).

Chapter IX

EVERY MAN HIS DUE

The specific object of justice (*justitia*) is what is just (*justum*), that is to say, in case of a settlement that which right (*jus*) demands. Now the right which justice looks to is divided into natural and positive. That justice be satisfied, the relation of equality between different persons interested in the same act must be guaranteed. This equality may be of two kinds. Let us suppose, for instance, that it is a matter of an exchange of products. We might manage the exchange first without taking account of anything but the products exchanged, each man giving precisely as much as he received, and this would be natural right. But we might regulate the exchange by a pact or agreement, whether it be private or public and made known by the ruler, and this would be an example of positive right (2–2, q.57, a.2).

The written law is only the formulation of these two rights, but the code has a different relation to each of them. For the code contains the natural law, but does not make it, and it is not from the law that the code gets its force, but from nature. With positive law it is another matter; for the code does not

merely contain the positive law, but besides makes it and gives it the force of law (*ibid.*, q.60, a.5).

Whatever be the nature of the law under consideration, we would say with the jurists that justice is "the steady unceasing will to give to every man his due" (*ibid.*, q. 58, a.1). As a will governed by reason and enriched by the purpose to do good, justice is manifestly a virtue—a fact that we have shown earlier in another connection. We may even say that it is in some sense a universal virtue, because we have seen that its work is to fix the right expedient in all actions dealing with external things (see p. 138; *cf.* 2–2, q.58, a.5 and a.6). Yet it is no less in its place when it sees to the maintenance of right, that is, to the natural or positive equity that ought to regulate the relations of man to man.

The vice of injustice is the contrary of the virtue of justice, and is the point-for-point negation of it. So far as justice manages the individual's relations to the public in a way conformable to the requirements of law and subordinates him to the common welfare, it is given the name of legal justice, and the sin of disavowing this justice is called illegality. And so far as justice takes care of the inter-relations of individuals within a community in a way conformable to the requirements of law, it gets the name of particular justice. The sin opposed to this justice is injustice pure and simple, and because of this sin an individual wants to have more, in matters of riches and honors, than the just share that he has a right

to, and in the case of burdens and labors he wants less than his just share (*ibid.*, q.59, a.1). One will notice that because the vices, like the virtues which they oppose, are set dispositions to act in a particular way, we do not regard as strictly unjust a man who may have given others more or less than their due through a mere inadvertence or under the influence of anger momentarily disturbing his judgment. The man marked by the sin of injustice is he who freely chooses an inequity contrary to right, just as he exhibits the virtue of justice who freely chooses an equity consistent with right. For whoever freely chooses injustice, chooses it just because it pleases him, and it pleases him just because it has become a habit, therefore a vice, with him (*ibid.*, a.2). Now that is certainly a serious vice which denies at once the natural law and the law of God, and, by the bare fact that it tends to our neighbor's harm, breaks down within us charity, which is the keystone of the whole edifice of virtues.

Just as the proper object of justice is right, so the proper act of justice is to say what is right, in a word, to judge. And for a judgment to be licit, it should fulfil three basic conditions: arise from a just inclination, proceed from someone who has authority to make it, and be given according to right reason, which is the guide of justice. Let any one of these three conditions be lacking, and the judgment ought to be taken as bad and not permissible. If it is at fault for having contradicted the rightness of jus-

tice, it is a perverse and unjust judgment; if the fault is a lack of authority in him who pronounces, it is a usurped judgment; and if the trouble is that it is passed on little known matters, and more on faith and simple conjecture than on a sound basis, it is a rash judgment (*ibid.*, q.60, a.2), or perhaps it is merely a suspicion. Nothing is more common than this last kind of injustice, but nothing is more complex than the causes from which it proceeds.

A suspicion, as Cicero says, is a persuasion of evil, but a persuasion resting on slight indications, and this notion has three different sources. First of all, in the fact that he who so judges is himself evil, and because he is conscious, we may say, of his own malice, he easily has a bad opinion of others, as indeed Ecclesiastes says (c.10): "The fool when he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools." Secondly, in the fact that he who passes such judgment is ill affected towards others: for when a person condemns another, or hates him, or is angry with him, or envies him, the least signs are enough to get him to think evil of the other, it being the way of people to think readily what they want to think. Thirdly, it comes also from long experience, and for this reason the Philosopher tells us (*Rhetoric,* 2, ch.13) that old men are extremely suspicious because they have had much experience of others' defects. Now, the first two causes of suspicion go with and show forth a perverse affection, whereas the third narrows the ground for suspicion, since experience makes for certitude and this is anything but suspicious in nature. At any rate, suspicion is never without some wrongness, and the farther suspicion goes, the more wrong it is. Suspicion itself has three grades: first,

a man may begin for flimsy reasons to doubt the goodness of some one. This is a slight matter, for it goes with that human adventure without which life itself is not carried on, and so says the ordinary commentary on the First Corinthians (c.4): "Judge not before the time." The second step is this: on slight warrant, a man makes up his mind for sure about another's badness, and if this judgment be in a serious matter, it is a serious sin, because it involves contempt of one's neighbor; whence the same Gloss says: "If because we are men we cannot avoid all suspicion, we should at least withhold our judgment, that is to say, our final and set opinions." The third stage is when a judge proceeds to condemn a man on mere suspicion. This directly contradicts justice, and in consequence is a mortal sin (2–2, q.60, a.3).

With justice so defined, we begin the study of the parts that make it up, that is, first of all the study of its two principal kinds: commutative justice and distributive justice; then the study of the virtues that are linked with and complete justice.

I. COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The distinction between the two basic kinds of justice is closely tied up with the distinction we have drawn between legal justice and individual justice. This individual justice looks to one private person, a person who has within the community only such a place as any one part occupies within a whole. And if we study one of these persons in reference to the other, we find a simple relation between private persons, and relations of this kind are governed by com-

mutative justice, the regulator of exchanges set up between man and man. But we may study the relations established between the whole and its parts, that is to say, the order that portions out to different individuals what is coming to them in common. Relations of this type are ruled by distributive justice, which sees to it that each member of the community gets out of the common fund a part proportioned to and due to him (2–2, q.61, a.1). In either case, justice remains faithful to its definite function, which is to guarantee the happy medium and to maintain equity between the two parties in question; though, of course, this equity is not of the same nature, whether it is a matter of commutative or of distributive justice.

Distributive justice consists in giving something to a private person, on the principle that what belongs to the whole, is due to each part. And what is given is naturally so much greater according as the part holds a more important place in the whole. For this reason, in distributive justice just so much more is given to anyone out of the common goods as that person has a higher ranking in the community. In an aristocracy the rating is according to worth, in an oligarchy according to money, in a democracy according to freedom, and so on, for any other kind of régime. And so in distributive justice the line of demarcation is not taken as an equality of thing to thing, but a certain proportion of things to persons; that is, so that as one person is more important than another, the thing that is given to one person is greater than that given to another. This is what Aristotle says (*Ethics,*

5, c.3) that such division is a geometrical proportioning, in which the equality is not based on quantity, but on fitness. Thus we say: 6:4::3:2, because in each instance the proportion is of one and a half, the larger number containing the smaller one wholly and half again; however, there is no equality between the quantities by which each larger number exceeds the smaller, for six is two more than four, whereas three is only one more than two.

In exchange or trading we pay a particular person something in consideration of some other thing that we have received from him. This is most evident in buying and selling, in which there is at once the nature of exchange. In these cases it is needful to get a balance of thing with thing, in such a way that whatever a man has that is not his own, he is to return to the other whose it is; and so an equality, a kind of arithmetical mean, is struck, that is, in relation to the two extreme quantities the division is even. Five, for instance, is the arithmetical mean between four and six, for it is one above four and one below six. If two persons in the beginning had five each, and one of them got one from the other, the recipient would have six and the other four: it would then be justice for them to return to the mean, and one be taken from the man having six and given to the other who has only four; each will now have five, which is the mean (2–2, q.61, a.2).

Let us examine, one at a time, those vices that can endanger the virtues of distributive and commutative justice. In what regards the first kind of justice, the capital sin to be avoided goes by the name of *human respect*. The basic principle of distributive

justice consists in giving to every member of a group the share of things that is coming to him according to his place in the group. But human respect, or respect of persons, begins to vitiate shares every time we let some other line of demarcation than this rule decide the part going to each individual.

We may suppose, as an instance, that it is a matter of giving someone a professor's honors and duties. If distributive justice is observed, this man has a claim in exact proportion to his learning, for it is his learning which marks out his place in the social hierarchy in relation to the order of teaching. To act justly in such case is to take into account just the learning of the candidate; on the contrary, to take into consideration his person is to be guilty of human respect, that is to say, to have regard to something that is not the one rightful reason we can have for conferring this dignity on him: his wealth, for example, or the ancestor that relates us to him. Here we may define "person" in a general way as being: any other condition than the legitimate cause for the attribution of a good in question. This means that persons necessarily vary with cases, and that a condition that involves respect of persons in a given case may be lawful or even required by justice in another. It is a matter of respect of persons if we take lineage into account in bestowing a prelacy, but it is not such if we take inheritance into account in making a will, and the crime of which we speak appears

only when it comes in to falsify the proportions (2–2, q.63, a.1). Still, this is not to say that it is always easy to indicate the point at which this crime begins, for the right that fixes the individual's share in the group's goods is rarely a simple matter. Since we have taken the instance of honor and of public duty as examples, we may note that honor is testimony given to the virtue of one whom we wish to pay deference to, but that public honors often are addressed less to what men are than what they represent. A prelate, no matter how bad he might be, is deserving of honor as representing God; our parents and teachers have a right to respect, not only on their own merits, but as sharers of the dignity of Him who is father and master of all things; old people, too, have a claim to honor, because age raises at least the presumption of virtue. It is true that this sign is sometimes deceptive and that, as the Book of Wisdom says (c.4), "venerable age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years . . . a spotless life is old age." As for riches, well, it may be necessary to pay them some tribute because of the standing they give to a man in a community; however, one would be guilty of respect of persons if he took into consideration anybody's riches and thought much of him on that account (q.63, a.3).

If we look next into the sins opposed to commutative justice, they will seem numerous indeed and varied, because of the many different ways in which exchange between persons can be carried on.

Some of the exchanges made between persons and presided over by commutative justice are voluntary and some are not. There is involuntary exchange whenever anyone uses another's property or person or work against the other's will. This can occur in secret and by fraud, or in the open and by violence; and in either case the injury can be done either to the property, or to the person, or to a related person. When it is a matter of property, and one gets away in secret with another's goods, we call the act *larceny;* when the act is done in the open, it is called *rapine.* When a man himself is taken, either his person or his dignity is endangered. When his person is in question, he is taken secretly to be killed treacherously, or perhaps clubbed or poisoned; when he is taken openly, he is killed openly, or thrown into prison, or flogged, or in some way mutilated. His dignity is attacked secretly by false witness or detraction or defamation or the like, and openly by accusation before a court, or by public insult. One can be wronged also in someone related to him, for instance, in his wife, by the act of adultery, or his servant, who may be induced to desert the master, and either of these actions is usually done in secret, though they can also be done openly. And so for all related persons, injustices of all kinds can be committed on each of them exactly as on the central person. Still, adultery and the seduction of servants are injustices directly on these persons themselves, though because servants are in some way owned (*possessio quaedam*) by the master, the seduction of them is a kind of theft.

Exchange, however, is voluntary when one gives something to another. And if he simply gives his own goods to the other though not obliged to do so, it is not a question of justice but of generosity. For a free transference has nothing to do with justice, unless in so far as there might be something owed in

the case. There could be such debt in any of several ways. First, a man may simply turn over something to another as pay for something of the other's, and this is what goes on in buying and selling. Secondly, a man may give something to another and allow him to use it, but with the duty to return it; and if he gives him the use of it gratis, the exchange is called *usufruct* in the case of things that produce some fruit, and a loan (*mutuum, seu commodatum*) in the case of things that do not fructify, such as money, furniture and the like. If the use is not given gratis, it is called *renting*. Thirdly, a man may give another something that he is to get back, and not that the other is to use it, but to keep it for him; and this is called a *deposit,* or *security,* when one pledges his property or himself in trust to another. Now in all actions of this kind whether voluntary or not, the manner of settling is the same: the two parties have a claim to equal return; and so every one of these cases is in the field of the one kind of justice, namely, commutative (2–2, q.61, a.3).

It is not difficult to make out that, among these acts where another's good is concerned, some correspond to vices, such as murder, that dispose of another's goods without his consent. Not that every destruction of any kind of life is a crime against justice, for the individual exists only in view of the whole of which he is a part, and every time that his destruction is useful to the good order of the whole, it becomes a legitimate thing. Man may, then, without scruple sacrifice plants to feed animals, and animals to nourish himself, for this is a use of them in view of their normal end (q.64, a.1). He may even

put an evil-doer to death, because a man of this kind is a nuisance to the whole community, and the ruler or the judge representing him only sees, as he should, to the health of the community by cutting off its diseased parts, as we cut off gangrenous members from the body. But it goes without saying that no private person has authority to do this, save in a case of legitimate self-defence, and that the priest least of all should soil his hands with blood.

For two reasons, a priest may not kill anyone. First of all, he is chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of Christ brought to death. Now, as St. Peter says in his First Epistle (c.2), Christ did not return blow for blow, and it is not fitting, therefore, that the cleric should strike or kill, for the servant ought to imitate his master, according to the saying of Ecclesiasticus (c.10): "As the judge of the people himself is, so also are his ministers." Another reason is that the ministry of the New Law is entrusted to the priest, and in that law there is no penalty of death fixed or of any physical mutilation (contrary to the Old Law, whose priests and Levites might chastise and put to death); and in order to be a fit minister of the New Testament, he ought to keep away from such things (2–2, q.64, a.4).

Suicide is a crime of the same order, for it not only destroys the charity with which a man is bound to love himself, but it disposes, as if it belonged to him, of a life that in reality belongs to God. Man's free will extends to all the acts of his life, yet not

to that life itself, for he has received that, and it is rightly His only, from whom man has life, to deliver man from afflictions in time and to let him enter a happier life (q.64, a.5, ad 3). To mutilate a man, to harm him, to take away his liberty without cause, is to commit an injustice, for it is to dispose against his will of the integrity or freedom of his person, which does not belong to us. Besides, in these cases, as in that of homicide, a penalty may for any valid reason be lightened, and a judge may, therefore, chastise and imprison the guilty man, and may put him to death, and a father may chastise the son whom he has the business of educating, though he is not allowed to harm his health or person.

All the crimes that we have just mentioned affect our neighbor in a personal way, but there are others that affect his goods or the things that he possesses. The fact that such vices exist, plainly supposes the lawfulness and rightness of proprietorship, for if there were no lawful ownership it would be no injustice to seize what men claim they possess. Now it is a natural right for man to have some exterior objects and to make them his own. All things are from God, but man is God's image precisely because he has reason and thus can dispose as he wills of the material world. This is why God in the creation said: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea." Besides, it is a good thing and useful to the general welfare for the individual to have some

property that belongs to him, and this arrangement need not prejudice the communal goods that are to remain in the hands of the whole group.

In the matter of exterior goods, man has two privileges. The *first* of these is the power of getting, and getting rid of. Under this heading, it is lawful for a man to have some things of his own. This is even necessary for human life, for three reasons. In the first place, a man is more careful to look after things that belong to him alone than things that belong to everyone or to many: for people keep out of the way of work and leave community jobs to someone else; and this is just what happens where, for instance, there is a plethora of servants. A second reason is that human affairs are kept in better order if everyone is given charge of something that belongs to himself, and there would be confusion if everyone was to take care of everything, indiscriminately. Thirdly, man's status is kept more peaceful in this way, and everyone is content with his own things; and indeed we see that among those who own something in common and with no division lines, trouble quite often arises. The *second* privilege that man has in exterior goods is the use of them. Yet in this matter man should not retain exterior goods as his own, but as everybody's; that is, so that in case of necessity he can the more easily share them with others. So the Apostle says to Timothy (I, vi, 18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on the true life" (2–2, q.66, a.2).

Such is the natural and social basis of the right to property. It is clear that any act derogating from

this right is a fault, and that any fixed disposition to derogate from it is a vice. This is why we have classed robbery and larceny, which is a secret form of robbery, among the sins of injustice. Yet this is also why any apparent theft ceases to be theft when it legalizes itself as a last resort on the same ground that proprietorship itself rests on, that which would seem a theft then becoming, in virtue of this principle, a lawful appropriation.

As a matter of fact, what exists by human law cannot repeal or restrict any part of either the natural law or the divine law. Now the order fixed by Providence is that lower things should be arranged so as to serve human needs. And so in dividing these things and appropriating them, as allowed by human law, no obstacle is to be placed to man's being served by them. And therefore things in which some persons superabound ought by natural law to go to the sustenance of the poor. Hence St. Ambrose says (*Serm. de Tempore,* 64) : "This bread which you store belongs to the hungry, these clothes which you hide away belong to the poorly clad, this money which you bury in the earth is for the ransom and freedom of afflicted people." Of course, as there are many who are in need and as the same goods cannot help all of them, the free disposition of his own goods is left to every man, so that he may assist the unfortunate. Still, there are cases of such urgent and plain necessity that the suffering persons may to relieve the immediate need take whatever comes to hand, as, for instance, when life is in danger and one cannot do anything else. A person may then lawfully use another's goods to supply his wants and seize upon such goods,

either in public or private, without really committing either theft or larceny (2–2, q.66, a.7).

Howsoever frequently injustice may be committed, either against persons or things, we may say that its chosen field is still what men properly call justice, that is to say, it is justice that the courts ought to give. There is no party to a case whom this vice does not dog: the judge, the plaintiff, the accused, the witness, the lawyer in his plea, all are exposed to fall into it. The gravest fault that can menace a judge, who is a public person dispensing justice in the ruler's name, is the temptation to do his work as a private person: to judge someone not within his jurisdiction, to condemn on knowledge obtained as a private person, and not on what the trial reveals to him or his own research reveals to him in a lawful way, to condemn a man whom he knows to be guilty, but whom no one accuses—these are confusions between man and judge which justice is meant to avoid (q.67). As for the accusation, it is not merely a right, it is a duty every time that an evil that has been committed threatens to cause damage to either the spiritual or the material good of the community. But the accuser should first of all be bound to show incontestable proof of what he says, and if he cannot do it, his duty is to withdraw (q.68). If he goes too far, especially in bad faith, the accuser becomes a calumniator, guilty of a criminal act in his turn, and the judge may inculpate him.

A person may proceed with an accusation only when he is absolutely sure of the matter and when there can be no possibility of ignorance of the facts. Yet it does not follow that everyone who brings a false accusation against another is a calumniator, but only he whom malice incites to bring such accusation. In fact, it might happen that one would accuse another through lightheadedness, that is, one might too easily believe what he had heard, and this would be an instance of temerity; or he might, because of some excusable error, go on to accuse; all of which matters should be left to the prudence and discernment of the judge, who will not condemn of calumny a person whom puerility or some pardonable mistake has led to make a false accusation (2–2, q.68, a.3, ad 1).

The accused naturally thinks first of defending himself; yet he has no right to do so at the expense of truth.

It is one thing to keep silent about a truth, it is another to affirm a falsehood. The first is permitted in some cases, for no one is bound to tell every truth, but only those truths that the judge may and ought to demand according to the regular legal form: for instance, when a man's crime is abroad and infamous, or the indications of it are external and plain, or when the trial is well advanced. But to advance an untruth is in no case allowable for anyone. Now one can proceed to what is allowable either in a lawful way adapted to the end desired, and it is prudent to do this; or in a way that is not licit and not fitted to the proposed end, and this is what a wily fellow, full of deceit and trickery, would do (see above, p. 243). The first way is praiseworthy, the other is vicious. The accused then may defend himself by saying nothing

about a truth which he is not bound to avow; for example, by not answering questions that he is not obliged to answer, and to do this is rather a prudent evasion than self-defence by chicanery. However, he is not permitted to lie or be silent about any truth he is bound to tell, or to use any trickery or fraud, for this would amount to a lie and to self-defence by deception.

Sometimes (some might object) the accused may defend himself by deceit, since according to civil law anyone is allowed to circumvent his enemy in a lawsuit; but to defend oneself so is most deceitful, and therefore the accused commits no sin when, in a criminal case, he defends himself by deceit. In answer we may say that human law leaves unpunished actions which are sins in the judgment of God, as for, instance, fornication. In fact, human law does not demand of man virtue of every kind, which is for the few only and cannot be shared in by so great a crowd as human law is designed to take care of. Still, for a man to be unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape death, which faces him in a criminal case, is a mark of perfect virtue, for of all terrifying things death is the most terrifying (Aristotle, *Ethics,* 3, c.6). And so if a guilty man does mislead his enemy in a suit, he sins by getting him to do wrong; but civil law has no penalty for this sin, and it is so far said to be licit (2–2, q.69, a.2, et ad 1).

If we inquire into the rôle of the witness, we see that it does not raise fewer or less thorny difficulties. To bear witness in favor of an accused person whom one knows to be innocent, is strictly a duty. Every man is bound to do it if asked, and he is bound to do it spontaneously if he is not asked. On the

other hand, no one is required to witness against an accused person in order to bring against him charges of which no one suspects him and which the regular course of justice has not revealed against him. Still less is a man bound to give testimony to aid the accuser to prove a case he has not made a success of, for a person is not obliged to make an accusation if he cannot prove it; "and even if danger menaces the accuser, we need not trouble ourselves about him, for he has gotten himself into this predicament, whereas the accused is menaced and exposed to danger in spite of himself" (q.70, a.1). As for evaluating testimony, we may say that there is no absolute rule. A human action is particular and may or may not come to pass; but there is no science of the particular; let a person then dispose of one or two or a thousand witnesses, he will ever have only a probability, never unquestionable certitude. However, this is no reason for making little of the probability that the testimony of two or three witnesses gives, nor for arguing that three witnesses are not better than one. Three allow for a beginning, a middle and an end, that is, for a final confirmation of the agreement arrived at by the first two witnesses. True, this agreement does not always exist, and it is hard to know in what measure people must secure it.

When the disagreement among witnesses is on crucial circumstances that might change the nature of the case—for in-

stance, the time or place or the chief persons concerned—the testimony is of no force, because if they are in disagreement on such matters, it seems that their testimony is individual and as if they witnessed to different cases. Thus, if one says that an event occurred at such and such a time or place, and another assigns another time and place, they seem not to speak of the same event. Yet it does not weaken the testimony for one to say he does not remember the time or place and the other to name a precise time and place. And if the witnesses for the accused and the accuser are in complete disagreement on the main points, and are equal in number and character on both sides, we ought to decide in favor of the accused, for a judge should be readier to pardon than to condemn, except perhaps in certain cases in which the accused has the advantage to begin with. But if the witnesses on both sides are in dissent, the judge will follow his own good sense in settling which party is to get the decision, though he will, of course, take into account the number of the witnesses, their reputation, the favoring circumstances, the standing of the case, and so on. A man's testimony is rejected if when he is asked about what he has seen or knows he contradicts himself, but not if there is some disagreement in his answer on matters that he gives an opinion on or has heard rumors of. But if there is discrepancy in what he says about some circumstance not bearing on the very substance of the matter in hand, for example, whether it was clear or a little cloudy, or whether a house was painted, or the like, this does not throw his testimony out, for men usually do not bother much about such things, which easily slip out of mind; nay, some lack of agreement on such matters, as St. Chrysostom says (*Homil. in Matt.,* 1), makes testimony the more credible, since a full concord in all such things, even the least, would make us

suspect that the answers were prearranged. Still, once the witness is heard, the matter is left to the prudence and discernment of the judge (2–2, q.70, a.2, ad2).

There remain now the lawyers, whose business, very often, is a mighty delicate one. They practice a profession, and have a right therefore to a just salary (*ibid.*, q.70, a.4). Absolutely speaking, they are not obliged to offer their services to the poor man, even though he is in need, for this is a work of mercy and, like any alms, is obligatory only on certain conditions, such as, if the poor man is in urgent need of legal help and there is no one in a better position to give it to him. On the contrary, if the need is not urgent or if this poor man could be assisted by a lawyer who is of near kin to him or who is better off, it is a good work indeed to defend him, but not an absolute duty. Otherwise, we should be bordering on the conclusion that lawyers ought to put their own work aside in order to serve the poor. Let the lawyer then be charitable; let him besides have the requisite qualifications for practicing his profession: skill in presenting his client's defence, an ear to learn accusations and a tongue to refute them, a reputation for honesty above suspicion, for he who cannot answer for himself can still less answer for others; let him above all things have the honor that will keep him from ever defending a case that he knows to be unjust, for thus he would make

himself an accomplice of the injustice which he is employed to defeat (*ibid.*, q.71).

Whatever be the form that injustice may put on, whether it be crimes properly so called, or injuries less directly against persons, such as insult, scorn, slander, calumny or mockery, the specific remedy for the evil committed is the same: *restitution.* This word means that one is given back a possession which belongs to him, and which he has given up voluntarily in the instance of a loan or a deposit, or of which he has been dispossessed in spite of himself in the instance of an injustice (*ibid.*, q.62, a.1). In cases in which restitution cannot be made by giving back the very object that was taken away or destroyed, at least its equivalent must be given. This happens when a man's honor is attacked or the members of his body are maimed, and compensation should then be fixed with due attention to the circumstances of the parties, by a just man chosen as arbiter (*ibid.*, a.2, ad 1), and without prejudice to the penalty that the guilty man may have coming to him for the moral fault he has committed (a.3). The demands of restitution are absolute, if we take the point of view of moral justice, and it is this absolute character that allows us to fix *a priori* the conditions according to which restitution ought to be made. Everyone who has not only committed, but protected injustice, or in any way taken part in it, is bound to restore and repair in the exact measure in which he was respon-

sibly tangled up with it: for example, the person who commands an unjust act is evidently answerable for it; and so is the accomplice without whose consent the act could not have been done, the recipient of stolen goods who hides them away, and even the monarch whose business is to see that justice is respected in his domain, but who lets evil-doers multiply, as if the revenues he enjoys were not meant precisely to give him a chance to uphold justice (*ibid.*, a.7). And the man guilty of injustice or the accomplice in it ought not only to make restitution, but he ought to do it at once, for it is no less reprehensible to keep what is another's than to take it.

II. THE VIRTUES ASSOCIATED WITH JUSTICE

It may at first blush seem unusual that there should be virtues connected with justice, that is to say, tied up with it, and that these nevertheless do not strictly belong to it. Yet the fact is explained if we take into account the twofold demand that should be met in order that there be a virtue of justice: to give to another what is due him, and in such a way as to build up an equality that has been torn down. From this point of view we may say that every virtuous act done in relation to another person has to do more or less immediately with the virtue of justice, though we find that there is no justice properly speaking when the action in question has not for its end the

rendering to someone what is due to him, or when it cannot give it to him in such a way as to re-establish equality. Hence, there are a great many virtuous actions that are just because they set up the relation that ought to exist between the one who does them and the one whom they are meant to help, but yet not completely just because they do not pay an out-and-out debt or really establish an equality. We have a typical instance of this second kind in the virtue of *religion.* To be religious is to give to God what is due Him, and it is, therefore, to do a just work. Still, how can we give back to God what is due Him? The Psalmist says (Ps. 115): "What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that he hath rendered to me?" So far, therefore, the virtue of religion is only an incomplete justice. *Filial devotion,* by which we give our parents the reverence that is due to them, is of the same order, for we cannot hope to balance in this way what they have done for us. Examples of the first kind could easily be cited in great numbers. For though there are absolute legal debts in relation to our neighbor, a debt when it is simply moral is far less definite, and a person can hardly speak of justice in the strict sense of the word. It is thus that we owe truth to others, and that others owe us an acknowledgment for the good turns we have done them. In the same class are generosity, affability, well-wishing, peace, and a score of virtuous attitudes that make our conduct

what it should be with regard to others, but resolve into actions whose debt-outline is scarcely traceable (2–2, q.80, a.1).

Let us take up first the virtue of religion. It is a special virtue, since it has its special object, which is to give God the honor that belongs to Him; and it is a moral virtue, though it has a theological aspect.

Religion is the virtue that gives God the worship due to Him. Two things are to be studied in religion: one of these is what religion offers to God, that is to say, worship, and this in relation to religion has the rôle of matter or object; the other is the person, namely, God, whom we worship in religion. Now, the acts by which we worship do not come so near to God as does a human act of faith in God. We may indeed say that God is the object of faith, not simply because we believe God, but because we believe in Him; whereas, to give to God the cult due to Him is limited to going through a ceremonial worship, such as sacrifice offered or the like, in His honor. Thus it is plain that God is not taken as the matter or object of the virtue of religion, but as its end; and religion is, therefore, not a theological virtue whose object would be the ultimate end, but a moral virtue which is concerned with the means to be used in gaining this end (2–2, q.81, a.5).

It follows from the nature of things that, if religion is a moral virtue, it is rightly the first of all moral virtues, for its immediate and direct object is the honor of God. The form we can most easily

see under which it is expressed is worship, that is, one or more exterior acts in which the body necessarily takes part. But its deepest form is devotion, or the act by which the soul itself is dedicated and given over wholly to God. Let us then, in the first place, examine the interior acts which inspire and rule the virtue of religion: namely, devotion and prayer, which is its expression.

Devotion engenders in the religious soul two effects that are readily noticeable: an accidental sadness born of seeing our soul habitually kept so far from God, and an essential joy born of the sentiment which this soul knows in actually coming near to God. And this twofold effect of devotion shows us at once the twofold source from which this virtue is fed.

The extrinsic cause of devotion, the main cause, is God. St. Ambrose says of Him (*Comment. in Luc.,* ch.9; from *Et conversus* . . .): "God calls whom He judges worthy, and whom He chooses He makes religious; and if He had wished, He would have made the Samaritans, who had no devotion, to be a devout people." Yet there should be an intrinsic cause on our part, which cause is meditation or contemplation. For devotion consists in an act of the will by which man gives himself with readiness to divine worship; and any act of will is born of an intellectual reflection that goes before it, since it is the intellectually known good that is the object of the will. Augustine says in *De Trinitate* (14, c.8) that "will is born of intelligence." It is required, then, that quiet forethought be the source of devotion, and it is through such forethought that man is led to give himself to divine wor-

ship. Two considerations lead to this end. One of them is God's goodness and His benefits; which is thus expressed by the Psalmist (Ps. 72): "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God;" and this first consideration begets in us the love which is the proximate cause of devotion. The second consideration is of our own failings, because of which we need to lean on God, as the Psalmist says: (Ps. 120): "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me. My help is from the Lord, who made heaven and earth." This bars out presumption, the vice of trusting to our own strength and not yielding to God (2–2, q.82, a.3).

Now for the other interior act by which religion is expressed. Prayer, of course, is good and really required for the perfection of this virtue. It is good, because metaphysics shows us that things are not governed by a blind necessity or by any divine caprice, but by divine foresight and planning; hence we may pray, not in order to change the unchangeable plans of God for us, but in order that by our acts we may fully effect the order prearranged for us by God (q.83, a.4). The act of prayer is needed also because it is essentially a request made to God by man to obtain from Him whatever we require, and because this human acknowledgment of our own poverty is an indispensable beginning of the virtue of religion (a.5). We should, therefore, pray, and when we hardly know what to ask of God, it is enough to observe the following rule: we should ask in our prayers whatever we ought to desire: namely, first, spirit-

ual goods for ourselves, our friends, and even our enemies; then, material goods too, but only so much of them as may be a help in gaining the Sovereign Good of the soul, to which they should remain subordinate.

The exterior acts of religion come next in order, and we may say first that their necessity is based on man's very nature.

If we give glory and honor to God, we do it not for His sake, for He is already full of His own glory, and nothing can be added to it by any creature. We do it rather for our sake, because to reverence and honor God is to submit our minds to Him, and our perfection lies in this act. For anything is perfected so far as it yields to what is above it: the body so far as it is animated by the soul, and the atmosphere so far as it is illumined by the sun. Now, for union with God the human mind needs to be led on by sense things, because the invisible things of God are understood by the things that are made (*Rom.* c.1). This is why in divine worship we need some corporal things, so that by them as by signs the mind of man is awakened to spiritual acts and conjoined to God. Thus religion supposes interior acts as its principal ones and as having to do directly with the virtue of religion, but it also supposes exterior acts as secondary and as meant to be aids to the interior (2–2, q.81, a.7).

The chief of the exterior acts are these: adoration, by which our bodies bow down before God as our minds are humbled before Him in devotion (q.84, a.2); sacrifice, which is not merely a Christian cus-

tom, but more a duty of natural law known by all peoples and based on man's desire to signify and confess his dependence on a higher being, as soon as he begins to think on the problem of his own poverty (q.85, a.1); and lastly the vows, by which a religious person obliges himself to live a better life and to settle himself in it according to the quasi-material formula of the spoken words he uses to bind himself (q.88, a.1).

The other virtues linked with justice are those that bind man not merely in relation to God, but also in relation to certain other men. Obedience, for example, causes man's will, by its submitting to a superior will, to reproduce the subordination of natural inferior forces to the higher forces which God has expressly willed as Orderer of the world (q.104, a.1). Gratitude, too, is close to justice, because it brings us to give to God, to parents, and in general to benefactors, what we owe them for the good things we have received from them (q.106, a.1). Like obedience, it rests on the analogy that the moral order is to be enforced if we would maintain the natural order willed by God. Every effect naturally points back to its cause as that which is its purpose and *raison d'être,* and whoever receives a benefit is so far an effect of the benefactor, since he would not be wholly what he is if he did not have the gift he has received; he should, therefore, turn toward him in some way to acknowledge his dependence, and this is why God, as the cause of all things, turns

them all back toward Himself (q.106, a.3). One of the most charming and vital virtues connected with justice is truth. It is a virtue, for it is good to speak the truth, and whatever makes us do good is a virtue. And it is a kind of justice, in the sense that it pays off a sort of debt, if not a legal debt, at least a moral one that all of us contract toward our neighbors by the very fact that we live in society. This debt or duty is the manifestation of truth.

Because man is a social being, one man owes to another that without which human society could not go on. And men could not live together unless they had towards one another a confidence founded on the mutual telling of the truth. Thus the virtue of truth takes on in some ways the character of a debt (q.109, a.3, ad 1).

Truth is only one virtue, but there are many vices opposed to it: lying, double-dealing, boasting, which makes us represent ourselves as better than we really are; irony, a subtler vice that makes us dissimulate and unjustly rate down our own strength with the aim of deceiving others on what we are (q.113, a.1). And as truth-telling means that we give others what the exigencies of social life require in the realm of thought, so affability is our means of meeting those same exigencies in the realm of manners: by it we say and do what is fitting and prescribed, not by the law of the land, but by the rules of civility (q.114, a.2).

Chapter X

THE MAN OF VALOR

We now take up the study of fortitude as the third cardinal virtue. We should recall that this name "cardinal" is given to the four virtues that possess in an eminent degree the general characteristics required in all virtues. One of these marks undoubtedly is a firmness in our way of acting; and this firmness flows directly from fortitude, so that this virtue is in some degree integral with all other virtues. So it is said to be a cardinal virtue, and it ranks next after justice in the hierarchy of these four virtues.

Augustine says (*De Trinitate,* vi, c.8): "In those things whose greatness does not consist in size, to be great simply means to be excellent." A virtue, then, is so much greater as it is the more excellent or good. And what in particular is man's good? Dionysius says it is the good of reason (*De Div. Nom.,* iv, 4). Now prudence, as the perfection of reason, essentially possesses this good. Justice, too, employs this good in so far as it is the business of justice to make reason king in all human affairs. Other virtues also help to preserve this value by so tempering the emotions that they do not turn man away from the rational good. If we take these two last

(fortitude and justice) in their order, fortitude has first place, because fear of imminent death is the greatest thing in the world to turn man away from the rational good. Next comes temperance, because all pleasures, and especially those of touch, keep man from the good which reason prescribes. And that which is of the essence of virtue is more important than what is only a help to virtue, and this latter, the help, is better than what serves, in a negative way, to clear out obstacles. That is why the main cardinal virtue is prudence, the second is justice, the third is fortitude, and the fourth temperance. After these come the other virtues (2–2, q.123, a 12).

As we have just pointed out, the proper object of fortitude is to clear out of virtue's path any obstacle that feeling opposes to virtue, especially the feeling or emotion of fear, and most of all that particular and agonizing fear which the peril of approaching death inspires. Whoever can do the greater can do the less. The man, then, who is capable of overcoming the fear of the most terrible of bodily evils, is of course able to win against the fear that all other evils might bring upon him. Here we have the reason why the virtue of fortitude is best seen in the presence of death, yet not every danger of death is equally fit to show forth this virtue.

We have said that fortitude strengthens man's spirit against the greatest of all perils, namely, death. Still, as fortitude is a virtue, and as the essence of virtue is to tend always to good, it follows that, if man is brave and faces the danger

of death, it must be in order to seek a certain good. Yet the danger of death occasioned by sickness or a storm or an assault from robbers or any such thing does not menace man directly as a seeker of some good; on the contrary, the danger of death brought on by war is a direct peril to man as a seeker of a particular good, that is, in so far as he defends the common good in a just war. And a war can be just, in either of two senses. First, in a general way, when two armies face each other in the field. Secondly, in a particular way, when a judge or even a private citizen does not flinch from a just judgment though he fears the sword over his head or some other deadly peril. It goes with the virtue of fortitude then, to make a man courageous of soul before the dangers of death that may be imminent indeed in common warfare and also in the particular attacks to which we may stretch the name of war. We must, therefore, grant that courage has to do properly with the danger of death to which war exposes us; but the brave bear themselves well in face of deadly danger from any other cause, for there is no danger of death that man may not encounter for the sake of virtue: for instance, he may go to help a sick friend and not run from the danger of a deadly infection, or keep on a journey in the interests of some pious business and not turn aside through fear of shipwreck or robbery (2–2, q.123, a.5).

It follows that the proper effect of the virtue of courage is to resist rather than to attack.

In matter of fact it is harder to resist than to attack. There are three reasons for this. In the first place, a man needs to resist only when invaded by one stronger than himself; for he who attacks does it because he is the stronger, and it is

harder to fight a stronger man than a weaker one. Second, he who resists knows the presence of danger, whereas he who attacks regards danger as in the future; and certainly it is more difficult to stand firm in present dangers than in view of future ones. Third, to hold out takes a longer time, whereas a person can attack with one sudden onrush, and it is harder to stay a long time waiting than to go swiftly into some arduous work (2–2, q.123, a.6, ad 1).

We come now to determination of the courageous act *par excellence,* which is also the most perfect act. It is martyrdom. That it is the very type of the courageous act will appear later in a particular manner; for it is an act of virtue, since it strengthens man in the good, and it is a virtuous act in a supreme degree, since it strengthens him before the danger of death that confronts him in the particular battle called persecution (q.124, a.5). But it remains to notice in what sense martyrdom is at the same time an act of the highest perfection.

There are two ways of looking at an act of virtue. The first has to do with the class to which the act itself belongs, and its relation to the virtue which immediately produces it. In this sense we may say that martyrdom, which is the taking of death as one ought, is not the most perfect act of virtue. In fact, to suffer death is not in itself an act of virtue, but only when it is done for some good, which good itself is founded on an act of virtue, as, let us say, faith in God, or love for God; so this act of virtue, as it is the purpose of constancy in the face of death, is better than this constancy.

The second way of looking at an act of virtue is concerned with the first motive of the act, and this motive is love of charity; it is chiefly in this light that an act makes for perfection of life. As the Apostle says (*Col.*, c.3): *Charity is the bond of perfection.* Now among all the acts of virtue martyrdom is the best demonstration of a perfect charity. For one shows more love for a thing, the more he contemns some other loved thing for it and is willing to suffer more grievous things for it. And it is evident that of all the goods of the present man most of all loves life itself and, on the contrary, hates death most, particularly a death borne with bodily torments: through fear of which, says Augustine, even the brute animals give up the greatest pleasures. In this sense it is plain that martyrdom is a more perfect act in its kind than other human acts, since it is the mark of the highest charity, as St. John says (c.15): "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (2–2, q.124, a.3).

The vices which are a denial of the virtue of fortitude are three: timidity, inability to fear, and overboldness. Timidity is that which keeps us back in the face of a danger that reason bids us to face; it is the very contrary of courage.

In every instance fear comes from love, for a person fears only the contrary of what he loves. And love, for its part, is not in any determined genus of virtue, or of vice either, but ordered love is included in every virtue, since a virtuous person always loves the own good of virtue; and disordered love is present in every sin. For from a disordered love comes wrong desire. So a badly ordered fear is included in every

sin: the miser fears the loss of his money, the intemperate man of his pleasures, and so on. But the main fear is of the danger of death. That is why we say that the disorder begot of this fear is opposed to fortitude, which means above all the braving of death, and that the main vice opposed to fortitude is timidity (2–2, q.125, a.2).

As for the inability to fear, though it might seem praiseworthy at first sight, it is no less vicious than the other. The truly brave man is not the heavy, senseless stock that, knowing nothing, can fear nothing. Nor is he the fellow who, caring little, has little fear of losing; nor yet he who, settled in pride and presumption, does not fear that any danger can ever menace what he loves (q.126, a.1). The really brave man is he who loves what he should and who fears what he should and when there is reasonable ground for fear, but who sets himself against this fear and turns upon the danger (*ibid.*, a.2). There is, then, a midway between him who fears too much and him who does not fear enough, and this course is not timid, not unflinching, and let us add, not brazen. We know that audacity is an emotion (see p. 128). Like all emotions, it is good when regulated by reason. It may be a good thing to take the field when the time is ripe for doing so and when some threatening danger must be cleared out of the way; but boldness is an evil when it goes to excess, shows a lack of moderation in the exercise of fortitude, and when it opens the door to needless and untimely invasion

(2–2, q.123, a.3, and q.127, a.2). Virtue goes over into vice every time that the good yields to evil by a violation of the promptings of reason.

Related to the cardinal virtue of fortitude are four virtues that share its nature, but do not fully realize its definition. These are magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. Magnanimity may not be classed with fortitude, nor are the two of the same degree, for the difference between them is that between standing unmoved before death, heedless of one's life, and giving proof of the kind of grandeur that magnanimity implies (2–2, q.129, a.5). Yet it is a virtue of the same class as the other, and when it is guided, it is in some sense the contrary of fear.

By its very name, *magnanimity* supposes a soul fit to strive for great things. Now we can study a virtue in two lights: first, in relation to the matter with which it deals, or on which it acts; second, in relation to its proper act, which lies in using this matter in a fitting way. And as it is mainly in view of its act that we define a virtue, a man is called magnanimous chiefly because he has a spirit inclined toward some great deed. But if we look at the grandeur of this act itself, it in its turn seems to us to be twofold, according as we take it either in a certain perspective or as absolute. An act may be called great either relatively or absolutely. It is called great in the former sense though it employs something cheap or of ordinary value, but makes the very best use of it; and that act which makes the very best use of the very best thing is called great simply or without qualification. The things that men use are exterior things, and the greatest of these is

honor; for we have seen (q.103, a.1 and a.2) that it is a very near neighbor of virtue and indeed a kind of present witness to some virtue, and also that it is given to God and to all best things, and that men lay aside everything to win honor and avoid shame. And because the greatness of the magnanimous soul is judged directly from the greatness of his acts, as his strength is gauged from their difficulty, it follows that magnanimity has to do with honors (2–2, q.129, a.1).

For the same reason we say further that, as an unavoidable consequence, this virtue tries for the greatest honors, but, in a way suggested by reason, moderates the hope we have of them. Here again virtue lies in taking a middle road, for it is an excellent thing to aim high and to desire and value one's own honor, which, after virtue, is most worthy of our efforts; but it is an excellent thing only if we desire no more than the highest honor reason tells us we are worthy of (*ibid.,* a.3, ad 1). At the same time we see that, without being in a proper sense identified with the virtue of fortitude, magnanimity is yet related to it and dependent on it, for honors are hard things to get, even though one be worthy of them; he must have firmness of soul, not, of course, so much as to face death, but enough to stand out against the obstacles that block his way to the rewards which he thinks are his due, and enough also to think himself worthy of them and therefore able to hope for them (*ibid.,* a.5). It is a tight rope that this virtue walks, for to believe ourselves able to reach what is above our heads, is presumption; to

believe ourselves worthy of an honor not in line with our true merit, is ambition; to like honors won on false titles or as seen by man's fallible mind or for any other end than God's honor or man's good, is vain or empty glory. Yet to be incapable of so much as wishing the honor to which one has a right in God's view, which one can win before God as he ought and for the purposes he ought, is pusillanimity, littleness of soul, the very etymology of which is at odds with greatness of soul or magnanimity.

It is the etymology of the name which gives us light also on the essence of the second main virtue linked to fortitude, namely, magnificence. The question here no longer is that of *being* a great soul, but of *doing* great things, or at any rate of extending oneself to do them (2–2, q.134, q.2, ad 2). Thus magnanimity is great because of the objects which it aims at, but magnificence derives its greatness from what it does, and also from the way in which it does it. It is in the realm of doing, *i. e.,* of producing, and is a virtue proper to the artist, whom it predisposes to realize works that are great in their dimensions or precise in their matter. It is one of the virtues, we should add, that can most poorly do without exterior goods; the magnificent man is he who has wherewith to give and who knows how to give.

The mark of magnificence, as we just said, is to aim at doing some great thing. And to do any great thing proportionate costs have to be borne, for no one does things on a

grand scale without heavy expense, and for this reason magnificence knows how to foot big bills so that important works be done as they should be. Now, to pay out is to part with money, and some men are such that their exaggerated love of money keeps them from doing this; and so the expense itself which the magnificent man incurs in doing a splendid work may be taken as the content of magnificence, and so, too, may the money which he pays out to meet this expense, or even his moderated liking for money, which does not get in the way of the large cost (2–2, q.134, a.3).

Magnificence is so truly a virtue that a vice makes its appearance as soon as the virtue is lacking: littleness or incapacity to give up the necessary sum for his undertakings. This is the vice of the man who is wanting in magnificence; and prodigality or a readiness to lavish without aim the resources one has at his disposal, is the fault of the man who by his overdoing misses the virtue of magnificence.

We have two other lordly virtues related to magnificence. These are: patience and perseverance. Patience is not precisely the same thing as fortitude, for it does not mean withstanding the fear begot of danger of death, yet it is strictly analogous to it. That is, it supposes a holding out against any sadness or depression that is not of so strong a nature as the fear of death, but that could run us off on a detour from the good mapped out for us by reason. And perseverance, we might say, is the fulfilment of all true fortitude, and in a way is simply the continuance of its effects.

Virtue looks to what is good but not easy to attain, and where there is a definite kind of difficulty or of the good to be won, there can be a special virtue. Now, the pursuit of virtue gets goodness, and labor too, from two sources. In the first place from the kind of act done, and this depends in turn on the nature of the object in question. Secondly, from the length of time, for the fact of sticking for a long time to a difficult problem has a special knottiness of its own, and this is why to keep on and on at a good until one completes it is the mark of a special virtue. And so, just as temperance and courage are particular virtues, for one moderates the pleasures of touch (which in itself is not easy) and the other checks both the fear and boldness that come in company with the danger (which checking also is hard work), so perseverance is likewise a specific virtue and its business is to be constant in these or other virtuous enterprises as long as is necessary (2–2, q.137, a.1).

We must not confuse perseverance with constancy, which is another virtue linked with fortitude. The two have not the same difficulty to overcome. What perseverance withstands and provides us against, is the length of time that we must keep up our effort, whereas constancy arms us for the most part against the obstacles and hazards which might get in the way of our purpose to do good (*ibid.*, a.3). This latter virtue is thus not so directly related to courage as perseverance, because the difficulty that comes of length of time is more at the center and within the act of virtue than the one that comes from exterior hindrances.

We note, too, that perseverance occurs, as do all virtues, at a temperate half-way point between the two excesses of softness and obstinacy. A lazy man breaks with a good cause as soon as any difficulty arises, even though this difficulty could be conquered. An obstinate man will not give up a resolution once it is made, even though he be unreasonable in holding to it. So, stubbornness clings to a scheme longer than it should, and softness lets go sooner than it should, but perseverance, unlike either, persists just as long as it ought, and that is why we consider it a virtue.

Chapter XI

THE PRACTICE OF SELF-CONTROL

In the study of temperance we come to a new object in relation to which it is defined. This object is sense pleasure and strong carnal desire. The strict business of temperance is to keep these in check. We might be even more precise and, taking the path that we followed in defining the virtue of courage, try to find which pleasures and which desires it should most of all moderate. The truth is, this is one of the four cardinal virtues, and it certainly has to do with a difficulty that is big and bound up with, not to say inherent in, the very nature of the human beings that we are (2–2, q.141, a.7). What is this difficulty?

The field of temperance is strong desire and sense joy, as that of fortitude is fear and rashness. Now, as the express object of courage we took the apprehension and presumption associated with the greatest of all evils, those that put an end to nature herself, that is, the perils of death. In a like manner temperance ought to be concerned with desires of the delights that are strongest of all. And because delight goes hand in hand with natural functioning, the more natural the functions with which they are linked the stronger are the delights. Now, among animals, the most natural of all actions

are those by which individuals survive by the help of food and drink and those by which the species is preserved through the union of male and female. It is accordingly with the delights of eating and drinking and of sex that temperance properly deals, and as pleasures of these kinds depend on the sense of touch, it follows that temperance pertains to the pleasures of touch (2–2, q.141, a.4).

As objects inferior to the foregoing we give second place to the delights of taste and also those of the senses of smell and sight, which latter may overlap those of touch and make them the more attractive. All these pleasures are, therefore, subjected by the virtue of temperance to a fixed rule, which determines the use of them, and this rule is found in the purpose of the pleasures which it has the work of keeping moderate. Their proper purpose, of course, is to make sure of the life of the individual and that of the species. This, then, will be the rule of temperance: to take of the goods and pleasures of touch just the amount that the needs of life require (*ibid.*, a.6). Thus we find this virtue equidistant between two contrary excesses: insensibility and intemperance. The former sins by default and by crushing desire; this vice exists, and there is no need to confuse it with what is merely a just moderation.

Anything that is contrary to the order of nature is bad. Now nature has associated pleasure with the functions necessary for the life of man, and this is why the order of nature

demands that we use pleasures of this kind just as much as is needful for the preservation of man, whether in the life of the individual or of the species. If anyone, therefore, should so far fly from pleasure that he would pass up things necessary for the conservation of nature, he would sin as flying in the face of the order of nature; and this would be an instance of the vice of insensibility. Still, we must note that sometimes it is worthy of praise and even needful, for the sake of some cause, to deny oneself the pleasures that go with actions of this kind. For instance, some people abstain from pleasures of food and drink, or of sex, for the good of their health. Others find it necessary to refrain from many dissipations in order to hold their jobs; penitents who want to build up strength of soul practise abstinence from pleasures as a kind of diet, and persons who aim at contemplation and try to be free for divine things should turn aside from the delights of the body. Nor do any of the aforesaid groups fall into the vice of insensibility, for they all act in a right and reasonable way (2–2, q.142, a.1).

The intemperate man sins by an excess that is the contrary of insensibility. He lets himself be carried away in the pursuit of pleasures that are tempting to the senses, especially by those that allure the sense of touch. Looked at from one point of view, the vice of intemperance would appear as worthy of some indulgence, for in the long run it is simply a criminal disorder of inclinations that in themselves are rightful and natural. But in reality it is a particularly low vice that merits censure through and through; in fact:

Condemnation seems to be the opposite of honor and glory. Honor should go to excellence, as glory to any striking worth. And if so, intemperance is blameworthy for two reasons. First, it is completely out of accord with human excellence, since it looks only to the delights that we have in common with the animals; and indeed it is said (Psalm 48): "Man when he was in honor did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." Second, intemperance is all out of step with man's nobility and beauty, because the delights after which the intemperate run are those in which the light of reason is little seen, and yet it is from this light that the whole grandeur and beauty of virtue arise. Such pleasures, then, are as slavish as any can be (2–2, q.142, a.4).

We see at once that the virtue of temperance takes in, as an integral part of itself, a virtue that is its invariable companion. This is modesty. Whoever loves the moderation that reason brings into our pleasures, detests at the same time the disorder that intemperance sets going, and it is this shame that we call modesty. In a like way temperance supposes and implies the virtue of honor. Though honor, taken in itself, has a much wider extension than has temperance in the strict sense, it is most closely related to the latter. For temperance has the work of bringing our lowest and most humiliating tendencies within the reign of reason, and this it could not begin to do without honor, which is the very taste for spiritual beauty brought into our lives by the rule of reason.

The specific applications of the virtue of temperance are many, because it has many pleasures to moderate and many ways of moderating them. Abstinence, for instance, or the mastery of self in the use of food so as to keep in line with the demands of reason. Fasting, which is a particular act for the exercise of the virtue of abstinence and which is therefore bound up with it. These restraints are excellent and effective ways of checking the opposed vice, known as gluttony, under whatever form it shows itself: fondness for rare and costly dishes, a studied way of preparing them, too large an amount of nourishing food, rapacity and speed in the gourmand's style of eating—how many wrong steps reason chides and the virtue of temperance sets itself to put right. And what is true of food, is just as true of drink. Sobriety has for its purview a measured use, and drunkenness is its direct opposite. Besides, this virtue and this vice are truly of a kind distinct from those that neighbor on them and are like them; the truth is that nothing is so directly and so out and out contrary to the practice of reason as excess in the use of intoxicating drink, so much so that we have here a special problem that menaces the reign of reason and a special remedy meant to take care of it. We may go even farther and note down the persons who are in a particular way obliged to sobriety.

Any virtue can be seen in either of two lights. First, there are vices which it debars and strong desires which it keeps

in leash. Then there is the purpose which it serves. So the need of a virtue is particularly felt by a person for either of two reasons. In the first place, he may be remarkably prone to the passion which this virtue muzzles, and to the vices which it destroys. Seen thus, sobriety is peculiarly required in youths and women; because youths are full of vigor and warmth and desire of pleasure, and women are not forceful enough in mind to resist pleasures, and that is why, according to Valerius Maximus (bk. 2, c.1), the Roman women in the olden days used not to drink wine. Another reason why sobriety is demanded more in some persons is that it is needed more for the work they have to do. Wine taken immoderately gets very much in the way of thought and judgment; and so sobriety is rigorously a duty for old men who to teach others need rational vitality, for bishops and all ministers of the Church, who ought to give their minds all the time and devotedly to spiritual concerns, and for rulers of whom wisdom is expected in the governance of the people (2–2, q.149, a.4).

The contrary of sobriety is drunkenness, the outward signs of which are easily known; the ethician looks at this vice from several distinct points of view.

Drunkenness is a fault that lies in the immoderate use and enjoyment of wine, and might occur in any of three ways. In the first instance, a man might not know that he was taking too much or that the stuff was intoxicating, and he might get drunk without sin. Second, a man might know that he was drinking heavily, but think that the liquor could not make a man drunk, and his drunkenness would not be grievously

sinful. Third, one might know that he was drinking too much and that the drink was strong, and yet be more willing to get drunk than to give up the cup. Such a person is a real drunkard, because acts are not classified as moral and immoral when the doer does not intend them, but only when he does definitely intend them. In such case intoxication is a grievous sin because the man, knowing what he is doing and willing to do it, cuts himself off from the use of reason, whereas it is only by the use of reason that we take any virtuous path and leave sin on the detour. He sins seriously by exposing himself to the danger (2–2, q.150, a.2).

By the same token we see how to solve the mooted problem of knowing whether intoxication is an excuse for the one who commits a crime while in that state. Plainly, since the drunken man has not the use of reason, he does not know what he does at the moment he does it, and so his drunkenness does help to excuse him. But it fully exonerates him only in the instance of that chance intoxication of which we first spoke and which in itself is not a fault. On the other hand, if a man gets drunk of his own accord and then commits a crime, he is responsible for putting himself in the way of committing it, though the fault itself is lessened because not directly chargeable to his will.

We may add that what abstinence and sobriety are to the use of food and drink, chastity is to sex pleasure, always with this difference, that an absolute abstention from the pleasures of the table is something that the needs of nature cannot stand,

whereas one can entirely refrain from this second kind of pleasure. Perfect virginity can be kept, and is so far from being unlawful that it is quite commendable, for the reason that it very well qualifies man for the highest form of life accessible to him.

What is vicious in man's acts is whatever rides full tilt against right reason. Now right reason is willing that a person use a means in the measure in which it serves its end. And as Aristotle says (*Ethics,* 1, c.8), values for man are of three kinds. The first are external, as, for instance, money; the second are for the welfare of the body; the third are spiritual values, among which those of a life of contemplation are higher than those of a life of action, as the Philosopher contends in the *Ethics* (10, c.7) and as Our Lord also says (St. Luke, c.10): "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of all these values, the external serve the bodily; the bodily are rated in view of the spiritual; and among spiritual values those of a life of action are subordinated to those of a life of contemplation. The work of right reason, then, is to use external good things so far as is expedient for the body, and to use the other values in their places. If, for the sake of bodily health or to seek truth, a man should let certain values pass which otherwise it were well to possess, he is not vicious, but a man of reason. And if anyone gives up bodily pleasures so as to be the freer for contemplating truth, his choice squares excellently with reason. This is what devoted virgins do; they abstain from sensual delectation to have more freedom for contemplating divine truth. So the Apostle says (I Cor., c.7): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things

of the world, that she may please her husband." Virginity therefore is not blameworthy, but quite praiseworthy (2–2, q.152, a.2).

Yet perhaps some people will protest that virginity is an open contradiction of the law of nature, which God sanctioned when, to make sure of the survival of the race, he gave the command to individuals: Increase and multiply and fill the earth (*cf. Genesis,* c.1). We grant that it is a fault against the law of nature if anyone brings his own individuality to nothing by wholly refusing food. Is not, then, the refusal to beget a like fault? Is it not to act contrary to the maintenance of the race?

The response to this is that every precept involves a duty, but that duties are of two kinds. There are duties to be fulfilled by this one person, and he cannot omit them without sin. But there are duties to be borne by a group, and no one of the group is held to carry out such duties: they are necessary indeed for the group, and no one is able to do them; yet they are completed, provided one person does this, another that. Now the command to eat, given man by the law of nature, must needs be carried out by each one, otherwise the individual could not survive. Yet the order to reproduce the species is given to the whole human race, which, of course, is duty-bound to physical reproduction, but also to spiritual progress. The needs of the human race are, therefore, sufficiently taken care of when some take up the work of carnal generation; others abstain from it and have leisure for contemplation of divine things in view of the welfare and adorn-

ment of the entire human family. The same principle holds in an army; some protect the supplies, some give signals, some go into battle, and in this way the total obligation is on the group and could not be borne by one (2–2, q.152, a.2, ad 1).

The vice that stands over against chastity is sensuality, which in its strict sense is defined as having chiefly to do with sex pleasures. This vice makes its appearance as soon as such pleasures are in any manner or degree turned aside from their purpose, which is the preservation of the race through generation. Few vices sound the tocsin among the powers of the soul for so far-reaching and thorough a disorder.

When the lower powers are strongly set on their objects, the result is that the higher faculties can no longer function, or do so only in a disordered way. Now, in the vice of sensuality the baser appetite, that is, lust, does strive most eagerly after its object of pleasure by a vehemence of passion and delectation. What comes of this is that sensuality runs a disorder through the nobler powers of reason and the will. But any action supposes four steps. The first is an act of simple understanding, which sees some goal as a good, but sensuality stays this act, as is said in the Book of Daniel (c.13): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart;" it fathers a mental blindness. The second stage is a mapping out of the road we must take to reach the end, and this act also is bothered by lust; whence the saying of Terence in *The Eunuch* (1, c.1) where he speaks of voluptuous love: "If an affair is beyond reason and measure, you cannot guide

it by any plan;" at this point lust begets hurry, which means the absence of aim, as was said earlier (see p. 239). The third turn is a judgment of what we must do, and this is likewise hindered by sensuality; as Daniel says of old voluptuaries (c.13): They have turned away their minds, that they might not remember just judgments; the result is a lack of thought. The fourth step is a reasoned command of what we are to do, and this is blocked by sensuality, which keeps men from doing what they know they ought to do; inconstancy is born now; so Terence wrote of a man who said he was going to give up a woman friend (*l.c.*), "One false little tear will put a stop to these words of his!"

So far as the will is concerned, two disordered acts result from lust. One is desire of the end, and here enters a love of self in the disordered pleasure that is wanted, and a hatred of God because He forbids the pleasure that is sought. The other is attachment to the means, so that one has an affection for life here and now and wants a sensuous enjoyment of it, and he loses hope of a future life, because when a person is too much given to carnal delights, he takes no care to attain spiritual ones, but has a distaste for them (2–2, q.153, a.5).

We just saw which virtues are implicit in temperance and the vices that make war on it. We must next study the virtues that, while not to be exactly called temperance, are within it almost as parts of it, are at any rate its neighbors and have something of its nature. There are three of these: continence, forbearance, and modesty.

If one were to take the term *continence* in an unrestricted sense, as some do, the virtue meant would

be the same as the virginity of which we have spoken. But to be exact, continence is something other, something less. It is a kind of quality, and not a virtue out and out. The really chaste man has the mastery over the movements of his physical self; one who is only continent has to labor more or less to control them and is not able to get a full captaincy over them. The effort is worthy of praise and credit; he is a good man in the sense that he struggles against evil; but his virtue is not perfect, because in a soul in which consummate virtue has its kingdom, no passion should ever rise up violently against the orders of reason. One sees how deserving continence is when it is lacking. The incontinent man is not rooted and fixed in evil as is the intemperate person who has a set disposition to do wrong and is satisfied to give himself up to passion, yet he lets himself be stirred by a strong passing movement toward evil, which though he at once repents, he had a duty to resist (*ibid.*, q.156, a.3). The main results of continence are in its opposing sense desire under two of its most basic and passionate forms: anger and lust; the leading effect of incontinence is to make us yield to them.

We may take *forbearance* as a second virtue in the field of temperance. We must show how this is like and how it is unlike meekness. The meek man is able to cool down within him the fiery anger that rouses him; the man of forbearance has power to cut down the penalties that an overcharged justice

might prompt him to inflict (*ibid.*, q.157, a.1). The two of them have this common mark of virtue, that they are ruled by reason, for it is not by any blind sentiment that the meek and the patient man rein in anger or lessen chastisement, but because of a sane judgment condemning this resentment and discipline as excessive (q.157, a.2, ad 1). These qualities are called virtues by a stretching of the sense of that word; their contraries are anger and cruelty. We inquire first what anger is, taken precisely as a vice.

As we remarked earlier (see p. 129), the word *anger* in its proper meaning refers to one of the emotions, and every emotion of sense desire is good so far as ruled by reason, but if it breaks with the rational order, it is bad. Now reason can rule anger in either of two ways. The goal sought is revenge, and when this is aimed at in a reasonable way, the desire which starts such anger is praiseworthy, and we speak of a righteous anger. But if this desire for revenge in any way breaks through the bidding of reason, the arousing of anger is vicious; for instance, when one desires to have a man punished who does not deserve it or does not deserve so much, or does not have him punished according to lawful order and for the right purpose, which is the upholding of justice and the correction of the fault; in such instance, anger is vicious. The second way of ruling anger has to do with its degree. It supposes that the movement of anger does not get too hot, either within or without; so that if the bounds of moderation are passed, the anger, though for a just revenge, will not be without sin (2–2, q.158, a.2).

The essential thing in cruelty is a kind of hardness and a rigorous feeling that shuts out every inclination to lighten the penalty inflicted on guilty persons. It is not at odds with that mastery of self which keeps reason from going beyond what is justly the limit in fixing a punishment to be imposed, but with that sweetness of spirit which we have named forbearance and which brings the judge to soften a little an austerity that is perhaps excessive (q.159, a.1, ad 1). We should not confuse cruelty with a relish for ferocity, a species of brutality that takes a bestial pleasure in making people suffer and gloats over the torture inflicted on a victim. The reasonable course is then twisted, because instead of punishing to straighten out a fault, it is done to see people suffer. So long as you are merely cruel you are guilty of a malice that is still human, but when you take pleasure in a thirst for blood, you lower yourself to the level of the brute.

The third of the virtues joined to temperance is *modesty* or moderation in the use of pleasures that are less than those of touch. It is not the least fruitful or happy in its effects on our moral life. We have noted that pleasures of touch are the bounded range for the virtue of temperance, and if there is needed a special virtue for the most intense physical delights, one is needed for the less intense. Modesty is just such a virtue, no matter under what form we may study it. For instance, it is undoubtedly true that we have an appetite for honors and for everything that

is great, so much so that we must have the virtue of magnanimity to maintain the desire in the face of the vice of despair. To keep that ambition from the contrary vice, which would hurry us, through lack of moderation, to ever more lofty aims, must we not have another virtue? This is the work of modesty: to give us balance at the correct point; and so it is called humility. Briefly, then, we may say that humility is the dress that modesty wears in order to manage our hopes (2–2, q.161, a.4) and that its contrary is pride, the first of all sins and the most serious kind of sin. As we already know, any sin has a formal and a material element. The material part is the movement by which man gives himself to some limited value, the formal is the movement by which man turns away from the unchanging value or God. Now humility in its perfect form means man's yielding to God, and pride is a refusal to submit to God and His law; so it is that pride is the first of the sins, because we may say it substantiates the definition of sin.

In any classification, that which is of itself comes first; and we have just seen that the act of turning away from God, or the formal principle of sin, belongs to pride *sui juris,* but to other sins only as a consequence. It follows that pride is by its nature the first of sins and for the same reason the font of all other sins (2–2, q.162, a.7).

This is wholly a natural doctrine, but it agrees with the thought of the Church, which regards orig-

inal sin as a sin of pride. The promise of the devil: "You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," begot in the mind of the first man a disordered desire to be like God, that is to say, to be able to make out by the force of his own nature what ought to be good or evil for him and by his purely natural resources to attain a position for doing this good or avoiding this evil (q.163, a.2). This was a sin of great gravity, nay, the gravest of all sins, if not in its matter, then at least in its effects and because of the state of perfection of those who committed it.

The study of original sin, which was a too-sufficient desire of a knowledge more than human, brings us by a natural path to a form of modesty that men of intellect run the greatest danger of forgetting: the virtue of limiting curiosity. It supposes a good understanding of nature; indeed:

> This virtue (*studiositas*) is concerned with the taste and desire for knowledge, and only in an indirect way with knowledge itself, for we must judge differently of the very knowledge of truth and a thirst or zeal to know truth. Knowledge of truth is generally a good thing, but it can in an accidental way and as a consequence be evil; for example, some get proud over knowledge of truth, as is said (1 *Cor.*, c.8): "Knowledge puffeth up;" and some men use knowledge of the truth to commit sin. Of course, the desire or ambition to know truth can be either right or wrong. It is wrong, for instance, every time that a man is desirous of a knowledge of the truth for the evil he can get out of it; such are those who drive themselves in the conquest of knowledge so that they

may plume themselves over it, persons described by St. Augustine (*De moribus Eccl.,* 21): "There are men who lay aside virtue and know not God or the majesty of that nature that remains ever the same, and who think they do something great if they inquire with the greatest curiosity into that universal magma that we call the world, but pride gets such a hold on them that they come to think they live in the heavens about which they argue." The zeal of those also who study only in order to sin is vicious; as Jeremias says (c.9): "They have taught their tongue to speak lies, and have labored to commit iniquity."

The desire to know the truth can be perverse in a second sense. The desire itself may be ungoverned, in any of four ways. It may be that a less useful study turns us into a detour from the main road that we should travel. Thus St. Jerome says (Letter 146, "On the Prodigal Son"): "We notice that priests close up the Gospels and the Prophets, and read comedies and sing the love songs of the Bucolics." Secondly, it may be that some try to learn from forbidden masters. This is evidently true of those who beseech the devils to show them the future; it is curiosity, but superstitious; whence St. Augustine says (*On the True Religion,* 4): "I do not know whether philosophers are not kept from the Faith by the vice of asking curious questions of the demons." Thirdly, sometimes a man wants to know the facts about creatures, but does not link this knowledge to its lawful goal, which is a knowledge of God; as Augustine remarks (*l.c.,* 29): "In the study of creatures an aimless and perishable curiosity is not to be employed, yet there must be a measure of inquiry in view of unchanging and imperishable things." Fourthly, a zeal to know is on the wrong scent when the truth in question is beyond the range of the human mind. As men we very

easily make mistakes. Hence the saying of Ecclesiasticus (c.3): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability, . . . and in many of God's works be not curious;" and, afterwards: conjecture on things above their understanding "hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity" (2–2, q.167, a.1).

This is the same as the last of the six points of advice given by St. Thomas to Brother John for earning the treasure of wisdom: "Seek not things that are above your head." That is, Do not try for what you cannot reach. For all the greater reason we should modestly check our curiosity in the world of purely sense knowledge, which, more than intellectual acquirement, should be kept as a servant to our final purpose.

There remain the expressions of modesty which are quite exterior and well known. They show themselves in one's carriage and dress. Undoubtedly, modesty in food and clothing is a virtue, for these matters depend on our will, and hence should be subject to the law of reason (q.168, a.1). And what reason chiefly asks is that everyone bear himself and attire himself as becomes his sex, person, and work. Let a woman take trouble to please her husband as she should, but go no farther. Let women who are unmarried and do not wish to marry or have not the chance, be not anxious to impress anyone. Let each person conduct himself as any sensible man would expect of him in the light of who he is and what his

position is; and let this rule stand for all occasions: whether one is busy, or at rest, or at play. For it is foolish and therefore bad to be unable or unwilling to divert oneself, and it is really a vice to be troublesome to oneself and to hinder others from playing if they have fun at a game. Yet be sure of it, to play too much would be worse than not to play enough, for amusement in life is like salt in cooking: a little is enough. Still, we must know how to take it.

To keep himself fit, a man needs to rest his body. He cannot work all the time, because he has just so much strength, and this is equal to just such and such tasks. It is the same with his soul, whose energy has its limits and is suited to definite labors. So when it spends itself on work beyond its capacity, it has to toil and gets tired; this is particularly true in spiritual labor that uses the body, as when the intellect works through the bodily organs. But sense goods are values connatural to man; and so when the soul rises above the sense world, and attends to the thought world, animal fatigue is born, whether he is engaged with work of the practical or the speculative reason. And that fatigue is greater if he aims at contemplation, for in this he is more detached from the sense order; though in some exterior undertakings of the practical reason the physical labor is greater, yet in either case the man who wears down himself more, is he who works more intensely with his mind.

Now as a fatigued body is rested through physical quiet, so a fatigued soul needs to be eased by mental quiet. As we said when we studied the emotions (see p. 118), pleasure is a rest for the soul. So the remedy for a tired-out soul is

first to break the strain that work of mind entails, and then to appeal to pleasant delight.

We read in the *Sermons of the Fathers* (c.24) that some people were horrified one day at finding St. John the Evangelist playing with his disciples. John asked one of them who had a bow to draw the arrow, and when he had done this several times, asked him whether he could keep it up. The man said that if he were to keep it up the bow would break. Then St. John replied that man's soul also would break down if it were kept under a constant strain. Here is the necessity of using once in a while those words and actions called games: they have no other aim than to please the soul, yet they serve as a kind of rest for it. And this is the teaching of Aristotle, who says (*Ethics,* 4, c.8) that to play is to rest.

It is quite needful, therefore, to have a spirit of play. But there seem to be three particular points to be avoided. The first and main one is that we are not to seek recreation in words and deeds that are dirty and mischievous; as Cicero said, there is a kind of joke that is low, wanton, shameless, and foul. The second matter is to take care that the poise of the soul is never wholly lost; in the words of St. Ambrose: "We must be careful that while we rest our minds we do not lose our balance, which is a kind of focal point for our good deeds;" and of Cicero: "As we give children not carte blanche but leave to play only decent games, so even in games the uprightness of our minds should be like a light." Our third care should be that sport, as all human actions, be in keeping with the persons and time and place and other circumstances; that is, that it be worthy, as Cicero remarks (*De Officiis,* 1) of the time and of the man.

Well, such questions are planned and guided by reason, and any habit that functions in a reasonable way is a moral

virtue. Play, then, can be a virtue. It is the virtue which Aristotle named the *spirit of play* (see p. 161). We call playful (εὐτράπελος: literally, versatile and ready) those persons who endeavor to give an amusing turn to what is said or done, and because this virtue checks a man and makes him moderate at games, it is listed under modesty (2–2, q.168, a.2).

With this we close the detailed study of the cardinal virtues. What we have still to do in order to round out applied ethics, is to define and grade the several ways of life in which men are expected to practise these many virtues.

Chapter XII

THE AIM OF GROUP-LIVING

In inquiring into the conditions for the growth of the moral life, we need to give attention first to man in society. We said earlier that man is a social animal and gave proof of this. Other animals have by nature everything they require to live alone: a coat of hair or feathers to cover them, teeth, horns, or claws for attacking, or at least speed to make their get-away and defend themselves. Man has not any of these, and if we suppose him living in isolation, he is unable to get himself the equivalent of them by his own power. So he must band with others, so that he may do something of their work, and they something of his. The necessity of association arises also from the need of acquiring knowledge. The beasts know by a kind of inborn instinct which of many things are good for them and which harmful, but man has to learn this discernment of objects and this science of their fitness by reasoning from principles. This science cannot be the work of one man, but requires a social organization. The practical question is, How can a society be organized, and, more than that, how should it be organized?

The possible forms of society are three: mon-

archy, aristocracy and democracy, and each of these stands over against a form which is the breakdown of itself: tyranny, oligarchy, and demagogy. Monarchy is the government of the people by one man, and its corrupt form (tyranny) is the oppression of all or some of the people by one man. Aristocracy is the ruling of the people by a small number of first-rate men, and the debased form of it (oligarchy) is the oppression of all or a part of the people by a few; it means rule by a tyrannous few. Democracy (*politia*) is the just control of the State by a large group, as by the military, for instance, and it miscarries into demagogy (*democratia*) or the oppression of one social class by another, as when the common people abuse their numerical power and oppress the monied caste; this amounts to tyranny by the crowd.

Of course, we have no mind to choose any of the tyrannous kinds, but it is in order to ask which of the three just forms of government is best.

An answer that will hold for every case cannot be given to this question. Rome is an instance of a nation that for a time had a monarchic government, but this degenerated into tyranny. We might expect the people to oust the tyrants and through very horror of such a régime set up an aristocratic reign of the consulary type. Or better, such a turnover might become the signal for an unbelievable renewing of vitality, and in fact we know from Sallust that this is what really took place.

It often happens that men who live under a king are sluggards about doing anything for the general good, for they know that such efforts bring them nothing, but serve him who holds the property of the community under his thumb. When, however, they see that public funds are not in the grip of one man, they care for them not as if they were another's, but each one looks after them as if they were his own. Experience shows that one city of this kind, ruled over year after year by a governor, sometimes gets more done than a king, who has three or four cities, and that light services asked by a king are done less willingly than the heavy burdens which the people themselves impose. This was the practice during the growth of the Roman republic. For the people bore military conscription, and when there was not enough money to pay the army, they put their private fortunes at the disposition of the public, and even the Senate itself kept back nothing except the gold ring and stud which each one wore as insignia of his office. But the people were worn out with incessant quarrels that turned into civil wars, and in the course of these the liberty for which the people had so greatly struggled, slipped out of their hands and fell into the clutches of the emperors. In the beginning these rulers did not want to take the name of kings because the Romans hated it. Some of the emperors were of royal bearing and were devoted, and they looked out for the common welfare; due to this fact the Roman State held together and spread out. Yet many of them who were tyrannous toward the people, and weak and cowardly toward the enemy, brought Rome down to nothing.

The Hebrew people took a like course. At first they were governed by the Jews and were snatched at by the enemy from every side, for each one did only what looked good to his private self. At the prayer of the people, God gave them

kings, but these were wicked men, who turned the people away from the worship of the one God and brought them down at last into slavery.

Thus we are always between Scylla and Charybdis. Either we fear the tyrant and in doing so forego the very excellent form of government which is the monarchic, or we have a great care for this kind of government and run the risk of its lapsing into tyranny (*De Regimine Principum,* i, 4).

The trouble we have of making a choice becomes all the more real when the seriousness of the chance taken grows, and this occurs *pari passu* with the superiority of the régime for which we are inclined to cast our vote. The corruption of the best ever gives us the worst. So, which is the wiser course: to rest content with not being very good for fear of becoming very bad, or, in spite of everything, to aim at the better and to let the less good take care of itself? The alternative is not so absolute as it looks at first blush, and we can get a good grasp of the matter by outlining the reasons which make monarchy the best type of government.

A king is a man who governs a city or a province in view of the general welfare of its people. Even so, we may ask, which is more for the good of that town or district, to be ruled by one man or by several? For an answer we have to inquire into the aim of the ruler to work for the good of the ruled. He is like the captain of a ship whose undertaking is to keep his charge safe through storms at sea and bring her into port in good shape. Now the good or welfare of an as-

sociation or group lies in its being one and at peace, for if it has not peace, the purpose of its social life is missed, and the people, divided within itself, becomes burdensome to itself. The ruler of a people should look, therefore, to making sure of harmony and peace. And he has no more right to think twice whether the people subject to him are to have peace than the physician has to decide whether he shall cure his patient. For no one should debate about the end which it is his business to serve, but only about the best means to reach it. The Apostle Paul, when he had commended the oneness of the believing people, said (*Ephes.,* c.4): "Be careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." A régime will be the more useful, the more certainly it makes for unity and peace, since we say that a thing is more useful when it more certainly leads to its end. And as the great source of heat is a body that of itself is warm, so it is evident that what is one in itself, can better effect unity than what is manifold. The rule of one, then, is more useful to the people than the rule of many.

. . . Besides, the way things are in nature is best, for nature takes the best road at every turn, and in nature the general form of government is unitary. One member, namely the heart, moves the other members of the body, and one power of the soul, that is, reason, is chief and chairman. The bees have only one queen, and in the whole universe there is just one God as maker and ruler of all. This is a reasonable arrangement. For the many derive from one. And if things of art imitate those of nature, and if the better a work of art is, the more it is like nature, it must be best that the human many be governed by one.

Experience gives the same verdict. Towns and countries not ruled by one man have quarrels and agitation and little

peace, so that the complaint that the Lord made through Jeremias seems true of them (c.12): "Many pastors have destroyed my vineyard." Whereas places and cities ruled by one king enjoy peace, justice is at home among them and they have plenty of everything. That is why the Lord promised as a gift that His people should have one head and that there should be only one prince among them (*De Reg. Princ.*, i, 2).

Certainly the hazard remains of falling into tyranny which, as the contrary of the best, must be the worst (*ibid.*, i, 3). Still, we are to keep in mind that tyranny is not a danger peculiar to monarchy. Oligarchy and demagogy are also tyrannies and, though a coterie or a crowd is in the saddle, are not always a less load to bear. When we say that the tyranny of one man is the worst type, we are thinking of unmitigated tyranny, for as just one man employed in the rôle of king to further the public interest is the surest warrant of civic happiness, so one man engaged as a tyrant in exploiting the people for his own profit is the source of the most frightful political evils. But really it is not often that we have such a tyranny. Most frequently it is limited to the fleecing of a few families or a large or small group of citizens; the welfare of only a section of the people or town is implicated, and the others are left in peace. However, when government is in the control of a few corrupt and tyrannous men, the trouble is with the government itself, and it quite upsets the equilibrium of the whole city or nation. On top of this, govern-

ment by a few more often begets tyranny than government by one man, because of the jealousies that arise among them and rouse one to put the others out of the way. We conclude, then, that in ordinary instances monarchy is beset with fewer dangers.

When we face two evils we should choose the less. Now, on the one hand, we have the better type of government with a slight risk of its becoming the worst and most complete kind of tyranny. On the other, we have governments that are not so good to begin with and that run the risk of becoming tyrannies, the least of which would disturb the good order of the entire State. If, then, the only reason for not choosing the better régime is fear of tyranny, and if tyranny is even more to be feared in the less good régimes than in the better, there is no reason for not choosing the better. We consequently make our choice of government by one man (*ibid.*, i, 5).

If royalty is selected, a king has to be chosen and instructed in his duties. Though it is the intention of the people to intrust its guidance to one man, it does not at all follow that the people should commit itself into the hands of the first comer. On the contrary, the preference ought to be given to a man whose disposition warrants the hope that he will never turn into a tyrant. And if, in spite of their precaution, he becomes one, they will do well to bear with him while he is bearable, for we often exchange a bad tyrant for a worse. Then, if at last they are brought to the extremity of getting rid of him, they

should be careful not to resort to violence and assassination, but rather imitate the patience of the early Christians toward their persecutors, the Roman emperors, and try to proceed in a legal way to get the tyrant to resign, for the people who choose kings always have the authority to deprive unworthy and tyrannous ones of their office (*ibid.*, i, 6).

What, as a matter of fact, is the surest guarantee that people can have against a tyrant? That the heavy burden of royalty have as companion the hope that it will be fitly repaid if it is well borne. Kings are men, and if they know that a just monarch is rewarded and the injustice of a tyrant is always punished, we may hope that they will not let themselves become vicious. And what will this reward be?

Some, notable among them Cicero, have urged that princes be nourished on gold and glory. Now, there is no doubt that glory is a reward becoming a prince, and even necessary for him, and that he has need of money to meet the many expenses which his office throws upon him; a prince without honor and without resources is not a prince. Yet we see that even in these quite external matters a good king is better provided for than a tyrant, for tyranny never lasts long, it costs dearly in armies and police, and it leaves after it, instead of honor, the memory of an accursed name (*ibid.*, i, 10).

Rewards of this kind, however, are not fit to give princes courage and steadfastness to conduct themselves as good kings, and there would be some im-

propriety in the people to expect kings to live by these things. The fact is, a king who wants to win a name and to grow rich will more often succeed by depending on his subjects, raising armies, and carrying on wars in which his people sometimes lose everything except liberty. And we have shown above (p. 36) that no reward on earth is enough to fulfil the lawful desires of any man. How, then, could honors and riches satisfy the desires of a king, at least when we leave out of the picture the heavenly honors reserved by God for his elect?

It is in this last sense that it is correct to say that honor and glory are a king's recompense. For what earthly and passing honor could be like this honor, that man should dwell with God and be His associate, that he should be ranked as a son of God and have inheritance with Christ in the kingdom of God? With admiration and desire of this honor King David said (Ps. 138): "Thy friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable." And what human glory or praise is comparable to this, which falls not from the tongue of a flatterer or deceiver nor is dependent on a mistaken notion of man, but comes from the inner witness of conscience and is confirmed by the witness of God and His promise to recognize in the sight of the angels and the glory of the Father those confessing him? They who seek this glory find it and receive a human glory that they do not seek; take, for instance, Solomon, who not only received from God the wisdom that he asked for, but was given glory above other kings.

We may add that he who does his royal duty in a worthy way will win a particularly high place in the celestial king-

dom. If bliss is the reward of virtue, great bliss should normally be the reward of great virtue. Now the consummate virtue is that which makes a man capable not only of directing himself, but also of guiding others, and the more men he can put and keep on the right course, the more his virtue, as a man is admitted to have a body of more power if he can down more adversaries and lift heavier weights. It takes an added virtue to govern a family as well as oneself; how much more, then, to rule a town or a kingdom? To administer the kingly office well is thus the sign of a superior goodness, and it should have an outstanding reward (*De Reg. Princ.,* i, 8 and 9).

We now suppose a prince of note, deeply conscious of the duties of his trust, keen and desirous of bearing himself well and worthy of such a recompense. In what light will he see his duties as sovereign? We have said before that the ideal work of art is like nature. Royal government is but one instance of government, and has models to follow in nature. Let a king inquire, then, how soul governs body, how reason rules the soul or, better, how God directs the world, and he will know how to go about his work. If he takes God's providence as pattern, he will find a twofold task: to found kingdoms, cities or institutions as God creates, and to look after his people and guide them to their end, as God rules the world and directs it to its end. In the matter of building he will imitate the remarkable work by which God separated the elements, made each thing distinct, and gave it its proper place. We shall, there-

fore, see the king choose a place that is healthful and flowing with natural resources, pleasant to live in, safe from enemies, if it is a town; and if it is a kingdom, he will also have to choose the sites for towns, camps, schools, areas for the soldiers to drill in, roads for commerce, and so on. He will have to see that everyone is settled according to his status and that each serves according to his ability; that, once the location of the court is fixed, he who is judge is most just, and once the church is built, men who are really worthy are the priests. And in the matter of government he will notice that God guides the world by directing all beings to their ends, and he will try above all to conduct his subjects to theirs. What is this end, and can only he reach it?

A person ought to pass the same judgment on the end of a whole group as on the end of each one in it. If, then, the end of a man is a good within himself, the ultimate end of the governance of a people is to get and make permanent within itself such a good. On the supposition that this ultimate end of man, individual or social, were physical life and health, the king ought to be a physician; if it were money, a financier should be chosen king; if the chief value that the people could attain were science and truth, the king should be a professor. But it appears that the aim of a social group is to live good lives, since men form groups in order to live well, something that a man living alone could not do. Excellent living, then, is the goal of human association.

The evidence of this is that only they who have the common job of living well are parties to a social unit. In-

deed, if the sole objective of society were to subsist, then animals and slaves would be citizens of the State; if it were to pile up shekels, all those who do business together would belong to the same commonwealth. Since, however, a man of virtuous life is meant for that higher end which lies in fruition with God, the end of the social group must be the same. We would say, therefore, that the ultimate aim of society is not merely that men should live together in virtue, but that this good life should be the path they take to arrive at the enjoyment of God.

If such an end can be reached by a purely human virtue, the business of the king is to direct men to that end. The truth is, we give the name *king* to the man who stands at the very tiptop of human government. And a régime is more excellent when its aim is higher. For a man who has the final objective as his goal always has command over the men who handle the tools helpful toward that end, as the sea captain who is getting ready for a trip outlines for the builder what kind of ship he will have fitted out for the undertaking, or as the townsman who needs a weapon tells the gunsmith what kind of a weapon to make for him. However, to rejoice in the sight of God is not an end attained purely by human virtue, but by divine favor, as the Apostle says to the Romans (c.6): "The grace of God, life everlasting." So it is by divine rather than human guidance that we make our way to that goal.

The king of such a realm, therefore, is more than man, he is God, Our Lord Jesus Christ, who by way of introduction to heavenly glory makes men the sons of God. The government that has been given to Him will not fail. Indeed, Holy Scripture calls Him priest but also king, in the words of Jeremias (c.23): "A king shall reign, and shall be wise." It is from Him that the royal priesthood derives. And what is

more, all believers in Christ, as they are His members, bear the name of kings and priests. But the spiritual realm must be distinct from the earthly, and the management of this kingdom is given not to the kings of the earth, but to priests, and mostly to a supreme priest, the successor of St. Peter and vicar of Christ, the Pope of Rome, to whom all kings of the Christian people should be subject, as to Christ himself. We know that anyone who has charge of a work has a right that those helping to realize it be at his command and under his orders. The way with pagans was that both priest and the whole divine cult served for the conquest of temporal values, which made for the general welfare of the people, and as the king had to take care of the people, it was natural that priests were subject to the kings. And in the Old Law earthly goods were promised to a faithful people not by the devils, but by the true God, and thus priests were subject to kings. In the New Law, however, the priest is higher, because the values towards which he directs men are spiritual, and for this reason kings ought to be submissive to priests in the kingdom of Christ.

At the same time we see how admirable are the paths trod by Providence when in the city of Rome, which God foresaw as the future central home of the Christian peoples, the custom grew little by little of having the civil rulers obedient to the priests. So Valerius Maximus reports: "Our City thinks that all other things ought always to be put second to religion, even those things by which she wishes to show honor to the supreme civil power. Emperors do not hold back from a share in the service of the altar, convinced that they will have a mastery of human affairs if they are good and faithful servants of the divine power." And because the religion of the Christian priesthood was slow to bloom in France, God let the pagan priests of Gaul or Druids give laws for all

Gaul: you may read of it in a book that Julius Cæsar wrote, *De Bello Gallico* (*De Reg. Princ.,* i, 14).

Such seems to us the ideal structure of a humanity wholly formed after the requirements of Christian ethics: at the top of the pyramid is the Pope, the vicar of Christ, who directs all the people to the final and supernatural goal of mankind, that is, to God. Beneath the Pope a group of monarchies, whose kings are ranked next to him and at the same time each of them rules his own people. King should be subject to Pope, because he controls his kingdom only in the interests of the common good of his subjects, and this good lies finally in a spiritual realm that is the Pope's. A king ought to recognize the limits of his jurisdiction: his government helps to prepare men for an end which it is not sufficient to secure for them. In a word, this preparatory work is his proper work, and is the basis of the rightful power that a king has over his people. With a respect for the law which God has given and the Church teaches, the king shapes the present life of the people in view of a future blessedness, making sure by law of a regard for virtue and affording a chance to practice it by the maintenance of peace, whence flow order and prosperity (*ibid.,* i, 15).

Thus, subject in a humble way to minor officials, then to greater ones, then to kings, and at last to the Supreme Pontiff, who is at once head of the Church and of humanity, individuals, groups, and

States are ranked in hierarchical order under the master objective of all social living, which is the same as the goal of all moral life, of the whole life of reason, the whole order of nature, and which we call God.

We may now take some one individual, at any place on this pyramid, and inquire how he ought to live. Two kinds of life, neatly distinct, offer him a choice: a life of contemplation or a life of action. Man is said to be a rational animal, and reason can have either of two aims. Either it is free for contemplation of truth, without other end than this contemplation, and then a man leads the contemplative life; or reason seeks the truth, so that man may know what he ought to do, and this is the active life. Briefly, to keep separate the two functions of reason, namely, theory and practice, is to define at once the only two sorts of life that a reasonable creature may lead (*Sum. Th.,* 2–2, q.179, 1 and 2). Is it necessary to choose, and if so, how is one to choose?

Certainly, if we suppose a wise man who has already chosen the better part and uses the lesser good for the sake of the better, no incompatibility exists between the active and the contemplative life. Quite the contrary. The active life can be and ought to be a powerful help to the contemplative when it takes the soul's passions in hand, puts them in order, tranquillizes them, and leaves the field free for contemplation (*Sum. Th.,* 2–2, q.182, a.3). It is nevertheless clear that, from an absolute point of view,

the two kinds of life are essentially incompatible: a person cannot think for the sake of thought, and at the same time think for the sake of action, and it would be yet more impossible to have leisure for contemplation while one goes into action. Therefore, a man must choose and cast his vote for the better life. Doubtless, that is the contemplative life, and as proof it is enough to define this life.

We are speaking now of that form of the contemplative life which man can attain. The difference between an angel and a man is this (see Dionysius, *On the Divine Names,* 7, c.2) that an angel grasps the truth by a simple intuition, man by beginning with many data, comes to understand a truth. So the contemplative life (of man) has one act in which he finally is perfected, that is, the contemplation of truth, and in this it has unity; but it has many acts by which it comes to that final act. Some of these have to do with the learning of principles with the aid of which a man proceeds to the contemplation of truth, while others have the business of deducing from these principles the truth that he seeks to know. But the full and rounded act is the contemplation itself of the truth (2–2, q.180, a.3).

It is not difficult to specify the farthest goal of the contemplative life and to show its greater excellence by the way the active life is subordinate to it.

A thing is relative to the contemplative life in one of two ways: by a primary or a secondary claim, *i. e.,* a preparatory one. The thing that primarily belongs to the contemplative life is contemplation of divine truth, for this is the goal of all

human life. That is why Augustine says (*On the Trinity,* 1, c.8) that "contemplation of God is promised us as the end of all our acts and the everlasting perfection of our joys." It will be perfect in the future life, when we see God face to face, and it will make us altogether happy. At present we practise contemplation of divine truth in an imperfect way, we look as through a glass and in a dark manner; yet this is some kind of beginning of happiness: it begins now and will continue in the future. And does not the Philosopher say (*Ethics,* 10, c.7 and 8) that our ultimate felicity is in contemplation of the greatest knowable object? The works of God lead us, as by the hand, to an understanding of God, as it is written (*Rom.* i, 20): "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

So a study of God's works belongs in an indirect way to the contemplative life: it guides man to a knowledge of God. Augustine says (*On the True Religion,* ch.29): "An inquiry about creatures should not be idle and passing curiosity, but a step toward lasting and eternal things."

It follows that we may classify the four stages of the contemplative life in the following way. First, the moral virtues. Second, intellectual acts that are not contemplative. Third, contemplation of the works of God. Fourth, which rounds out all the others, the contemplation of divine truth (2–2, q.180, a.4).

Take the case of a man who is earnest about moral perfection and has chosen the better of the two kinds of life that are open to us. He has got to choose a life-state in which to work out that better way. Plainly, men are in conditions that are socially unlike. And we do not wish to say merely that some

are rich and some poor, some famed and others unknown, for these are variable individual differences that are subject to frequent upsets. A "state" (*status*) is a settled mode of living, quite or nearly inseparable from the person. It is first of all the free or the servile status of the individual. Basically, there are just two states of life, whether civil or spiritual, namely, slavery and freedom (2–2, q.183, a.1). Since our quest is the perfect moral life, we need not be preoccupied with a choice between civic slavery and civic liberty; these are matters that bear on the life of action, and we have cast our vote for the spiritual life of contemplation. We, therefore, turn to the higher order and make this distinction within it.

We have remarked that any state is either servile or free. And in spiritual matters there are just two kinds of servitude and two of freedom. One is a slavery of sin, the other a slavery of justice; and one is a freedom from sin, the other from justice. This is plain, in the Apostle's words (*Rom.* c.6): "When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice. . . . But now being made free from sin, you have become the servants of God." To live in bondage to sin or to justice is to have an habitual leaning either to evil by vice and sin, or to good by the virtue of justice. Likewise, to be free from sin is to stand unconquered by the tendency to sin, and to be free from justice is not to be faced away from evil by a love of justice. And because man's reason by its nature inclines toward justice, and sin is contrary to nature and reason, the freedom from sin, and the associated bondage to

justice, is a veritable liberty. Indeed, through both of them man tends to the good proper to him. A bondage to sin on the other hand, and the accompanying freedom from justice, is out and out slavery; either one of these keeps man from what is his good.

It is a man's own doing that he is made the servant either of justice or of sin. The Apostle's words on the point are (*Rom.* c.6): "Whom you yield yourselves to obey, his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justice." And as every human enterprise has a beginning, a middle, and an end, so the state of spiritual slavery or of freedom has three distinct periods. First, the condition of the beginners. Second, that of the proficients. Third, that of the perfect (2–2, q.183, a.4).

And so the end of moral endeavor, if looked at from the states of life, lies in the perfection of the contemplative state, and we return by this route to what the definition of the Value of values early taught us. The beginner lives the highest of the virtues, which is the theological virtue of charity (see p. 216). The perfect man, though he does not tend toward God with all his power, for our power for love is not wholly realized in this life, has at least a love that debars all serious sin or anything that might ruin the virtue of charity within him (*ibid.*, q.184, a.2).

We can readily see that the rounded whole of perfection amounts to keeping the two great commandments of Scripture: to love God with all our heart and our neighbor for the love of God. In these, as

we read in St. Matthew, are the Law and the Prophets. All else is inescapably included. Fasting, vigils, prayer, chastisement of the body, the giving up of wealth, none of these is perfection, but all are instruments or means to perfection (q.184, a.3). What, then, is to be done that this inner moral perfection may become truly a state? Let it be fixed and made lasting by freely entwining itself with vows and promises to a rule of life. A man can be perfect though he does not bind his life to the state of perfection, but, alas! what a bother is the state of perfection to a man who is not perfect (q.184, a.4)! The moral life in its complete form requires both the man and the status, and this is the life of the religious contemplative. He is joined by a solemn vow to the most perfect kind of life, is faithful to it, and the settledness of his bounden state is like the unbrokenness of the beatific vision which is to be.

The conclusion does not take us by surprise. Once more, a last time, the problem of man's conduct, set by moral experience, has a full solution only in the realm of religion.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

A. The chief texts of Saint Thomas Aquinas dealing with ethics are these:

1. His studies on the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard (1254–1256).

2. The *Summa Contra Gentes* (1258–1260), especially the Third Book.

3. The *Summa Theologica,* especially 1–2 (1269–1270) and 2–2 (1271–1272).

4. His studies of Aristotle's *Ethics* (about 1266).

5. His studies of Aristotle's *Politics* (about 1268), as far as bk. 4, lect. 6.

6. *De Regimine Principum* (1265–1266); incomplete.

7. *Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus* (1270–1272).

We cannot be too urgent in recommending that the study of the *Summa Theologica* be given first place.

B. For material on the dates of the works of Saint Thomas, see P. Mandonnet, O.P. and J. Destrez, O.P., *Bibliographie Thomiste,* Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1921; the conclusions of the studies of P. Mandonnet are conveniently summarized in *Vie de Saint Thomas et ses Ecrits Authentiques,* pp. ix–xxi. To complete this collection we mention the excellent *Bulletin Thomiste,* mouthpiece of the Thomistic Society, published since 1924, and *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* (Paris, Gabalda) which carries bibliographies and yearly indexes that are quite complete and serviceable.

C. For general introductions to the philosophy of Saint Thomas, the reader may consult:

1. A. FOREST, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Collection: *Les Philosophes*) Paris, J. Vrin, 1923.

2. E. GILSON, *Le Thomisme* (mentioned above, p. 11).

3. Readers familiar with the thought of Saint Thomas at first hand will find a fruitful study in A. D. SERTILLANGES, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin,* 2 vols., Paris, Alcan, 1910.

(The English reader might also consult: D'ARCY, *Thomas Aquinas,* London, E. Benn, and Boston, Little, Brown, 1930; and GRABMANN, *Thomas Aquinas: His Personality and Thought* (tr. by V. Michel), London and New York, Longmans, 1928.—Tr.).

4. For Thomistic ethics the best single study is A. D. SERTILLANGES, *La Philosophie Morale de Saint Thomas d'Aquin,* Paris, Alcan, 1916; but we also highly recommend, as an introduction, the works of P. NOBLE, O.P., *La Vie Morale d'après Saint Thomas,* Paris, Lethielleux.

5. For Thomistic views on government, consult JACQUES ZEILLER, *L'Idée de l'État dans Saint Thomas d'Aquin,* Paris, Alcan, 1910.

D. As for the use of the present volume, we advise beginners to limit themselves to chapters i, ii, and vi, then to turn to the Second Part. Afterward they can return to the other chapters, which contain the philosophical basis for the system and might be too difficult at the outset. To dissipate fears, we note the following points:

1. Some books are clear at a first reading, but become less clear the more you think about them. Others are obscure at first, but become clear and ever clearer as you give more reflection to them. The great philosophers, and Saint Thomas is far from an exception, write this latter kind of book.

2. To see an author clearly, we must *explain texts,* that is: (*a*) learn his language, so as to use terms in the sense in which he uses them, and (*b*) initiate ourselves into the particular order in which he conceives and states his thoughts.

3. This order for Aquinas is analytic, in almost any instance which the reader finds difficult; that is to say, he states his thesis as if it were proved, and shows, often in the same phrase, the principle that does prove it. He goes so far as to let one phrase contain the thesis, the analytic proof, an illustrative example, and a confirmation of the thesis by reference to the part it plays in some other proof.

4. The reader will therefore have grasped and explained a passage, when he has (*a*) established the meaning of the technical terms to which the reasoning appeals, (*b*) reëstablished this reasoning in the synthetic order (from principles to consequents), and (*c*) separated from the reasoning the example that is there only to illustrate it.

5. Nothing is authentic on the thought of a philosopher—not the historian's study, nor the most painstaking translation—nothing, except the text of that philosopher, read in the language in which he wrote.

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